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—Michael Collins
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On 22 June 1921 King GeorgeV opened the Northern Ireland Parliament in Belfast with a speech calling for ‘an end of strife amongst her [Ireland’s] people, whatever their race or creed’.
Members of the Senate and of the House of Commons.
For all who love Ireland, as I do with all my heart, this is a profoundly moving occasion in Irish history. My memories of the Irish people date back to the time when I spent many happy days in Ireland as a midshipman. My affection for the Irish people has been deepened by the successive visits since that time, and I have watched with constant sympathy the course of their affairs. I could not have allowed myself to give Ireland by deputy alone my earnest prayers and good wishes in the new era which opens with this ceremony, and I have therefore come in person, as the head of the Empire, to inaugurate this parliament on Irish soil. I inaugurate it with deep felt hope and I feel assured that you will do your utmost to make it an instrument of happiness and good government for all parts of the community which you
represent.
This is a great and critical occasion in the history of the Six Counties—but not for the Six Counties alone, for everything which interests them touches Ireland, and everything which touches Ireland finds an echo in the remotest parts of the Empire. Few things are more earnestly desired throughout the English speaking world than a satisfactory solution of the age long Irish
problems, which for generations embarrassed our forefathers, as they now weigh heavily upon us …
I am confident that the important matters entrusted to the control and guidance of the Northern Parliament will be managed with wisdom and with moderation, with fairness and due regard to every faith and interest, and with no abatement of that patriotic devotion to the Empire which you proved so gallantly in the Great War …
My hope is broader still. The eyes of the whole Empire are on Ireland today, that Empire in which so many nations and races have come together in spite of ancient feuds, and in which new nations have come to birth within the lifetime of the youngest in this Hall.
I am emboldened by that thought to look beyond the sorrow and the anxiety which have clouded of late my vision of Irish affairs.
I speak from a full heart when … I appeal to all Irishmen to pause, to stretch out the hand of forbearance and conciliation, to forgive and to forget, and to join in making for the land which they love a new era of peace, contentment, and goodwill …
For this the parliament of the United Kingdom has in the fullest measure provided the powers; for this the parliament of Ulster is pointing the way.
The future lies in the hands of my Irish people themselves.
May this historic gathering be the prelude of a day in which the Irish people, North and South, under one parliament or two, as those parliaments may themselves decide, shall work together in common love for Ireland upon the sure foundations of mutual justice and respect. 1
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Prime Minister Lloyd George had previously submitted a speech to the king, who asked whether it could be rewritten. Lloyd George then asked South African Prime Minister Jan Smuts to draft a new speech, and that was the one the king gave.
Smuts drafted a warm plea for civil peace and pressed it on Lloyd
George. Lloyd George thereafter accepted Smuts’s proposal and soon made it his own. GeorgeV deserves some of the credit. His initiative was perhaps the greatest service performed by a British monarch in modern times. 2
Lloyd George and his government took their cue from the king’s widely praised speech. As the message stressed several times that Ireland should stay within the British Empire, they could reiterate this as the official policy guiding any settlement proposals. 3 The king’s call for a cessation of violence undercut conservative arguments at Westminster that the rebellion should be stamped out before imposing a political solution. Two days after the speech, The Times declared that ‘now was the moment for a Truce’. 4
Lloyd George was a minority in a Cabinet composed mostly of hard- liners; although he realised the necessity for negotiations and a political accord, he had to overrule the majority to bring that about. As a result, he moved quickly to capitalise on the opening given by the king’s speech. On 24 June he wrote to de Valera, asking for a meeting between themselves and Northern Ireland Prime Minister James Craig to ‘explore to the utmost the possibility of a settlement’. 5 De Valera initially insisted that no settlement was possible until Lloyd George recognised Ireland’s ‘essential unity, and right of national self-determination’. 6 Over the next two weeks a series of letters circulated between Dublin, Belfast and London. De Valera met with Craig and other Unionists to discuss the possibilities of co-operation between Unionist and republican Ireland. He also met Prime Minister Smuts, who assured him that the British government earnestly desired a settlement. 7 By 8 July de Valera had dropped his conditions and agreed to a one-on-one meeting with Lloyd George. 8
The Truce did not come as a surprise, as the negotiations that led to it were well publicised, but republicans disagreed on whether it was necessary. Kerry Volunteer Con Casey later insisted that ‘the IRA never felt stronger’. 9 GHQ organiser Seá n MacBride said that he was annoyed by the cessation of hostilities, as ‘we were on the way to really make things hotter’. 10 Many republicans viewed the Truce itself as a validation of the legitimacy of their military and political campaigns. Liam de Roiste TD called it ‘a recognition of our national status as coequal with England’. 11 On the British side, General Macready insisted that the republicans were
on the verge of defeat when the Truce was declared, and Conservative and Unionist polemicists dubbed the cessation a surrender to gunmen. 12
On 8 July 1921 deValera convened a consultation preparatory to aTruce; Dublin Lord Mayor Laurence (Larry) O’Neill, General Sir Nevil Macready, Lord Midleton (representing Southern Unionists), Arthur Griffith and Robert Barton attended the meeting. James Craig refused to attend. The following day, the terms of the Truce were agreed upon and settled at a 3 p. m. meeting in Dublin’s Mansion House between General Macready, Colonel J. Brind and Alfred W. Cope for the British, and Robert C. Barton and É amonn J. Duggan for the Irish. The terms went into effect at noon on 11 July 1921. From the time of the Truce, Macready described Collins as
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the easiest to deal with … He had what few of his countrymen possess, a sense of humour and, above all, the gift during conversation of sticking to essentials … he would complete the discussion with the least possible waste of time. 13
On behalf of the British, the Truce called for:
No incoming troops, RIC and auxiliary police and munitions. No movements for military purposes of troops and munitions, except for maintenance drafts.
