The politics of social research

THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

We have discussed above the manner in which the researcher’s approach to knowl- edge is shaped by their assumptions about social reality. Such ontological assumptions and epistemological priorities are inevitably tied to the political context of the research itself. We shall explore the politics of criminological research in four differ- ent sections:

· the search for truth

· scientific relevancy

· the policing of researchers

· funding fit.

The search for truth

There are contrasting views regarding the politics of criminological research. For some social scientists, like Hammersley (1995, 2015), it is possible to focus on an exclusive pursuit of the truth. For Hammersley (1995: 40), the meaning of ‘value neutrality’ is the commitment to uncovering things as they actually are and the gen- eration of knowledge that is ‘of value in itself and/or has desirable consequences in the world’. From this perspective, a scientifically pure form of research is thought to be achievable and, in this view, research can transcend social circumstances and be an objective study of the lived realities of participants. The ontological and

epistemological assumptions are that the social world can be objectively analysed and that an untarnished and ‘apolitical knowledge’ can be produced so long as the researcher is focused on the search for truth. Knowledge production, however, is closely associated with power relations and the proposition that there can be ‘value- free’ knowledge has been strongly contested (Behr et al., 2013; Schumann, 2013). Specifically, critical thinkers like Walters (2003) have argued that social research is often used to reinforce existing power relations and social divisions and thus acts in the interests of the current social order rather than provide an objective analysis. In our time of ‘market-led’ (Walters, 2003) criminological research, the designs and methodologies of criminological studies often reflect the ontological assumptions of the State. The State is a configuration of alliances in a given historical moment which mediates power relations and intervenes in social life. It is a collection of different institutions, actors and partnerships working in alliance together. As a state is always in flux, with new and different partners potentially joining forces to exercise power, it can be a site for class struggle and resistance, meaning that engagement with the State can lead to progressive and emancipatory change, but such outcomes are by no means certain. Indeed, the research independence for those who closely align with State institutions can be fatally undermined by either the external constraints of government authorities or research funders. Whatever the aspirations of the researcher, considerable constraints can undoubtedly be placed on any apparently neutral search for truth.

Scientific relevancy

Schumann (2013) notes that the State has historically drawn a distinction between ‘proper’ criminologists – who advocate a ‘pseudo-science’ of criminology; and ‘devi- ant’ criminologists – who examine law, conflict and harm in their social contexts. He suggests that the former category play a central role in legitimizing the repressive practices of penal institutions such as the prison. Legitimacy refers to the correct, justified and valid way of doing something. As there are a number of different approaches regarding the ‘right way’ of doing research, the validity of certain research findings has been contested. Schumann dismisses claims to scientific objec- tivity prevalent within the positivist orientations of mainstream criminology as the work of ‘charlatan scientists’. Positivist criminology is underscored by the belief that the methods and methodologies of the natural sciences can be applied to the study of human life. Schumann, however, identifies various ‘deceptive practices’ adopted by positivistic criminologists in order to demonstrate legitimation. First, there is a claim that criminology is a unique and coherent subject which is able to explain ‘crime’. Noting that the only consistent feature of all ‘crimes’ is that they are labelled as such by actors within the criminal process, Schumann (2013) dismisses these claims as an ‘illusion’ designed to obscure the partial application of criminal law against the poor, marginalized and excluded. Second, there is the claim that

‘legitimate’ criminological research adopts the highest standards in research method- ology. What is considered as legitimate research is often shackled to restrictive methodological practices. Schumann suggests that this attachment to scientific research standards (positivism) is problematic as it can lead to the rejection of critical research which falls foul of the scientific model.

This discussion is particularly important at a time when criminological knowledge has become commodified, transferred out of the public sphere and into the realm of the private sector, as researchers find themselves under increasing pressure to sell their services to the highest bidder (Walters, 2003). A culture of managerialism means that research which is not easily quantifiable, producing ‘scientific’ results that are immediately clear and implementable, is simply not considered ‘relevant’. Whilst those who legitimate State agendas make a great deal of ‘noise’, those who propose alternative narratives are ‘silenced, inaudible above the consensus of the technicians and the suffocating policy demands of the State’ (Hillyard et al., 2004: 372). Here, the definition of ‘relevant research’ is research that serves the interests of the State by legitimating existing policy initiatives, especially those that encour- age privatization and the growth of the penal apparatus (p. 374). It is important then that such understandings of ‘relevancy’ are contested and alternative formula- tions – grounded in what is relevant for ordinary people and the harms, problems and difficulties they encounter on a day-to-day basis – are at the forefront of crimi- nological research. Accepting State definitions of a given set of social circumstances inevitably rules in and rules out certain realities (ontology), thus shaping legitimate knowledge (epistemology).