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5. Intelligence—a war of secrets
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Notes
1 T. E. Lawrence, ‘The evolution of a revolt’, Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (October 1920), p. 11.
2 Francis Costello, ‘The role of propaganda in the Anglo-IrishWar, 1919–1921’, Canadian Journal of Irish Studies, vol. 14, no. 2 (1989).
3 Charles Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919–1921 (Oxford, 1975), p. 65.
4 G. Dangerfield, The Damnable Question: A Study in Anglo-Irish Relations (Boston, 1976), pp 283–90.
5 Gary Evans, ‘The raising of the First Dá il É ireann Loan and the British responses to it, 1919–1921’, unpublished Ph. D thesis, Department of History, National University of Ireland, Maynooth (February 2012).
6 Evening Herald, 6 November 1965.
7 Peter Young, ‘Michael Collins—a military leader’, in Gabriel Doherty and Dermot Keogh (eds), Michael Collins and the Making of the Irish Free State (Cork, 1998), p. 90.
8 Michael Foy, Michael Collins’ Intelligence War (Stroud, 2006; Dublin, 2007), p. 120.
9 Mao Zedong’s theory of guerrilla warfare indicated that military operations are an important component of revolutionary war but that the underlying principle and fundamental objective is political. It was towards that goal that Mao directed his ‘phased strategy’ of guerrilla war. The broad strategy underlying all successful guerrilla warfare is that of protracted harassment accomplished by extremely subtle, flexible tactics designed to wear down the enemy. The time gained is necessary either to develop sufficient military strength to defeat the enemy forces in orthodox battle (as Mao did in China) or to subject the enemy to internal and external military and political pressures sufficient to cause him to seek peace favourable to the guerrillas (as Collins and the Irish did). This strategy embodies political, social, economic and psychological factors to which the military element is often subordinated—without, however, lessening the ultimate importance of the military role. Whether called a ‘phased, ’‘paced’ or ‘prudent’ type of warfare, it is the strategy needed to succeed.
10 Risteard Mulcahy, ‘The development of the IrishVolunteers, 1916–1922’, An Cosantó ir, vol. 40 (Part 3: April 1980).
11 Colin S. Gray, ‘The Anglo-Irish War 1919–1921: lessons from an irregular conflict’,
Comparative Strategy, vol. 26, issue 5 (8 January 2008).
12 See Ian Kenneally, The Paper Wall: Newspapers and Propaganda in Ireland, 1919–1921
(Cork, 2008).
13 Ian Kenneally, ‘Press played pivotal role in the War of Independence’, Irish Times, 15
November 2014.
14 See http: //www. militaryarchives. ie/ie/bailiuchain/bailiuchain-idirlin/an-toglach- magazine-1918-1933.
15 J. B. E. Hittle, Michael Collins and the Anglo-Irish War: Britain’s Counter-insurgency Failure
(Chicago, 2011), p. 208.
16 Kenneally, The Paper Wall, pp 46–75.
17 James P. Walsh, ‘De Valera in the United States, 1919’, Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Philadelphia, vol. 73, no. 3/4 (1962).
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18 NewYork Times, 23 June 1919.
19 Not all publicity generated by deValera was favourable, however. In Philadelphia, on 1 October, de Valera said: ‘As far as England is concerned, the Irish people wished and hoped that Germany might win the war’. Immediately thereafter the American Legion came out against de Valera for not fighting in World War I. Later, when de Valera was in Los Angeles, Harry Chandler, publisher of the Los AngelesTimes, wrote of him in an editorial that ‘his American tour is being staged not to secure real freedom for Ireland, but: First, to stir opposition in this country to Great Britain. Second, to defeat, if possible, the League of Nations. Third to raise funds for the Sinn Fé iners of Ireland who slay soldiers and peace officers and who assaulted American soldiers during the war’ (Los Angeles Times, 16 November 1919). Dave Hannigan, DeValera in America: the Rebel President’s 1919 Campaign (Dublin, 2008), p. 122.
