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2. Guerrilla war—war in the shadows 3 страница
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There are several characteristics to any guerrilla war, and the Irish War of Independence illustrated them.
• The guerrilla cannot have a fixed base: T. E. Lawrence wrote that ‘bases are targets’.
• The Irish used attack and retreat—hit and run—to preserve their
fighting ability.
• The function of the individual Volunteer, and even their military leaders, was not to defeat the British militarily. Collins and the Irish wanted to wear out and drain the British army, and render the British government ineffective.
• The principal task of the Irish was to distract the British government from their ability to govern. That permitted the emergence of the Sinn Fé in political government in contrast to the British government.
• In general, the Irish objective was to inflict as much loss and damage upon the British as possible while avoiding a fight to a finish.
The regular commander seeks decisive methods but a guerrilla leader will avoid direct confrontation. It is important to remember that the IRA had distinct goals in mind that justified their strategy and tactics. The function of the Irish guerrilla war was to use attrition in exactly the same way as in the guerrilla wars that followed worldwide. The Irish intent was
not to destroy the enemy, for that is utopian, but it is indeed to force him, through a prolonged war of psychological and physical attrition, to abandon our territory due to exhaustion and isolation’. 94
All guerrilla wars are wars amongst the people—in the Irish war and the guerrilla wars of today. Such warfare is largely one of evasion, and the Irish war was characterised by a ceaseless and relentless offensive against the weak points of the British in Dublin and Cork, and in the countryside, and then a withdrawal to attack somewhere else. As Lawrence defined them, ‘Most wars are wars of contact, ours [a guerrilla war] is one of detachment’. Collins and the Irish were fighting a war of erosion of the British military: their long-term goal was to wear down the British in the field, but more importantly to break the British will to continue the military fight in the knowledge that the Irish would never quit.
The columns tied down and embarrassed the British, especially in international opinion. The very existence of armed men in an area, even if they never attacked, was a continuous challenge to the British and forced them to maintain large garrisons to meet the threat and for the security of
civil administration. What the British most wanted was for the Irish to have another Rising like that in 1916, which they could quickly put down and destroy. Instead, they got a guerrilla war. As Henry Kissinger wrote so cogently fifty years later about the US role in Vietnam (and which could be adapted to any guerrilla war),
We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process, we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla warfare: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. 95
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In Cork Tom Barry followed classic guerrilla tactics: fighting only when the odds looked particularly good, and focusing his efforts on keeping the column away from the enemy. His men travelled light and chose difficult terrain and weather, exhausting and wearing down the British. The British tried to fight a military war; the Irish fought a political one. To continue to exist meant the IRA were ‘succeeding’—not winning, but succeeding. They were a threat to the British. Barry wrote:
It was accepted in West Cork that the paramount objective of the Flying Columns, in the circumstances then prevailing, should not be to fight, but to continue to exist. The very existence of such a column of armed men, even if it never struck a blow, was a continuous challenge to the enemy and forced him to maintain large garrisons to meet the threatened onslaught on his military forces and for the security of his civil administration. Such a column moving around must seriously affect the morale of garrisons, for one day it would surely strike. 96
In the final analysis, the Irish strategy and tactics did not beat the British militarily nor win the war, but they did prevent defeat. That, in itself, was a triumph. 97
As the war began, many units outside Dublin wanted to begin operations on a much larger scale than was envisioned by GHQ. The Volunteers from Munster, in particular, were dangerously enthusiastic. They
were spoiling to get into the fight and were apt to be reckless. For example, Cork Brigade Commandant Tomá s MacCurtá in proposed a plan to Collins, who refused to sanction the project and referred him up the chain of command. Vice-Brigadier Terence MacSwiney met with Mulcahy early in November seeking approval to attack ten different constabulary barracks in one night. Michael Leahy, commander of the brigade’s Fourth Battalion, later wrote that, owing to casual security measures in the rural outposts, the capture of most of the RIC barracks in the brigade area would involve little more than walking in and capturing all arms, supplies and records. 98 MacSwiney proposed the barrack assaults as a prelude to a general uprising of Volunteers in Cork City. Mulcahy later quoted him as saying that ‘they could hope to last about a fortnight anyway before they would be wiped out, but the flag would have been raised and in six months time the same could be done in Galway’. 99
The idea of Volunteer risings in urban areas was a departure from GHQ strategy, even at that early stage of the war. The Cork plans, and others in the south-west, indicated a willingness to incur heavy casualties. Moreover, implementing the idea of urban uprisings would ruin several of Ireland’s largest cities and towns, and such human and material sacrifices were antithetical to GHQ plans. Florence O’Donoghue, intelligence officer in the First Cork Brigade, wrote that two essential keys to GHQ plans were ‘the governing policy of not committing the whole force to the conflict at the start, and though severe damage was done to the economic life of the country … no part of the country was completely devastated’. 100 Mulcahy offered a compromise by allowing the Cork Brigade officers to select and attack three barracks in one night. 101 Michael Leahy wrote that a further condition was to await the outcome of a particularly sensational attack that was in the works for Dublin, and it was January 1920 before the attacks could proceed.