No provocative display of force, armed or not armed.
It is understood that all provisions of this Truce shall apply to the Martial Law area equally to the rest of Ireland.
No pursuits of Irish officers, or men, or war material, or military stores.
No secret agents, noting descriptions or movements, and no interference with the movements of Irish persons, military or civil, and no attempt to discover the haunts or habits of Irish officers and men.
Note: there are other details concerning courts, motor transport etc. to be dealt with later.
On the Irish side it was agreed:
Attacks on Crown Forces and civilians to cease.
No provocative display of force, armed or not armed.
No interference with British Government or private property. To discountenance [sic] and prevent any action likely to cause disturbance of the peace which might necessitate military interference.
Collins was not entirely pleased with the Truce. He wrote to Moya Llewellyn Davies that it was
… only the first step. The days ahead are going to be the truly trying ones and we can only face them with set faces and hearts full of hope and confidence. 14
He also wrote to Harry Boland, who was in the US:
There’s something about [it] which I don’t like, and I have the impression that the whole thing is pressing on me. I find myself looking at friends as if they were enemies—looking at them twice just to make sure that they are really friends after all. I mention no names. After all it may be a wrong impression that’s got into me. Frankly, though, I don’t care for things as they are now. 15
Collins’s fears were well founded, as during the five months of the Truce the frustrations, antagonisms and personality clashes that had festered during the War of Independence contributed to many of the divisions that were to occur during the Treaty debates and after ratification. 16 During the war the IRA/Volunteers mostly showed a strong sense of responsibility and discipline, but the Truce led to many acts of bad public behaviour. Many of those who ‘joined’ the IRA/Volunteers at that time were deemed ‘Trucileers’ and had not been involved in any action during the war. Their activities, and the adverse influence of the circumstances created by the Truce that Collins had feared, all had their effects on the genesis of the Civil War. 17
Upon the establishment of a Truce, everything for the Irish depended on positioning. 18 The key was to position themselves to best advantage
whether the Truce lasted or not, and whether they were able to get what they wanted from the upcoming negotiations or not. It was vital that they not be seen as responsible if the Truce failed, or for rejecting what international opinion would deem a reasonable offer from the British. If the British made what was deemed to be such an offer and the Irish turned it down, the British would be politically empowered to declare a true war, embodying many of the measures that Macready had said would be necessary for the British to ‘win’ the war. Nevertheless, the Irish negotiators were between a rock and a hard place: they could not accept or compromise too quickly or too much or they would lose the most militant members of the IRA, who thought that they were winning anyway.
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On 14 July deValera went to London to negotiate with Lloyd George. Included in the delegation were Arthur Griffith, Count Plunkett, Austin Stack, Robert Barton and Erskine Childers. Collins forcefully pressed to be included but de Valera chose to leave him in Dublin. At first he said that this was because he didn’t want Collins to be photographed in case they returned to war, but he later indicated that he wanted to leave at least one senior politician in Dublin. This was an ‘all Sinn Fé in’ delegation, breaking the unwritten rule that a Volunteer should be present at all negotiations. On the night before they left, Collins again argued that he should be included in the delegation, but de Valera refused. It was an acrimonious meeting, and both left upset. Next day, de Valera had the first of four meetings with Lloyd George at 10 Downing Street. Lloyd George told his secretary, Geoffrey Shakespeare, that he ‘listened to a very long lecture on the wrongs done to Ireland starting with Cromwell, and when I tried to bring him to the present day, he went back to Cromwell again. It reminded me of a circus round-about when I was a boy. ’19
From the outset it was de Valera’s intent to show as little of his hand as possible. The formal British proposals were delivered to the Irish on 18 July: a twenty-six-county dominion; defence restrictions limiting the size of the Irish army; a prohibition on an Irish navy; insistence on free trade; and ‘an allowance for the full recognition of the existing powers and privileges of the Parliament of Northern Ireland’. On the following day de Valera indicated that he would accept being a dominion but that the British offer was not of unfettered dominion status. He also indicated that Northern Ireland must be represented within the all-Ireland parliament, otherwise
the only alternative was for the twenty-six counties to be a republic. Lloyd George offered a limited form of dominion, with Northern Ireland remaining as it was, no military or fiscal autonomy for the south and Home Rule government as part of the United Kingdom. The talks quickly stalled when deValera insisted on prior recognition of Irish sovereignty and Lloyd George refused. ‘This means war, ’ replied Lloyd George. DeValera dismissed the British proposals and called Lloyd George’s bluff, as he was not to be seen carrying the British proposals home with him.
After the July meetings de Valera knew that he was not going to get a republic or ‘External Association’. The best the Irish could hope for was the status of a self-governing dominion within the British Commonwealth. Several times he told the Cabinet and the Dá il that ‘we are not doctrinaire Republicans’, and the Irish delegation never looked for a republic in the negotiations; their purpose was to minimise the role of the king. One thing was absolutely clear from the London meetings and the follow-on correspondence between deValera and Lloyd George: there was no question of a republic. Both the Cabinet in Dublin and the Cabinet in London were aware of that. DeValera clearly grasped what was on offer: an acceptance of partition, an Irish Free State with the same dominion status as Canada or Australia, an oath of some sort to the Crown, and the installation of a governor general. 20 The republic had been shelved before the negotiations began and everyone concerned, particularly de Valera, recognised this. 21
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Upon his return to Dublin de Valera convened a Cabinet meeting to persuade the members to agree to a settlement. He wanted to present a plan to the Irish people that would acknowledge Ireland’s freedom and accept the same de facto status as the dominions. Two days later he reconvened the meeting and presented his concept of ‘External Association’ with the British Commonwealth. 22 DeValera knew that the king had to be written into the agreement, but how could Ireland make the king utterly powerless? He said that he came up with the idea of External Association while tying his shoes one morning:
• Independence for Ireland regarding domestic affairs.
