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Sudan. State Sponsor: Implications. An Informal Watchlist
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Sudan
Sudan was cooperating with U. S. counterterrorism efforts before 11 September 2001, which included a close relationship with various U. S. Government agencies to investigate and apprehend extremists suspected of involvement in terrorist activities. Sudan is a party to eleven of the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. Sudan also has participated in regional efforts to end the civil war that has been ongoing since 1983 - a U. S. policy priority that parallels the U. S. objective of having Sudan deny safe haven to terrorists.
While concerns remain regarding Sudanese Government support for certain terrorist groups, such as HAMAS and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, the United States is pleased with Sudan's cooperation and the progress being made in their antiterrorist activities.
Syria
The Syrian Government has continued to provide political and limited material support to a number of Palestinian groups, including allowing them to maintain headquarters or offices in Damascus. Some of these groups have committed terrorist acts, but the Syrian Government insists that their Damascus offices undertake only political and informational activities. The most notable Palestinian rejectionist groups in Syria are the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS). Syria also continued to permit Iranian resupply, via Damascus, of Hizballah in Lebanon. Nonetheless, the Syrian Government has not been implicated directly in an act of terrorism since 1986.
At the UN Security Council and in other multilateral fora, Syria has taken a leading role in espousing the view that Palestinian and Lebanese terrorist groups fighting Israel are not terrorists; it also has used its voice in the UN Security Council to encourage international support for Palestinian national aspirations and denounce Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories as " state terrorism. "
The Syrian Government has repeatedly assured the United States that it will take every possible measure to protect U. S. citizens and facilities from terrorists in Syria. In times of increased threat, it has increased police protection around the U. S. Embassy. During the past five years, there have been no acts of terrorism against U. S. citizens in Syria. The Government of Syria has cooperated significantly with the United States and other foreign governments against Al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other terrorist organizations and individuals. It also has discouraged any signs of public support for Al-Qaida, including in the media and at mosques
In 2002, Syria became a party to the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, making it party to five of the twelve international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.
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State Sponsor: Implications
Designating countries that repeatedly support international terrorism (i. e., placing a country on the " terrorism list" ) imposes four main sets of U. S. Government sanctions:
1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales.
2. Controls over exports of dual use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism.
3. Prohibitions on economic assistance.
4. Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including:
• Requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions.
• Lifting diplomatic immunity to allow families of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuits in U. S. courts.
• Denying companies and individuals tax credits for income earned in terrorist list countries.
• Denial of duty-free treatment for goods exported to the United States.
• Authority to prohibit any U. S. person from engaging in a financial transaction with a terrorist list government without a Treasury Department license.
• Prohibition of Defense Department contracts above $100, 000 with companies controlled by terrorist list states.
An Informal Watchlist
There is utility in drawing to Congress' attention countries that do not currently qualify for inclusion in the terrorism list but where added scrutiny may be warranted. It would reflect legitimate concerns of those in the intelligence and policy community and might serve as an informal warning mechanism to countries that their activities are being scrutinized. For example, the State Department warned Pakistan in January 1993 that it was under ''active continuing review" to determine whether it should be placed on the terrorism list. When the list came out in April 1993, Pakistan was not on it. A similar warning was issued to Pakistan in January 2000. Sudan was also warned that it was being subjected to special review prior to its being placed on the terrorism list in August 1993.
In 2000, some informally discussed candidates for such a list include (1) Afghanistan, which is characterized as " a training ground and base of operations" for worldwide terrorist activities. Concerns are that Islamic fundamentalist terrorists linked to numerous international plots continue to train and operate out of the country and/or enter or exit with impunity, and more specifically that the Taliban continues to offer sanctuary to Usama Bin Laden and his associated terror networks; (2) Pakistan - Pakistan has tolerated terrorists living and moving freely within its territory; supported groups that engage in violence in Kashmir; and is " providing the Taliban with material, fuel, funding, technical assistance, and military advisers; " (3) Lebanon -ongoing concern exists over terrorist groups operating with impunity from there, often under Syrian protection, in areas ostensibly controlled by the Government of Lebanon; and (4) Yemen - despite growing military cooperation and assistance in the U. S. S. Cole bombing investigation, Yemen, a nation where a thriving kidnapping industry flourishes in remote areas, remains a safe haven for international terrorist groups with the Government of Yemen, apparently unable " to discourage the terrorist presence in Yemen. " There is a growing concern in U. S. policy circles that Chechnya may increasingly become a magnet for Islamic radicals. However, concern exists that " increased radicalization of Islamist populations connected to the Chechnya conflict would encourage violence and spread instability elsewhere in Russia and beyond. " Concerns also remain that militant Iranian elements and militants linked to Usama Bin Ladin remaining in the territory of Nations of the former Yugoslavia may resort to terrorist violence.
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" Congressional Research Service " 2000
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