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During a November 1919 meeting, MacSwiney accused Mulcahy and GHQ officers of not understanding the mind-set in the rest of the country. Long years of drilling and arrests, as well as a feeling of having missed out during 1916, were frustrating country Volunteers. 102 Demoralisation was a serious threat to the IRA. Periods of inaction, mass arrests, a lack of arms, and constant accusations of cowardice and murder in the press took a toll on rank-and-file morale. Moreover, these incidents show that tension existed
between GHQ and the most active republican units from the beginning of the war.
Collins has been called the ‘founder of modern guerrilla warfare’ but, as noted earlier, all guerrillas have followed in the footsteps of previous insurrectionists. Nevertheless, Collins did bring to the Irish war some guerrilla concepts adapted to a city, and for that he should be remembered. There were few deliberate large-scale attacks in the cities (the burning of the Custom House, addressed later, is the most notable example in Dublin), but there were so many small-scale attacks and ambushes that one area of Aungier Street was known as ‘the Dardanelles’. Guerrilla warfare is difficult in cities, for both sides, and most IRA actions there were intelligence operations and arms- gathering, intimidation of civilians, patrolling, disruption of transportation and assassinations. In Dublin, Cork and Belfast most actions were single actions of chance or of design, with a small group sent out on an assassination mission. (While Dublin was the centre of police assassinations, Belfast was the more dangerous. There were more attacks there than in other cities, and this continued throughout the war. ) Some have claimed that this is not ‘war’, but it was the reality on the streets of Dublin at the time. 103 As with British actions in the country, Irish assassinations and bombings in the cities served political and propaganda roles as well as military ones, and press reports in the British and international papers indicated just how dangerous the city streets were to the British.
The continued unfettered enthusiasm of the country units required GHQ to head off several attempts to escalate the conflict or even to redirect it from the emerging system of guerrilla war. The first such proposed action emanated from the TipperaryVolunteers, soon after the Soloheadbeg action. On 23 February officers of the Third Tipperary Brigade drafted a proclamation against the constabulary in their county. It stated that ‘by the end of the month, any members of the Force remaining in the county will be deemed to have forfeited his life’. The document extended the threat to ‘anyone paid by the British government, or whoever helps England to rule this country … Civilians giving information to the Constabulary and doctors who assisted them were also threatened with execution. ’104 The brigade officers sent the draft to Dublin, where the Dá il and GHQ forbade
its publication. Richard Mulcahy later wrote that ‘such an initiative would disrupt the minds and lives of a whole people, undercutting the IRA’s support’. 105 Rather than directing the entire war, GHQ often saw its role as that of preventing excesses of violence that might undermine support of the IRA. 106 (See Chapter 6 for a discussion of British and Irish use of terror. )
‘Pace’ continued to be of great importance throughout the war. Collins and GHQ knew that they were aiming not for a military victory but to bring the British to the bargaining table. They could not let any part of the war get ahead of the military/political/propaganda pace that they determined was the best way to accomplish that. It was necessary to control the factors that made that possible:
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• The governing policy of not committing the whole force to the conflict at the start.
• The slow build-up of activity from 1919 to 1920 that allowed the Volunteers and the people to become acclimated gradually to the atmosphere of war.
• The fact that over a large part of the country the IRA retained the initiative.
• The IRA maintained high standards of morale and discipline.
• The fact that though severe damage was done to the economic life of the country through reprisals, destruction of creameries, factories and shops, no part of the country was completely devastated. There was no aerial bombing. 107
GHQ increasingly imposed its control in Dublin and sanctioned larger and more frequent attacks in the country. At the same time, Collins and other GHQ leaders did not want to escalate the conflict out of control, so they kept a steady and constant pressure on the true target: British governance. Setting the ‘pace’ was always the key. By the end of 1919, in the final issue of that year, An t-Ó glá ch editorialised:
A year ago we compared the IrishVolunteers to any army in the trenches whose activities were confined to occasional trench raids and sniping. Since then the raids and sniping have greatly
increased in frequency; in fact a situation has been created which more resembles guerrilla warfare. 108
The drift toward ‘organised’ guerrilla warfare depended on an extremely small segment of the Volunteers, most of whom were concentrated in the south-west. 109 The restraints imposed by GHQ had most of the Volunteers confined to activities regarding the Dá il Loan and Dá il Courts. Sporadic and unsanctioned attempts to procure arms led to more confrontations with the British, and when theVolunteers were identified they were forced to go on the run. Overall, the numbers of active Volunteers remained very small. It was only in January 1920 that attacks on the British forces were sanctioned by the Dá il.