• Alignment with the British Empire on foreign affairs.
• The king was to be the head of the association.
In effect, it was what India received in 1948, but it was impractical politics in 1922. The debate on the forthcoming negotiations had already begun even though it had not been agreed to hold negotiations.
De Valera wrote to Prime Minister Smuts: ‘I was greatly disappointed with the British government’s proposals. They seem quite unable to understand the temper of our people, or appear not to have the will to realise the opportunity that is now presented to them. ’ On 31 July deValera asked Smuts to continue to be involved:
My dear General Smuts:
I received your letter of July 29th, and have had two conversations with Mr Lane. He will tell you that the proposals of the British Government will not be accepted here.
Unless the North East comes in on some reasonable basis no further progress can be made. An Ireland in fragments nobody cares about. A unified Ireland alone can be happy or prosperous. To the British Commonwealth group and to Britain itself Ireland would readily become friendly, but it is only in freedom that friendship could come. To the principle of national self- determination our people are devotedly attached, for they recognise in it a principle vital to the peace of the world. The Republic is the expression of that principle in their own regard.
These then they will not readily abandon, but they are prepared to make great sacrifices in other directions.
The question of procedure and form as distinguished from substance are very important, as I pointed out to you. The British do not seem to realise this at all. Your understanding of the situation is particularly necessary at that end therefore.
I am very glad you are able to remain on for a little time longer. I know how your people are clamouring for you, but the cause you are assisting is a truly great and worthy one.
Very sincerely yours, É amon de Valera23
The First Session of the Second Dá il was held on 16 August 1921 in the Round Room of Dublin’s Mansion House. There were 130 Republican
TDs, six Nationalist TDs and forty-four Unionist TDs (who absented themselves as usual). All TDs present took the oath to the Dá il. The Dá il was to consider de Valera’s correspondence and negotiations with London, and the British offer of dominion status for Ireland. On 17 August the Dá il’s Foreign Representatives were named as follows: John Chartres (Germany), Harry Boland (USA), Seá n T. O’Kelly (Paris), George Gavan-Duffy (Rome), Art O’Brien (London), Dr Patrick McCartan (Russia), É amon Bulfin (Argentina) and Frank W. Egan (Chile). 24 De Valera addressed the Dá il: ‘I would be willing to suggest to the Irish people to give up a good deal in order to have an Ireland that could look to the future without anticipating distracting internal problems’. On 22 August he told the Dá il that ‘the minority in Ulster had a right to have their sentiments considered to the utmost limit. If the Republic were recognised I would be in favour of giving each county power to vote itself out of the Republic if it so wished. ’25
In a private session later on 23 August, de Valera told the TDs that if they were determined to make peace only on the basis of recognition of the Republic they were going to be faced with war—only this time it would be a real war of British reconquest, not just a continuation of limited military coercive measures ‘in support of the civil police’ to force people to obey the law. He clearly indicated his willingness to compromise, even on partition: ‘I do not consider myself bound to consider anything, I feel myself open to consider anything’.
On 7 September Lloyd George wrote to de Valera, requesting a ‘definite reply as to whether you are prepared to enter a conference to ascertain how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire can best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations’. He proposed that the conference should begin at Inverness, Scotland, on 20 September. De Valera could delay no longer. A reading of the Official Correspondence Relating to the Peace Negotiations June– September 1921 makes it clear that Lloyd George was offering dominion status for the twenty-six counties and nothing else. DeValera was committed to an imaginative and far-sighted scheme of his own creation, that of an external association between Ireland and Britain, but he failed to communicate to his colleagues the strength of his feelings on this subject. What is not in doubt is that deValera knew before the delegation left Ireland
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that the offer of an Irish Republic was not on the table for discussion.
De Valera told the Cabinet that he was not going to the negotiations. Reviewing his motives, his decision to stay in Dublin was based on solid grounds. He knew that those who went were likely to become scapegoats— with the radicals if they compromised, and with the moderates if they did not. ‘We must have scapegoats’, de Valera told the Cabinet. 26 In essence he was following the well-established diplomatic maxim that principals should not engage in negotiations but should remain in reserve as the ultimate arbiters. Where that broke down in this case was that Lloyd George was fully engaged in the negotiations, and deValera’s absence undoubtedly left the Irish delegation at a disadvantage. He also had other motives. By staying away he hoped to protect his status as president of the Irish Republic, and thus the Republic itself, rather than being involved in invidious negotiations about it, in which he might be accused of a conflict of interest. De Valera’s other concern, a very natural one for any political leader, was to preserve the unity of the movement. He thought that he could keep the more extreme republican wing on board by staying at home. He may have contemplated joining the delegation at the very end but, if so, he left it much too late. De Valera was a devoted admirer of Machiavelli and especially of his The Prince.
If the Prince’s advisors tell him he is not going to get what he desires, he shouldn’t go to the negotiations.