20 David Neligan, The Spy in the Castle (London, 1999).
21 It should be noted thatWilson’s statements regarding self-determination were contested even within his own government. His anxious Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, sensed at once that self-determination was a phrase ‘simply loaded with dynamite’. As he presciently remarked in a confidential memorandum sent to Wilson on 13 December 1918, ‘The more I think about the President’s declaration as to the right of “self-determination”, the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the Peace Congress, and create trouble in many lands … The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realized. It will, I fear, cost thousands of lives. In the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream of an idealist who failed to realize the danger until too late to check those who attempt to put the principle into force. What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause! Think of the feelings of the author when he counts the dead who dies because he coined a phrase! A man, who is a leader of public thought, should beware of intemperate or undigested declarations. He is responsible for the consequences … What effect will it have on the Irish, the Indians, the Egyptians, and the nationalists among the Boers? Will it not breed discontent, disorder, and rebellion? Will not the Mohammadans of Syria and Palestine and possibly of Morocco andTripoli rely on it? How can it be harmonized with Zionism, to which the President is practically committed? ’ Editorial Notebook; Woodrow Wilson’s Dynamite, New York Times, 14 April 1991.
22 Fearghal McGarry, ‘The War of Independence’, https: //www. qub. ac. uk/sites/ irishhistorylive/IrishHistoryResources/Articlesandlecturesbyourteachingstaff/TheWaro fIndependence/.
23 Bernadette Whelan, ‘Wilson was urged to support presence of Irish voice at Paris Peace Conference’, Irish Times, 21 January 2019.
24 The Times, 22 September 1919.
25 The Irish Bulletin (Acts of Aggression newsletter), 12 July 1919. Mike Rast, ‘Tactics, politics and propaganda in the Irish War of Independence, 1917–1921’, unpublished Master’s thesis, Georgia State University (2011).
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26 The Irish Bulletin (Acts of Aggression newsletter), 13 September 1919.
27 New York Times, 14 September 1919. See Patrick McCartan, With de Valera in America
(Dublin, 1932); Hannigan, DeValera in America, p. 100.
28 David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish Life, 1913–1921: Provincial Experience of War and Revolution (Dublin, 1977), p. 123.
29 Sr Eithne Lawless, Witness Statement 414.
30 Bridie O’Reilly, Witness Statement 454.
31 Ernest Blythe, Witness Statement 939.
32 Ian McKeane, ‘Michael Collins and the media: then and now’, History Ireland, vol. 3, no. 3 (1995); K. McKenna, ‘The Irish Bulletin’, Capuchin Annual (1970).
33 Graham Walker, ‘The Irish Dr Goebbels: Frank Gallagher and Irish republican propaganda’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 27, no. 1 (1992).
34 Mulcahy papers, File 7a, No. 56.
35 Ibid. PRO, CO 904/162/1, Sinn Fé in Propaganda, and DE 2/10, Correspondence with Publicity Department 14 February 1920, with a report on the department dated April 1922. Dá il É ireann Reports, National Library, Dublin.
36 D. George Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy, 1918–1922 (London, 1972; Aldershot, 1994), p. 85.
37 House of Lords Debates, No. 58, V. 2038.
38 Sir Ormonde Winter, Winter’s Tale (London, 1955), p. 307.
38 Kathleen McKenna (né e Napoli), Witness Statement 643; McKenna, ‘The Irish Bulletin’.
40 The Irish Bulletin, 19 June 1920.
41 RIC Constable Jeremiah Mee, Witness Statement 379; Dorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic (New York, 1937; 1965), p. 360. See J. Anthony Gaughan (ed. ), Memoirs of Constable J. Mee, RIC (Dublin, 1975).
42 Anne Marreco, The Rebel Countess: The Life andTimes of Constance Markievicz (London, 1967), p. 250.
43 ‘General played tennis in IRA custody—remembering the past’, An Phoblacht, 29 June 1995.