Over the course of the war, rifts continued to develop between GHQ and the local commanders. In Cork, for example, Tom Barry (arguably the most successful column leader) and his immediate superiors believed that maintaining momentum against the British was of utmost importance, even though GHQ preferred the Cork IRA to manoeuvre on its timetable. 110 In the end, however, all concerned determined that the local commander knew best. 111
By 1920 the RIC had abandoned or closed most of the smaller barracks and those that remained occupied were reinforced, making barracks attacks increasingly difficult by the summer of 1920. The change from barracks attacks to ambushing, causing many more casualties on both sides, made the conflict more vicious and hardened attitudes. Such a change in attitude on the part of the Irish became self-sustaining as the IRA became ever more active, and the ambushes became more frequent and more lethal for the British. Activity increased everywhere in 1920. Flying columns were a logical and realistic extension of the basic tenets of guerrilla war. Moreover, the components of the columns were already in existence:
• The men on the run had taken up full-time service.
• Usually they were the most experienced and active men in each unit.
• Invariably they were the men who had pioneered the earlier local activities.
By early 1920 there was a sufficient supply of rifles to arm small columns,
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and those on full-time service could better defend themselves in organised groups than as individuals. The basic organisation envisioned by GHQ had been brought to a state of efficiency that made it capable of undertaking the vital roles of providing intelligence, billeting and a pool of trained reserves to utilise the columns. 112 The essential purpose of the columns remained the same thereafter. The basic idea was capable of being adapted to a wide range of activities, from ambushes to barracks attacks, thus putting a premium on local initiative and enterprise. The Irish drew the British forces into terrain most advantageous to the Irish—choosing the battlefield on which the battle was to be fought—then retreating into hiding and shelter. (That was the intent of the Irish in their small attacks and assassinations in the cities as well. ) The IRA’s strength lay not in large, conventional military power but in speed, mobility and intelligence that made possible the columns’ swift, concentrated blows at selected British objectives. The fundamental characteristic was mobility: in a few minutes the columns could move from a specific location, and in a few hours far from the region. Che Guevara wrote that ‘the essential task of the guerrilla fighter is to keep himself from being destroyed’. 113 Another fundamental for the guerrilla is flexibility, the ability to adapt to all circumstances and to work in all areas of the region. Good intelligence breeds good morale for all guerrillas and is vital. The Irish utilised all facets of guerrilla warfare.
Although writing of another theatre of war, Lawrence could have been precisely defining the Irish columns and their use:
Our tactics were always tip and run, not pushes, but strokes. We never tried to maintain or improve an advantage, but to move off and strike again somewhere else. We used the smallest force, in the quickest time, at the farthest place. If the action had continued till the enemy had changed his dispositions to resist it, we would have been breaking the spirit of our fundamental rule of denying him targets. 114
The British reports after the war came to a different conclusion regarding the establishment and function of flying columns:
In October 1920, so many of the Irish were ‘on the run’ that they
were grouped together to form ‘flying columns’. … This was an astute move on the part of Sinn Fé in. It provided organisations to which all rapparees could go when they could not stay in their own areas with safety and in almost all areas it created a small force which stirred the sluggish Sinn Fé iners into some sort of activity and ensured terror among the remainder.
…
Whatever it may have been called by the IRA, [they were] neither more nor less than a murder gang …115 [Emphasis in original]
Their reports also minimised the military effects of the Irish columns:
In the country by a system of military drives organised whenever any objective was reported and by strong [British] mobile columns, the IRA forces were continually hunted from place to place and were undoubtedly becoming tired and somewhat dispirited. These drives and their mobile columns [Irish] did not achieve any tangible or sensational results, beyond improving our knowledge of the country and training the troops and police to a new system of tactics that were quite new to them after their experience of the war in Europe. 116
In June 1920, An t-Ó glá ch provided not only a rationale for why the RIC were targeted by the IRA but also a generally accurate assessment of the state of the RIC at that time. 117 This assessment was an indication that the tactics of the IRA were working.