DeValera had also seen how US President Woodrow Wilson lost touch with the American public while in Versailles and he did not want to follow that example. Collins was determined that deValera should go. A vote was taken in the Cabinet, with each member being asked whether he should go. Arthur Griffith, W. T. Cosgrave and Collins voted in favour, while Cathal Brugha, Austin Stack and Robert Barton voted against. With the vote tied, de Valera voted not to go. In the final analysis, his decision not to go to London was a mistake, and one that he was to regret and try to justify all his life. Tellingly, whenever there were negotiations during his time as taoiseach, de Valera always led the delegation and took personal control. It was a mistake that he was determined not to make again.
On 14 September 1921 the plenipotentiaries were chosen for the Treaty negotiations: Arthur Griffith, Robert Barton, Collins, George Gavan-
Duffy and É amonn Duggan. Gavan-Duffy objected to the term ‘plenipotentiaries’ but de Valera insisted. Collins complained that ‘it was an unheard of thing that a soldier who had fought in the field should be elected to carry out negotiations. It was de Valera’s job, not his. ’27 Still, Collins was also aware that the IRA was exhausted and that any agreement, even a compromise, was preferable to fighting a ruinous war.
Collins addressed the Dá il after a very heated debate:
To me the task is a loathsome one. If I go, I go in the spirit of a soldier who acts against his judgment at the orders of a superior officer. 28
Later, he was more explicit to the IRB:
I have been sent to London to do a thing which those who sent me knew had to be done but had not the courage to do it themselves. We had not, when the terms were offered, an average of one round of ammunition for each weapon we had. The fighting area in Cork … was becoming daily more circumcised [sic] and they could not have carried on much longer. 29
On 15 September deValera proposed that the army (IRA/Volunteers) ‘be put on a regular basis’. The Cabinet, in late November, affirmed: ‘The supreme body directing the Army is the Cabinet. The immediate executive representative of the Government is the Minister for Defence who is, therefore, Administrative Head of the Army. The Minister for Defence is a civilian. All Army appointments are to be sanctioned by the Minister for Defence, who is to have the power of nomination and veto. ’
On 18 September, Lloyd George wrote to de Valera:
From the very outset of our conversation I told you that we looked to Ireland to own allegiance to the Throne, and to make her future as a member of the British Commonwealth. That was the basis of our proposals, and we cannot alter it. The status which you now claim in advance for your delegates is, in effect, a repudiation of that basis.
The basis of the conference in London was the ‘Gairloch Formula’, according to which the status of a republic, as previously demanded by de Valera, was not acceptable; instead, the negotiations were to ascertain ‘how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations’. Collins later argued that the restrictions of the ‘Gairloch Formula’ eliminated any pretence of sustaining a request for the Republic:
If we all stood on the recognition of the Irish Republic as a prelude to any conference we could very easily have said so, and there would have been no conference … it was the acceptance of the invitation that formed the compromise. I was sent there to form that adaption, to bear the brunt of it. 30
It has often been charged that, as a military man, Collins was too prone to interpret political rhetoric literally. Yet Robert Barton—who, though he signed the Treaty, later disagreed with it and changed his position—also came to the same conclusion:
The English refused to recognise us as acting on behalf of the Irish Republic and the fact we agreed to negotiate at all on any other basis was possibly the primary cause of our downfall. Certainly [it was] the first milestone on the road to disaster. 31
When asked to be a member of the delegation, Arthur Griffith agreed but told deValera: ‘You are my chief, and if you tell me to go, I’ll go. But I know, and you know, that I can’t bring back a Republic. ’32 DeValera explained to the Dá il why he insisted that Collins go to London: ‘It was from the personal touch and contact I had with the Minister for Finance that I knew he was vital to the delegation’. Collins disagreed and was to say again that ‘It was the acceptance of the invitation that formed the compromise’. 33 The Irish delegation was therefore committed to advancing Irish nationalism rather than establishing a republic.
In September de Valera had further talks with Prime Minister Smuts, who came to Ireland at the behest of Lloyd George to mediate. In their conversations, Smuts indicated that Britain would never give the Irish a ‘republic’ and that in fact the South Africans had never asked for one. Smuts
said, ‘Ask what you want, but not a republic’. ‘If the status of a dominion is offered’, deValera replied, ‘I will use all our machinery to get the Irish people to accept it. ’34 Smuts reported on his Irish visit to the British Cabinet the next day. De Valera authorised members of the government to open negotiations with Britain in October.
On 30 September 1921 de Valera issued a final ‘acceptance’ of the Treaty Conference ‘Terms’ in a letter to Lloyd George:
We have received your letter of invitation to a Conference in London on October 11th ‘with a view to ascertaining how the association of Ireland with the community of nations known as the British Empire may best be reconciled with Irish national aspirations’.
Our respective positions have been stated and are understood and we agree that conference, not correspondence, is the most practical and hopeful way to an understanding. We accept the invitation, and our Delegates will meet you in London on the date mentioned ‘to explore every possibility of settlement by personal discussion’. 35
Regarding the wording of the correspondence, J. J. Lee has written:
So scholastic a scrutineer of texts as deValera can hardly have overlooked the significance of ‘how’ rather than ‘whether’ in this formula, which already contained the seeds of compromise as Collins correctly observed in the Treaty debate. 36
While de Valera was not prepared to lead the delegation in negotiations, this did not prevent him from attempting to direct events from Dublin. Accordingly, he drew up the following document of instructions, which he circulated to the plenipotentiaries on 7 October, one day before they left for London:
(1) The Plenipotentiaries have full powers as defined in their credentials.