44 G. Power, ‘The capture of General Lucas’, in The Kerryman, Rebel Cork’s Fighting Story, 1916–1921 (Tralee, 1961); A Volunteer, ‘The IRA campaign in West Limerick— captivity of General Lucas’, in The Kerryman, Limerick’s Fighting Story, 1916–1921 (Tralee, 1948); ‘Whether Officers in Ireland are on Active Service’, NAUK, WO 32/4309.
45 Joe Good, Enchanted by Dreams: The Journal of a Revolutionary (ed. Maurice Good) (Dingle, 1996), p. 166.
46 Ibid., p. 168.
47 Francis Costello, The Irish Revolution and its Aftermath, 1916–1923 (Dublin, 2003), pp 50–3.
48 Cabinet Records, 15 August 1919.
49 See Francis Costello, Enduring the Most: The Life and Death ofTerence MacSwiney (Dublin, 1995); Seá n O’Mahony, The First Hunger Strike—Thomas Ashe, 1917 (Dublin, 2001).
50 Joseph E. A. Connell Jnr, Rebels’ Priests: Ministering to Republicans, 1916–1924 (Dublin, 2014), pp 38–46.
51 While in Frongoch Collins approved of hunger strikes, but soon changed his opinion of their usefulness.
52 George Sweeney, ‘Self-immolation in Ireland: hunger strikes and political confrontation’, AnthropologyToday, vol. 9, no. 5 (1993); ‘Irish hunger strikes and the cult of self-sacrifice’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 28, no. 3 (1993); D. J. O’Neill, ‘The cult of self- sacrifice: the Irish experience’, É ire-Ireland, vol. 24, no. 4 (1981); Barry Flynn, Pawns in the Game: Irish Hunger Strikes 1912–1991 (Cork, 2002).
53 Jason Perlman, ‘Terence MacSwiney, the triumph and tragedy of the hunger strike’,
NewYork State Historical Association, vol. 88, no. 3 (2007).
54 Peter Hart, ‘Operations abroad: the IRA in Britain, 1919–1923’, English Historical Review, vol. 115, no. 460 (2000).
55 Cabinet Records, 21 April 1921.
56 Hamar Greenwood in the Weekly Summary, 22 November 1920.
57 Weekly Summary, 8 October 1920.
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58 Weekly Summary, 25 February 1921.
59 Weekly Summary, 11 February 1921.
60 PRO CO 904/168.
61 Weekly Summary, 29 September 1920.
62 T he Times, 27 September 1920.
63 John Borgonovo, Spies, Informers and the Anti-Sinn Fé in Society (Dublin, 2006), p. 16. See Chapter 6 for a fuller account of the controversy over the Anti-Sinn Fé in Society.
64 C. E. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries (London, 1927), p. 251.
65 The Irish Bulletin, 10 September 1920.
66 Frank Gallagher [writing as ‘David Hogan’], The Four GloriousYears (Dublin, 1953), pp 90–4.
67 Major C. J. C. Street [writing as ‘I. O. ’], The Administration of Ireland, 1920 (New York, 1921; London, 1922); Ireland in 1921 (NewYork, 1921; London, 1922).
68 See Brian P. Murphy, The Origin and Organisation of British Propaganda in Ireland, 1920
(Dublin, 2006).
69 Costello, The Irish Revolution, pp 57–9.
70 Street [‘I. O. ’], The Administration of Ireland, 1920, p. 361.
71 Ibid., p. 362.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Costello, ‘The role of propaganda in the Anglo-Irish War, 1919–1921’.
75 See http: //theauxiliaries. com/men-alphabetical/men-d/dowdall/dowdall. html.
76 Ibid.
77 Evidence on Conditions in Ireland (ed. Albert Coyle), American Commission on Conditions in Ireland, Interim Report (Washington DC, 1921), pp 99–101.
