The impact of the Trafficking Protocol

The impact of the Trafficking Protocol

It is important to recognize that only nations that sign and ratify have obligations under the Protocol. We emphasize this because understanding the obligations of nations and their engagement with the Trafficking Protocol is important to undertaking research that seeks to understand and assess both how and why (and if at all) they have imple- mented particular counter-trafficking strategies. It is also important to note that there are very limited mechanisms of review at the international level and that these mecha- nisms are weak (Milivojevic and Segrave, 2012). This highlights the necessity for well-designed, independent research. In relation to the Trafficking Protocol, the Working Group on Trafficking in Persons (WGTIP) was established in 2005 to oversee the implementation of the Protocol and to identify weaknesses and gaps; however, there has been no commitment to rigorous evaluation of counter-trafficking efforts to determine their impact in its reports (see, for example, WGTIP, 2015). While they make recommendations, they cannot enforce sanctions or other measures to ensure that states party to the Protocol comply with their recommendations.

Parallel to the development of the Trafficking Protocol, the US introduced legisla- tion in 2000 to implement a range of domestic counter-trafficking bodies and policies. Included within this was the direction to the US Department of State to produce an annual TIP report, to review US and other selected nations’ efforts to address human trafficking. This has been in place since 2001. It has expanded the number of nations included over time, and it reviews counter-trafficking efforts based on US-defined criteria. It judges nations by placing them on a Tier level, with Tier One being the highest standard, and Tier Three being the lowest. It has been subject to ongoing criticism (Chuang, 2006; Gallagher, 2011); however, it has also been recognized as a strong diplomatic tool, particularly for nations dependent on US funding, as sanctions are the currency of poor TIP report results and failure to proactively respond and redress the specific concerns outlined in the TIP report. This reporting mechanism plays an influential role globally in the counter-trafficking agenda, and is relied on as an evidence base for its effectiveness. However, the TIP report assessment is not an ‘impact’ measure. For example, there is no contact with victims to make assessments of the qual- ity of the services provided, there is no way to indicate whether these efforts reduce exploitation and there is a reliance on process outcomes as indicators of ‘success’. The consequence, as many have argued (Feingold, 2010; Goodey, 2008, 2011; Milivojevic, 2012; Steinfatt, 2011; Wylie, 2016), is a reliance on the reproduction of

numbers (such as estimates of the scope and breadth of human trafficking and crimi- nal justice data, e. g. the number of prosecutions).

What we know about human trafficking

In the two decades (almost) since the introduction of the Trafficking Protocol, the con- cept of human trafficking has become mainstream in the international community. In some ways, this has potentially positive consequences: such as better recognition of victims/survivors, strategies in place to support gatekeepers and authorities to make more informed decisions and, significantly, more funding for research and counter- trafficking efforts. The downside, especially for an issue as broad and debated as human trafficking, is that there is a swathe of experts and committed practitioners all working towards different ends and competing for resources, whilst seeking to claim success and expertise. The evidence base, however, is replete with studies that begin with ‘the proviso that data on the extent of the problem are unreliable’ (Wylie, 2016: 3). This poses a prob- lem in relation to the fast-moving policy context – there are no reliable measures of impact and there is no agreed definition of success. Consequently, it becomes appealing for any successful criminal justice outcome, such as a criminal conviction, to be heralded as a ‘suc- cess’. Our concern is that little attention is paid to the needs of victims, who are often constructed within very narrow terms (see Doezema, 2010; O’Connell-Davidson, 2015), and the broader context within which trafficking occurs. We think a beginning point is to recognize the complexity of ‘the problem’ of human trafficking in the first instance, and the resulting complexity of what is required to reduce this form of exploitation.

Once definitions have been established, identifying and quantifying the problem in all

research is important. Articulating what we know, including the size and scope of the problem, is part of the researcher’s task. However, a significant issue in the field of human trafficking research is reliable empirical data. How prevalent is human traffick- ing? This question is extremely difficult to answer, and, given the nature of human trafficking, as a clandestine practice that involves (often) unlawful non-citizens (see Box 15. 2) who for various reasons avoid any engagement with authorities (and upon contact may simply be deported), we will always be approximating the nature and extent of the problem. There are numbers promoted globally and often repeated, for example the International Labour Organisation (ILO) claims that there are ‘nearly 21 million people around the world in forced labour’ (www. ilo. org/global/topics/forced-labour/policy- areas/statistics/lang--en/index. htm). However, the ILO includes human trafficking as a subset of the forced labour figure, and consequently the percentage of human trafficking within the 21 million figure is not specified. More recently, the Walkfree Foundation produced a ‘global estimate’ of slavery, and asserts that today 40. 3 million people are enslaved (www. globalslaveryindex. org – accessed 3 August 2018). Close scrutiny of the methodology that leads to the identification of numbers is recommended. Commentators writing in 2005 and 2014 attest to the problem of knowing the numbers. The Global Slavery Index is a laudable attempt to go some way towards this, but it uses a broad

definition of modern slavery (which extends beyond human trafficking) and its definition and the methodology utilised to access and extrapolate data do limit the accuracy of the Index (see Box 15. 2).

The challenge in estimating the extent to which human trafficking occurs is an ongoing problem given the consequences of inaccuracy, as Tyldum and Brunovskis (2005: 18) have argued:

overestimating the extent of a phenomenon can have equally negative consequences as underestimating it. Uncritically using or publishing findings not based on sound methodologies may result in misinformation and hinder the creation of relevant policies and appropriate programmes.

The limitations of the data (see Segrave et al., 2009: 12–15 and Gozdziak, 2015) are worth exploring. The work of Andreas and Greenhill (2010) on the broad interroga- tion of global crime data is useful in this respect, as is that of Goodey (2008) and Weitzer (2014) regarding the production of global human trafficking trend data.