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Список рекомендуемой литературы
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Список рекомендуемой литературы
Глава 1
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Глава 2
Baars, B. J. (2003). The double life of B. F. Skinner: Inner confl ict, dissociation and the taboo against consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10, 5–25.
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Глава 3
Banks, W. B. (Ed. ) (2009). Encyclopedia of consciousness (Vols. 1 and 2). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
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Глава 4
D\'Esposito. M. (Ed. ) (2003). Neurological foundations of cognitive neuroscience. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press. Driver, J., & Vuilleumier. P. (2001). Perceptual awareness and its loss in unilateral neglect and extinction. Cognition, 79, 39–88.
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Глава 5
Ellis, A. W., & Young, A. W. (1988). Human cognitive neuropsychology. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
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Глава 6
Bermú dez. J. L. (2009). Self: Body awareness and self‑ awareness. In W. P. Banks (Ed. ), Encyclopedia of consciousness (Vol. 2, pp. 289–300). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
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Глава 7
Chalmers. D. J. (2000). What is a neural correlate of consciousness? In T. Metzinger (Ed. ). Neural correlates ofconsciousness (pp. 17–39). Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.
Koch, C. (2004). Tlw quest for consciousness: A neurobiological approach. Englewood Cliff s. NJ: Roberts & Company.
Revonsuo, A. (2001). Can functional brain imaging discover consciousness in the brain? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8, 3–23.
Глава 8
Cavanna. A. E., & Monaco. F. (2009). Brain mechanisms of altered conscious states during epileptic seizures. Nature Reviews Neurology, 5, 267–276.
Laureys, S. (Ed. ) (2006). The boundaries of consciousness: Neurotnology and neuropathology ( Progress in Hrain Research ) . Amsterdam: Elsevier.
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Yu, L., & Blumenfeld, H. (2009). Theories of impaired consciousness in epilepsy. Annals of the New York Academy of the Sciences, 1157, 48–60.
Глава 9
Kanwisher. N. (2001). Neural events and perceptual awareness. Cognition, 79, 89–113.
Koch. C. (2004). The quest fi n– consciousness: Л neumlwlogical approach. Enslewood Cliff s. NJ:
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Глава10
Blackmore, S. J. (2006). Conversations on consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Глава 11
Baars, B. J. (1988). A cognitive theory of consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press. Baars. B. J. (1997). In tlw tlieater of consciousness: The workspace of the mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Глава 12
Farthing, W. G. (1992). The psychology of consciousness. New York: Prentice‑ Hall.
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Глава 13
Barrett, D., & McNamara, P. (Eds. ) (2007). The new science of dreaming (Vote. 1–3). Westport, CT: Praeger.
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Глава 14
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Глава 15
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Эпилог
Eid, M., & Larsen, R. J. (Eds. ) (2008). The science of subjective well‑ being. New York: Guilford Press.
Flanagan, O. (2007). The really hard problem. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Metzinger, T. (2009). The ego tunnel. New York: Basic Books.
Revonsuo, A. (1995). Consciousness, dreams, and virtual realities. Philosophical Psychology, 8, 35–58.
Revonsuo, A. (2000). The reinterpretation of dreams: An evolutionary hypothesis of the function of dreaming. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 877–901.
Revonsuo, A. (2006). Inner presence: Consciousness as a biological phenomenon. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Valli, K., & Revonsuo, A. (2009). The threat simulation theory in light of recent empirical evidence: A review. American Journal of Psychology, 122, 17–38.
Wallace, B. A. (2007). Contemplative science. New York: Columbia University Press.
Примечания
Селф (Я) – центральная часть сознания, обобщающая индивидуальный опыт человека. В русском языке нет различий между «я» активным и «я» пассивным. В английском я‑ субъекту соответствует «the I», или «я». Я‑ объекту соответствует «the self», т. е. «self» включает элементы рефлексии. Например, мы говорим: «Я задел себя», т. е. и объект и субъект представлены одним рефлексирующим человеком. Таким образом, «self» означает личность, одновременно и совершающую действие, и претерпевающую его. – Примеч. науч. ред.
Название «эмерджентный» происходит от английского «emergence», что означает появление, или возникновение. – Примеч. перев.
Существует много определений квалиа, и они менялись со временем. Простейшим, наиболее широким определением квалиа является следующее: «каково оно», свойство ментальных состояний. То, как оно чувствуется, когда испытываешь такие ментальные состояния, как боль, видение красного цвета, запах розы и т. д. – Примеч. перев.
Копенгагенская интерпретация – это интерпретация квантовой механики, которую сформулировали Нильс Бор и Вернер Гейзенберг во время совместной работы в Копенгагене около 1927 года. – Примеч. перев.
Конфабуляция (лат. confabulari – болтать, рассказывать) – расстройство памяти, заключающееся в том, что больной сообщает о вымышленных событиях, никогда не имевших места в его жизни. – Примеч. перев.
Вуду – общее название религиозных верований, появившихся среди потомков чернокожих рабов, вывезенных из Африки в Южную и Центральную Америку. – Примеч. перев.
Монада – понятие, используемое в ряде философских систем для обозначения простых субстанций, не имеющих частей. – Примеч. перев.
«Философский зомби» – гипотетическое существо, которое неотличимо от нормального человека за исключением того, что у него отсутствует осознанное переживание или способность ощущать. Понятие «философский зомби» – это, главным образом, мысленный эксперимент, используемый в философии сознания как аргумент в спорах и доказательствах (так называемый «аргумент зомби»). Чаще всего он применяется в качестве критики физикализма, выступающего в формах материализма и бихевиоризма. – Примеч. перев.
Игра, соответствующая российской игре «Эрудит» – Примеч. науч. ред.
Сирл предложил следующий мысленный эксперимент: человек, не знающий китайского языка, получает программу, в которой определенные китайские предложения соотноятся с другими китайскими предложениями. Человек находится в изолированной комнате, и его собеседники не знают, что он не говорит по‑ китайски и не понимает, что у него спрашивают. Он лишь соединяет ряд одних китайских символов с другими с помощью специальной программы. Программа лишь имитирует осмысленное действие человека. Но это лишь имитация, а не естественное человеческое понимание языка. – Примеч. науч. ред.
Спайк – активное состояние возбуждения нейрона, пауза – период восстановления потенциала мембраны нейрона, когда он не может передавать импульсы и возбуждаться. – Примеч. перев.
Гамма‑ волны на ЭЭГ – волны с частотой более 30 Гц, в том числе и волны 40 Гц. – Примеч. науч. ред.
Не зависящие от внешней стимуляции. – Примеч. науч. ред.
Люцидный (лат. lux – свет). В широком смысле – то, что находится в свете сознания; не наполненный паталогическим содержанием (психиатр. ) – Примеч. науч. ред.
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