78 John McCann, ‘Burning of the Custom House’, The Kerryman, 17 March 1938.
79 Lawrence, ‘The evolution of a revolt’, p. 10.
80 Liz Gillis, May 25: Burning of the Custom House 1921 (Dublin, 2017).
81 T. Ryle Dwyer, The Squad and the Intelligence Operations of Michael Collins (Cork, 2005), p. 200.
82 Oscar Traynor, Witness Statement 340; ‘The burning of the Custom House—Dublin’s fighting story’, The Kerryman, [date? ] 1939; McCann, ‘Burning of the Custom House’.
83 Oscar Traynor, Witness Statement 340.
84 N. L. Miller, P. Matsangas and L. G. Shattuck, ‘Fatigue and its effect on performance in military environments’, Performance Under Stress (26 September 2007), pp 231–48.
85 An Cosantó ir, vol. 2, no. 1 (1942), pp 3–4.
86 Gillis (May 25: Burning of the Custom House 1921, pp 127–32) underscores that, apart from the considerable destruction caused on the first day, a significant amount of additional damage was also done to the building and to material inside (including files) over subsequent days. It turned out that the Dublin Fire Brigade were less than enthusiastic about tackling the blaze (many were members of the IRA themselves) and, after fires repeatedly broke out again over the following days, soldiers had to take over fire-fighting duties. As much as anything else, the Fire Brigade’s apathy was yet another indication of the lack of support for the British authorities in most of Ireland outside Ulster at this stage. See ‘Report by the General Officer Commanding in Chief, The Situation in Ireland for theWeek Ending 28 May, 1921’(PRO CAB 24/123); Las Fallon, ‘Forgotten allies: the Dublin Fire Brigade, 1919–1921’, An Cosantó ir (March, 2019).
87 T. Ryle Dwyer, Michael Collins: The Man Who Won the War (Cork, 1990), p. 120.
88 Harry Colley, Witness Statement 1617.
89 General Patrick Daly, Witness Statement 387.
90 Charles Townshend, ‘The Irish Republican Army and the development of guerrilla warfare, 1916–1921’, English Historical Review, vol. 94, no. 371 (1979).
91 Foy, Michael Collins’ Intelligence War, p. 218.
92 Michael B. Barry, ‘The Irish War of Independence as seen by the international press’,
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The Irish Times, 3 January 2019.
93 Gillis, May 25: Burning of the Custom House, p. 114.
94 La Tribuna Illustrata, 15 December 1920.
95 Bureau of Military History, CD/227/16/06.
96 The Nation and Athenaeum, December 1920.
97 The Times, 1 November 1920.
98 The Daily Mail, 1 January 1921.
99 H. H. Asquith, quoted in The London Times, 15 January 1921.
100 The Times, 21 January 1921.
101 Gen. Hubert Gough, quoted in W. Alison Phillips, The Revolution in Ireland, 1906–1923 (London, 1923), pp 186–91. See Gen. Hubert Gough, ‘The situation in Ireland’, Review of Reviews, vol. 63 (1921).
102 Hansard, 6 April 1921.
103 See Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles.
104 Lloyd George Papers, File F/19.
105 Costello, ‘The role of propaganda in the Anglo-Irish War, 1919–1921’.
106 Francis Costello, ‘King George V’s speech at Belfast, 1921: prelude to the Anglo-Irish Truce’, É ire-Ireland, vol. 22, no. 3 (1987).
107 General Sir Nevil Macready, Annals of an Active Life (2 vols) (London, 1925; 1942), vol.
2, p. 471.
108 Roy F. Foster, Modern Ireland, 1600–1972 (London, 1988), p. 502.
109 Charles Townshend, ‘The Irish Republican Army and the development of guerrilla warfare, 1919-1921’, English Historical Review, (1979).
5. Intelligence—a war of secrets
To paralyse the British machine it was necessary to strike at individuals. Without her spies, England was helpless. It was only by means of their accumulated and accumulating knowledge that the British machine could operate. Without their police throughout the country, how could they find the man they ‘wanted’?
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