(2) It is understood before decisions are finally reached on a main
question, that a dispatch notifying the intention to make these decisions will be sent to members of the Cabinet in Dublin, and that a reply will be awaited by the Plenipotentiaries before final decision is made.
(3) It is also understood that the complete text of the draft treaty about to be signed will be similarly submitted to Dublin and a reply awaited.
(4) In case of a break the text of final proposals from our side will be similarly submitted.
(5) It is understood that the Cabinet in Dublin will be kept regularly informed of the progress of the negotiations. 37
DeValera clearly intended that these instructions, particularly clauses 2 and 3, would enable him to veto any draft document that he considered unacceptable. It is also accepted that these ‘instructions’ were formulated in order to placate Cathal Brugha and Austin Stack, who were much more doctrinaire and ideological than the Irish people, who were desperately anxious for a settlement. Griffith and Collins, for their part, were unhappy with the limitations, and they chose to ignore these further instructions, which had not been approved by the Cabinet, considering them only as guiding principles, not mandatory. There are contrasting views of these ‘instructions’. A rigid interpretation is not reconcilable with the ‘plenipotentiary’ credentials, defined as ‘one who is invested with the full power of independent action on behalf of the government’. Since the Dá il had already conferred full plenipotentiary powers, the instructions from the Cabinet, an inferior body, were not legally binding in any instance in which they limited the powers of the delegation. Brugha and Stack, however, viewed the ‘instructions’ as requiring the delegation in London to keep the Cabinet in Dublin duly informed at every step and not to sign the final draft without submitting it to the Cabinet and awaiting a reply. 38
Thus there was an implicit contradiction hanging over the negotiations: were the delegates plenipotentiaries or acting on instructions to report back to the Cabinet? The plenipotentiary status conferred by the Dá il was superior to instructions from the Cabinet. The delegates in London were not pleased with what they deemed to be interference from deValera. In October Griffith sent a letter to deValera emphasising that they
were plenipotentiaries and that they were not to be instructed on all the minutiae of the negotiations.
Originally, Harry Boland was to go to London as a secretary to the delegation, along with Childers, Diarmuid O’Hegarty and Fionan Lynch, but de Valera sent him back to the US instead. Boland told Joe McGrath: ‘I have a nice job to prepare Irish-America for a compromise’. He was ‘going back to America on the President’s instructions to prepare the American people for something less than a Republic’. 39
At the outset of negotiations both sides were ready to compromise. The British were demoralised and under pressure at home and from international opinion. Collins knew that the Irish were out of arms, especially ammunition. Richard Mulcahy agreed that to drive the British from anything more substantial than a police barracks was beyond them. Lloyd George was the head of a coalition government and greatly reliant on the Conservatives to remain in power, as they significantly outnumbered his Liberals both in Cabinet and in Parliament. He lost his position as prime minister in October 1922, and he placed much of the blame for that on the compromises that led to the Treaty.
From the time of the Truce in July and during the weeks leading up to the signing of the Treaty, and even in the Treaty debates that followed, the precise form that a government should take was imagined and debated by different wings in Sinn Fé in—from Arthur Griffith’s vision of a dual monarchy to acceptance of dominion status, and from de Valera’s concept of ‘External Association’ to those who were adamant that only a republic would be acceptable. All of the women TDs in the Dá il were ready to reject anything less than a republic with full independence from Britain. Tensions mounted as the delegates went back and forth to London and then returned with the Agreement.
There were several meetings of both the Dá il and the Cabinet as the negotiations continued through October and November. DeValera continued to press his plan for external association, but no one really knew what he wanted. ‘External Association’ was an impossible concept in the minds of the British negotiators. Extremist Republicans, and most TDs, saw no virtue in any kind of association with Britain. Collins simply could not see the point of repeatedly presenting the ‘External Association’ in the negotiations, and Griffith, though he argued strenuously for it in London, was unconvinced. 40
The Irish delegation intended that if there were to be a ‘break’ it would be on Ulster. Sovereignty, status and the role of the king were most important to the leaders; Ulster and partition were most important to the people.
The chief mistake the Irish delegation made was to allow the two all-important issues of the Crown and Ulster to become confused. They did not sufficiently single out Ulster as the issue on which to challenge the British. This was largely because, though the unity of Ireland was more important than the issue of allegiance to most Irish citizens, the issue of allegiance was of equal importance to the minority of Republican dogmatists whom the delegates also represented. 41
It was not the first—nor would it be the last—time that the Irish leaders were out of touch with the wishes of the Irish people.
Griffith’s unilateral agreement with Lloyd George in early November prevented that break on Ulster. 42 Griffith was asked in a private meeting to ‘help’ Lloyd George avoid a Conservative revolt. Griffith said that if Lloyd George would agree to a Boundary Commission the Irish would not break on Ulster. None of the other delegates knew of this meeting or of Griffith’s assurance to Lloyd George. Griffith did not sign or initial any agreement, but honoured his word when Lloyd George showed him the minutes of that earlier meeting near the end of the negotiations. From that point, partition ceased to be a main point of contention.
The last Irish Cabinet meeting was held on 3 December, when de Valera rejected the proposed treaty mainly on the grounds that the oath was unacceptable. Brugha said that as Collins and Griffith had been doing ‘most of the negotiating’ the British had selected ‘their men’. Griffith was outraged, but Collins just considered who it was that said it. During a break in the meeting Collins met with Seá n Ó Muirthile, who enumerated the IRB’s reservations. They were basically the oath (Collins passed along one that he had previously given to the British) and the positions that had been presented on defence and partition. When the Cabinet meeting resumed, Griffith again pointed out that he would never break on the issue of the Crown. He said that he would not sign a treaty but would bring it back to
the Dá il. Although the discussion took several hours and many issues were discussed, the oath was the single item that caused the most criticism. Prior to the meeting’s adjournment, it was decided that the delegation should return to London with the same powers and instructions. Griffith, Collins and Duggan went back to London on one boat, while Gavan-Duffy, Barton and Childers travelled on another. The intention to negotiate further is implicit in the circumstances and was explicit in the Cabinet minutes, but clearly it was not a delegation in which the Cabinet could have confidence that it would conclude a treaty on the grounds discussed in that last meeting.