The English front line in Ireland, his chief instrument of executive power, was the R. I. C., an armed force of Irish mercenaries with elaborate local knowledge, situated in strongholds in every part of the country, even the wildest and remotest. The R. I. C. were his eyes and ears and his strong right arm in Ireland. A relatively small body of men as compared to the people of Ireland, they were able by their organisation and elaborate system of intelligence to dominate the unarmed
citizens. … To-day the first line of the enemy, the chief instrument of executive power has broken down and ceased to be effective. The R. I. C. have been driven from their outposts, nearly five hundred of their strongholds have been evacuated and destroyed, and they have been forced to concentrate only in certain strong centres, where, in some parts of the country, they are in the position of beleaguered garrisons. They are no longer effective for the purpose for which they were intended. … Demoralisation has set in their ranks. … There are lists of resignations from the force daily, and the effort of the enemy to fill up the gaps by English recruits [Black and Tans] is a confession of failure. The English recruits will not be effective for the purpose for which the R. I. C. were established. … English soldiers have not the local knowledge of the Irish constables … They are not likely to succeed where the R. I. C. failed. 118
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The British approach to the deteriorating situation in Ireland continued to be conducted in a haphazard manner which took little account of the prevailing political and social conditions. In general, an IRA action was followed by a British show of strength that only increased the popular feeling of British oppression. Even so, in August 1920 Hamar Greenwood complained to the House of Commons that the Irish were operating under advantageous conditions that were not available to the British. The columns, though recently started, were certainly having an effect.
[The Irish] are conducting warlike operations against us and we are not permitted to do so against him. He also enjoys the usual advantages of guerrilla warfare without suffering any of the penalties attached to it. We have to fight largely on the defensive, for we have no-one to take the offensive against. As far as we possibly can we take the offensive but our blows fall on empty air, and the enemy forces at once take up the role of innocent peasants whom we must not touch. 119
Greenwood’s rant in the Commons underscores the political restraints
placed on the British military by both their politicians and the British public, and the frustration caused by such restraints.
There were two distinct types of action that developed during the war: the ambush in the country, and the revolver and bomb attack in the cities and towns. 120 These required different tactics and different arms. Shotguns, rifles, light machine-guns (Lewis guns) and land-mines (later in the war) were the main ambush weapons. Revolvers, pistols and hand-grenades were essential for street fighting. Columns in the country could occupy a position and wait for the British; on the streets, the IRA had to keep on the move, the only cover available to them being the ordinary street traffic. Though fighting in different venues and ways, each unit made it clear that there were no safe areas for the British. Because of the closeness of the IRA and the British, there often seemed to be more intense fighting in Dublin and Cork than in other parts of the country. Both in the cities and the country, hand-grenades were effective weapons against unarmoured vehicles. They were so effective that by the end of the war the British could use no vehicles unless covered with wire netting. This gave rise to the saying that ‘The Boers put them in khaki, the Germans put them in helmets, and the Irish put them in wire cages’. 121
As the war progressed, the British learned to spread out their columns so that, if the first lorry was ambushed, additional elements could move up from the rear as reinforcements. Although the IRA in their flying columns lacked experience, their discipline was good and they fought on familiar ground, as all guerrillas must do. They struck suddenly and without warning, and then disappeared just as suddenly, moving cross-country on foot to evade pursuit by the road-bound British. Dumping their arms in well- hidden caches, the Volunteers took refuge on farms and in ‘dugouts’, hide-outs literally dug into the ground. The Irish could depend on support from the local population, and some who were not actual combatants acted as spies, scouts and couriers, and brought food and medical supplies. By 1920 the Irish had perfected the art of guerrilla warfare on their home ground.
At that time the British instituted guerrilla warfare classes at the Curragh. (The 5th Division had its own guerrilla warfare school in County Cork, which all officers assigned to the Division were required to attend before reporting to their assignment. ) The Curragh camp school issued a
set of instructions to the British officers:
Orders
All Officers and NCOs require practice before commencing an operation.
Secrecy
The leakage of information in Ireland is very great and it may be generally assumed that no inhabitant or civilian employee is to be trusted.
Rebel Tactics
The tactics of the enemy are those of ambush. Ambushes are dependent for their success on surprise and fire effect at close range, and do not aim at further offensive action, the rebels having no stomach for fighting at close quarters or suffering heavy casualties.
Individuals cutting peat in a bog may not be as harmless as they appear.
Our Tactics
… the idea of taking the active offensive will be in the minds of all ranks.