Collins said that he was confused because de Valera had proposed an oath that was consistent with dominion status. He said that the proposals had been discussed again and again with the British and had been rejected, and that he was not going to go over the same issues again. The British again flatly rejected ‘External Association’, as Collins predicted. Thereafter, in meetings with the British, Collins attacked hard on defence and trade issues. Griffith wanted further discussion on the oath and insisted that the law and practice of the Crown as applied in Canada should govern the action of the British in Ireland. All the arguments had been presented before and the British rejected them again.
On 5 December Lloyd George inserted more drama into the negotiations: he held up two envelopes and said that one of them was to be delivered to a destroyer, which would take it to James Craig in Belfast that night. One contained news that there would be a treaty, while the other indicated that there was no treaty. Collins said that Lloyd George threatened the Irish delegates with a renewal of ‘terrible and immediate war’ if the Treaty were not signed at once. Lloyd George’s secretary, Geoffrey Shakespeare, said he knew that Lloyd George was bluffing on the ‘war’, but he was not bluffing that he had gone as far as he could. Referring the Treaty back to Dublin that night by telephone was not an issue: Collins, Barton and Gavan-Duffy all said that they had not thought of it, and Childers wrote that he had not thought of it either. Griffith reasoned: ‘I like what I see; I can accept this Treaty’. He got what he always wanted: a single king over two countries, going back to his famous articles on ‘The Resurrection of Hungary’. He had first channelled this idea in a series of twenty-seven articles in his United Irishman newspaper in 1904. 43 Collins came around; it was a stepping-stone for him. Collins, Griffith and Barton thought that they
had fulfilled their duty and signed around 2. 30 a. m. that night. Gavan-Duffy and Duggan signed the next morning. (It should be noted that Collins’s celebrated stepping-stone argument—his admission that the Treaty conferred not freedom but the freedom to achieve freedom—also contributed to the corrosion of his revolutionary reputation in the eyes of those who opposed the Treaty because it offered not so much an inducement to recognise how much had already been achieved as a calculus for future progress. )
On 6 December 1921 Articles of Agreement for a Treaty were formally signed in London, and two days later the Irish Cabinet met to debate the provisions. 44 Griffith’s decision to sign forced the others to their decisions. Only Griffith was absolutely sure that he was doing the right thing, and he was not a man to be dissuaded from what he deemed to be the right course. It has been written that Barton and Gavan-Duffy signed under pressure from the other three plenipotentiaries. Duggan said that he signed because Collins did. And Collins followed Griffith. 45 Collins was acutely aware of the weakened military position of the IRA/Volunteers. Moreover, he was ‘convinced that Ireland could not get substantially better terms and that the alternative to settlement was war and defeat’. He agonised over his decision, but in the taxi that night he announced that he was going to sign. 46 He was under no illusion about what the Treaty meant, but it was really no more or less than he had expected from the start.
The Irish people generally welcomed the Treaty. The ‘establishment’ was massively in favour:
• The Catholic Church
• The press
• Business interests
• Three hundred and twenty-eight local councils and bodies47
• The Supreme Council of the IRB (only Liam Lynch was opposed)
• The majority of the GHQ staff
The IRA rank and file, however, were mostly opposed. Many of those who were the most effective and active commanders in the War of Independence were opposed. The position of the IRA was: ‘We are Ireland—not the
people. Going back to the Rising, we represent Ireland—the people don’t. ’ Those in attendance at the Irish Cabinet meeting of 8 December were Barton, Brugha, Collins, Cosgrave, de Valera, Griffith, Stack, Childers and Gavan-Duffy. Collins and, especially, Griffith returned from London thinking that there could be dissatisfaction over the Treaty but that deValera would believe that the delegation had acted as he would have wanted. They were quickly disillusioned. 48 DeValera was furious, feeling that the delegates had folded under pressure. Moreover, he felt personally betrayed. 49 At the end of an extremely angry six-hour meeting, Brugha, de Valera and Stack voted against the Treaty. Barton (angry, opposed in principle but honour- bound to stand by his signature), Collins, Cosgrave and Griffith voted for it. De Valera denounced the delegates for their breach of faith in failing to consult him before signing, but Barton countered by insisting that the real problem had been caused by de Valera’s refusal to attend the conference. 50 De Valera said that he would resign if the Dá il accepted the Treaty, while both Griffith and Collins said that they would do the same if it were
rejected. Later, de Valera told the Dá il:
… now I would like everybody clearly to understand that the plenipotentiaries went over to negotiate a Treaty, that they could differ from the Cabinet if they wanted to, and that in anything of consequence they could take their decision against the decision of the Cabinet. 51
That evening de Valera issued a press statement, which he called a ‘Proclamation to the Irish People’, indicating that he could not recommend acceptance of the Treaty:
The terms of this agreement are in violent conflict with the wishes of the majority of this nation, as expressed freely in successive elections during the past three years. I feel it my duty to inform you immediately that I cannot recommend the acceptance of this treaty either to Dá il hÉ ireann or to the country. In this attitude I am supported by the Ministers of Home Affairs [Austin Stack] and Defence [Cathal Brugha] … The greatest test of our people has come. Let us face it worthily
without bitterness, and above all, without recrimination. There is a definite constitutional way of resolving our political differences—let us not depart from it, and let the conduct of the Cabinet in this matter be an example to the whole nation. 52
The normal division of opinion that was bound to result from the signing of the Treaty was immensely complicated by the fact that instead of two parties there were really three: republican diehards, moderates and de Valera. 53 The issues of the Treaty might have appeared simple enough— peace or a resumption of the war, a conceptual republic or a positive dominion status—but there were no simple questions for TDs with little political experience who were easily swayed by emotional attachments or other considerations.
The Treaty proposed the establishment of the Irish Free State, consisting of all thirty-two counties. The Unionists of Northern Ireland promptly denounced this as a gross betrayal, despite a provision stipulating that they could withdraw from the Irish Free State within a month of the Treaty’s ratification. In that case, however, a Boundary Commission would redraw the border in line with the wishes of the inhabitants. Collins and the other signatories maintained the broad belief that the Boundary Commission would ‘deliver’ an acceptable resolution for the South. (On 5 March 1922, Collins and Griffith addressed a massive rally in front of the Bank of Ireland building in College Green. Collins said that ‘we could not have beaten the British by force, but when we have beaten them out by the Treaty, the republican ideal, which was surrendered in July, is restored’. 54 On 20 April 1922 Collins spoke to another huge crowd there. He gave his view that the Treaty was a ‘stepping-stone’ that gave the ‘freedom to achieve freedom’. He also assured them that the Boundary Commission would give large parts of Northern Ireland to the Free State on the basis of demographics. 55)
Thus the partition issue was not a real factor in the Treaty split, which was primarily over the oath of allegiance to the British Crown to be taken by Irish parliamentarians. The key questions in the Dá il debates and in the Cabinet were the oath, the republic and the Crown, not partition. The lack of importance accorded to discussion of partition can be seen in the records of the debates: only nine pages of the public Dá il debates dealt with
partition, and over 300 pages did not. Likewise, in the private debates, only three of 181 pages were devoted to partition. 56
The next day the Dá il assembled in private session and de Valera proposed his ‘External Association’, or ‘Document Number Two’ (Collins gave it that name, and it stuck). It was rejected and de Valera ‘withdrew’ it, asking that it be held as confidential. With regard to partition, Document Number Two included the six partition clauses of the Treaty verbatim. The only difference was a declaration to the effect that ‘the right of any part of Ireland to be excluded from the supreme authority of the national parliament and government’ was not being recognised, but for the sake of internal peace and in order to divorce the Ulster question from the overall Anglo-Irish dispute de Valera said that he was prepared to accept the partition clauses of the Treaty, even though they provided ‘an explicit recognition of the right on the part of Irishmen to secede from Ireland’. 57 When he read the document, Griffith challenged de Valera regarding ‘recognition’. ‘Obviously, ’ Griffin said, ‘any form of association necessitates discussion of recognition in some form or another of the head of the association. ’ Some form of recognition of the Crown was inevitable.
On 19 December the debates continued, and de Valera and Collins stated their positions on the Treaty. Collins said:
What I want to make clear is that it was the acceptance of the invitation that formed the compromise. I was sent there to form that adaptation, to bear the brunt of it. Now as one of the signatories of the document I naturally recommend its acceptance. I do not recommend it for more than it is. Equally I do not recommend it for less than it is. In my opinion it gives us freedom, not the ultimate freedom that all nations desire and develop to, but the freedom to achieve it. 58
After the debate on 22 December, Kathleen Clarke came to visit Collins. She had spoken against the agreement and said that if her husband Tom were alive he would not vote for it. Collins responded: ‘I wouldn’t ask you to vote for it. All I ask is that, if it’s passed, you give us a chance to work it. ’59
On 21 December 1921 the Dá il adjourned on the motion of Collins to reassemble on 3 January 1922. The debates resumed and continued for
five days in the Convocation Hall of the National University of Ireland. 60 Prior to the close of the last Mansion House session, de Valera addressed the Dá il and said:
I would like my last word here to be this: we have had a glorious record for four years; it has been four years of magnificent discipline in our nation. The world is looking at us now. 61
The Christmas break was crucial to the debates; the TDs went home and encountered pressure for peace. But tempers worsened after the break.
Though there was disagreement over the lack of a named ‘Republic’, dominion status versus ‘External Association’ and Ulster partition, the primary disagreement continued to be over the oath required in the Treaty:
I … do solemnly swear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of the Irish Free State as by law established and that I will be faithful to HM GeorgeV, his heirs and successors by law, in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland and Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations. 62
It was noted at the time that there was no oath of ‘allegiance’ to the king but rather an oath to be ‘faithful’. Care was taken to explain that ‘allegiance’ denoted ‘obedience’, whereas to be ‘faithful’ denoted equality between the two countries, but the explanation fell on the deaf ears of the TDs.
On 7 January 1922 the Dá il voted 64–57 to ratify the Treaty. A total of 122 TDs answered the roll for the day, but Eoin MacNeill (who would have voted in favour), as chairman, did not vote. Frank Drohan resigned, as he was unwilling to vote for the Treaty but did not want to flout the will of his constituents and vote against it. Tom Kelly (who would have voted in favour) was too ill to attend. Laurence Ginnell (who would have voted against) did not attend, as he was in Argentina. Five TDs (Collins, deValera, Griffith, Liam Mellows and Seá n Milroy) represented more than one constituency. All such TDs cast only one ballot, however, even though Griffith objected strenuously to such multiple constituencies being ‘disenfranchised’. Had their ‘second vote’ been counted, the Treaty would
have passed by one more vote.