Lorry patrols will always consist of at least two motor vehicles.
Reconnaissance
Much practice is required by Officers and NCOs in the making of reconnaissance of buildings, especially at night.
Bicycle patrol
Bicycle patrols have been found most useful—especially where quietness is required …
Bicycles must be kept in good condition.
Cyclist patrols will not allow civilian bicycles or motor cycles or motors to pass for fear of information being given away on the approach of the patrol.
Lorry patrols
Lorries are particularly easy to ambush and the greatest vigilance is required.
Lorries should be disposed in depth … There are officers who consider 300 yards to be the minimum.
… lorries should be in good working order before starting out.
The success of lorry raids is dependent on speed rather than secrecy. The Commandant should never be in the lead lorry.
Dress
All patrols will be as lightly equipped as possible.
Armoured lorries
… care must be observed in ascertaining the armour on lorries is bullet proof or only against long range pistol fire and slug.
Armoured cars
As soon as any portion of a column is attacked, the armoured car should move to the ambushers and pin them down.
Searches
Places to be searched
Pedestrians—man wearing a hat, under the hat. In animal’s ears, under the cow horn …
Houses
Whenever a house is to be searched a receipt should be obtained from the inhabitants to the effect that no damage has been done and nothing taken away with the exception of the arms or documents seized.
General
… It must be remembered that the rebels are not highly disciplined troops and a threat to their line of retreat usually makes them bolt. In short the one essential condition for success in raids, searches and drives is surprise and every ruse by which surprise can be obtained must be studied and practised. 122
It is not known how much day-to-day effect the Curragh classes had on the British officers, but it is clear that these comprehensive ‘orders’ brought much mirth to the Irish who captured them and learned that no damage was to be done on raids, that receipts were to be ‘obtained from the residents’, and that the British thought that they were ‘not highly disciplined’ and that a threat ‘would make them bolt’.
The dramatic increase in British operations by the end of 1920 changed conditions nationwide. The fighting increased so much that by early 1921 the positions of most columns throughout the country were untenable. The greater numbers of British forces, the increased use of
effective counter-insurgency tactics, the use of reconnaissance aircraft, better knowledge of guerrilla warfare as more British officers underwent training, combined with the lengthening days of spring and summer, all made the columns’ existence increasingly dangerous and Irish successes more unlikely. The war was not going well for the Irish with the increased British pressure into mid-1921; there were more casualties, more men were captured and there was difficulty in finding replacements.
The Dublin units felt increasing pressure as well. Up to then the use of violence had been confined to an extremely small group of Volunteers, who only engaged with those pursuing them. (Collins’s ‘Squad’ was mostly employed in targeted assassinations and usually did not engage the British in any other operations. ) At the end of 1920 there were many more indiscriminate attacks on British forces throughout the city, resulting in more random searches by the British military and Auxiliaries, which again increased substantially the number of men who were arrested. The growing availability of arms contributed to this, but the inevitable losses made the continuing acquisition of even more weapons and ammunition vital.
Although there was a disparity of forces throughout the country during most of the war there was no shortage of Volunteers for action, but there was a persistent and perilous arms problem. (This is always a problem for guerrilla armies. ) As in most guerrilla wars, the primary purpose of the Irish ambush was to acquire weapons. Che Guevara stated the principle that ‘all attacks should recover the same amount of ammunition as that expended’. When the war started in 1919, Britain became a vital source of arms for the IRA. Two things are needed for any guerrilla war— arms and money—and Michael Collins took the lead in providing both. He did business with gunsmiths in London, German arms dealers, British members of the IRA who worked at collieries in Scotland, criminal gangs in the British midlands—in effect, anyone who would take the Irish money. Liverpool Volunteer Paddy Daly recalled that ‘we found the Englishman always willing to do business’. 123
The British command at the Curragh camp required that all lorries on patrol carry a ‘box of 1000 rounds of. 303 ammunition’ to supplement that carried by each soldier. (The. 303 ammunition was used in British rifles as well as in Lewis and Maxim machine-guns, and was the most prevalent ammunition size used by weapons in the war on both sides. ) Taking a lorry’s
spare ammunition was a prime motive for all Irish ambushes. In fact, at the end of the war in July 1921, it was apparent that the Irish didn’t run out of weapons but they were running out of ammunition.
It was primarily for arms that the Irish looked outside the country for sources and assistance. When Collins conceived the Dá il Loan, it was to be used to fund the Dá il’s administrative activities. On 19 June 1919 the Dá il launched the National Loan prospectus, which it was hoped would raise
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