It was an afternoon meeting, beginning at 4 p. m. Voting began at 8. 35
p. m. with Diarmuid O’Hegarty calling the roll, continuing until 9 p. m. Those who voted for the Treaty were:
Robert Barton, Piaras Bé aslaí, Ernest Blythe, Patrick Brennan, É amon (Frank) Bulfin, Seá mus Burke, C. M. Byrne, Thomas Carter, Michael Collins, Richard Corish, Philip B. Cosgrave, William T. Cosgrave, John Crowley, Liam De Roiste, James Derham, James N. Dolan, George Gavan-Duffy, É amonn J. Duggan, Desmond FitzGerald, Paul Galligan, Arthur Griffith, Seá n Hales, Dr Richard Hayes, Michael Hayes, Seá n Hayes, William Hayes, P. J. Hogan, Peter Hughes, Andrew Lavin, Frank Lawless, Seá n Leddy, Fionan Lynch, Joseph Lynch, Joseph MacBride, Seá n MacEoin, Alex McCabe, Dr Patrick McCartan, Daniel McCarthy, Seá n McGarry, Dr J. P. McGinley, P. J. McGoldrick, Joseph McGrath, Joseph McGuinness, Justin McKenna, Seá n Milroy, Richard Mulcahy, James Murphy, George Nicolls, Thomas O’Donnell, Eoin O’Duffy, John O’Dwyer, Kevin O’Higgins, Padraig O’Keefe, Padraig Ó Maille, Daniel O’Rourke, Gearó id O’Sullivan, Lorcan Robbins, William Sears, Michael Staines, Joseph Sweeney, James J. Walsh, Peter Ward, J. B. Whelehan and Dr Vincent White.
Those who voted against the Treaty were:
E. Aylward, Harry Boland, Cathal Brugha, Daniel Buckley, Frank Carty, Erskine Childers, Kathleen Clarke, M. P. Colivet, Conor Collins, Daniel Corkery, Dr Seá n Crowley, Dr Brian Cusack, É amon Dee, Thomas Derrigg, É amon de Valera, James Devins, Sé amus Doyle, Dr Ada English, Seá n Etchingham, Frank Fahy, Dr Frank Ferran, James Fitzgerald Jr, Thomas Hunter, David Kent, James Lennon, Joseph MacDonagh, Seá n MacEntee, Mary MacSwiney, Seá n MacSwiney, Countess Constance Markievicz, Thomas McGuire, Liam Mellows, P. J. Moloney, Seá n Moylan, Charles Murphy, Seá n Nolan, Count P. J. O’Byrne, P. S. O’Cahill, Kate O’Callaghan, Daniel O’Callaghan, Art O’Connor, Joseph
O’Doherty, Thomas O’Donoghue, Samuel O’Flaherty, Brian O’Higgins, J. J. O’Kelly (‘Sceilg’), Seá n T. O’Kelly, Seá n O’Mahoney, Margaret Pearse, George Noble Count Plunkett, Sé amus Robinson, É amon Roche, P. J. Rutledge, Dr James Ryan, Philip Shanahan, Austin Stack and W. F. P. Stockley. 63
There were six women TDs, and the oath was anathema to their socialist and republican beliefs. 64 They felt that, as well as betraying their dead comrades’ convictions, it would continue to subject Ireland to the British government and its class-ridden political system. They were opposed to compromise and all voted against the Treaty. 65 Four* of the six (known as the ‘Black Widows’) had lost male relatives in the Rising or the War of Independence: Kathleen Clarke* (wife of Thomas Clarke and sister of the executed Ned Daly), Dr Ada English, Mary MacSwiney* (elder sister of Terence), Countess Markievicz, Kate O’Callaghan* (wife of Michael O’Callaghan, a former lord mayor of Limerick) and Margaret Pearse* (mother of Patrick and Willie). Expressing the views of all of the women, and many of the male members of the Dá il, Dr Kathleen Lynn wrote:
Peace Terms, but what a peace! Not what Connolly and Mallin and countless died for. Please God the Country won’t agree to what Griffith, Barton, Gavan-Duffy, Duggan, and Mick Collins had put their names to, more shame to them, better war than with such a peace. It is terrible how many who should know better seem quite pleased with the terms. 66
The HQ staff of the IRA were split on the issue. Those opposed to the Treaty were:
Cathal Brugha, Minister for Defence
Austin Stack, formerly Deputy Chief of Staff Liam Mellows, Director of Purchases
Rory O’Connor, Director of Engineering Seá n Russell, Director of Munitions Seá mus O’Donovan, Director of Chemicals Oscar Traynor, O/C of the Dublin Brigade
Those in favour of the Treaty were:
Richard Mulcahy, Chief of Staff
J. J. O’Connell, Assistant Chief of Staff Eoin O’Duffy, Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Collins, Director of Intelligence
Diarmuid O’Hegarty, Director of Organisation Piaras Bé aslaí, Director of Publicity67
On 9 January de Valera resigned and put himself forward for re- election as president; he was defeated on 10 January (by 60 to 58 votes). Griffith was elected; de Valera did not vote. De Valera’s expressed view was that ‘The Republic must exist until the people disestablish it’. 68 He also said:
I hope that nobody will talk of fratricidal strife. That is all nonsense. We have a nation that knows how to conduct itself. 69
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