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TEXT 1. The troika of Russian foreign policy
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Exercise 21 Translate the texts in writing, learn the words and expressions given in bold type. Pay particular attention to possible variants of translating the parts given in italics. Compare your variant with those of your classmates and make an informed decision about the best.
TEXT 1. THE TROIKA OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Contemporary Russian foreign policy displays the unmistakable presence of three centuries-old drivers of Moscow’s posture on the world stage. Chief among these drivers is Russia’s quest for strategic depth and secure buffers against external threats, which, considering the country’s geography and absence of natural protective barriers between it and neighboring powers, has guided its geographic expansion. Along with physical insecurity and expansion, the second key driver of Russian foreign policy has been its ambition for recognition as a great power, which the Kremlin has long seen as necessary for legitimizing its geographic conquests and geopolitical ambitions. The third driver, related to the first two, is Russia’s complicated relationship with the West, which combines rivalry with the need for cooperation.
These recurrent themes are important. They highlight the degree to which Russian foreign policy in the Putin era is a continuation of many pursuits that are, by turns, decades- and centuries-old and were embraced by previous Russian governments regardless of their political persuasion. The historical record also performs an important legitimizing function for the citizens of the Russian state, which is less than three decades old, cementing the state’s claim to be the heir to a long, illustrious tradition dating back centuries . References to this tradition thus legitimize the Putin government’s ambitious overseas pursuits and present them as a matter of historical continuity and as an integral part of what Russia is.
TEXT 2. Russia’s Comeback Isn’t Stopping With Syria
For many in the West, Russia’s return to the world stage over the past few years has come as a surprise, and not an especially pleasant one. After the downfall of the Soviet Union, the country was written off as a regional power, a filling station masquerading as a state.
Five years later, however, Russia is still resilient, despite the Western sanctions imposed over its actions in Ukraine. It has effectively won, militarily, in Syria: Today it is a power broker in that country; the victory has raised its prestige in the Middle East and provided material support for Moscow’s claims to be a great power again.
Those who experience this moment with some discomfort should get used to it: Russia is not a superpower, but it is back as an important independent player. And it will be playing in various regions around the world in the years to come.
To the Russians themselves, this feels natural enough. In the 1990s, when the world saw Russia on its back, Russia’s leaders never looked at the country as finished. Rather, they saw its post-Soviet decline and withdrawal from the world scene as only temporary — something that Russia had experienced before and would eventually overcome. The only question was what form it would take.
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In the 2000s, Moscow became disillusioned over its desire to become part of the extended Euro-Atlantic community: Its pleas to be treated as an equal by the United States did not impress Washington, and its demands that its national security interests be respected were ignored in the process of NATO enlargement . And so from the early 2010s, the Kremlin started charting a course that was clearly at odds with its earlier policies of Western integration.
TEXT 3. Russia: Adapting To Sanctions Leaves Economy In Robust Health
Analysts say Moscow now has more to fear from a removal of restrictions than additional ones
Five years ago, the Russian economy was teetering on the brink. Following Moscow’s invasion and annexation of Crimea in March 2014, western countries imposed powerful economic sanctions on Russia which, coupled with a steep decline in the price of oil, could have brought the Kremlin to its knees. Yet by many metrics, Russia’s $1. 7tn economy looks to be in better shape today than it has done for some time. Growth is slower but more stable, a $124bn sovereign fund has been created, exporters have found new markets and importers have found domestic alternatives. Some economic analysts think Moscow has more to fear from an abrupt removal of the sanctions than additional ones. “The single biggest danger to the Russian economy would be if the US woke up one day and lifted all the sanctions, ” says a senior official who advises the Russian central bank. “There would be a massive inflow of capital, the currency would spike, all the government’s policies would be in tatters. It would be a disaster. ” That Russia should be in this seemingly absurd situation is a result of prudent fiscal policy by the Kremlin, economic adaptation over the years spent under western restrictions — and a fat slice of luck. The sanctions, imposed by the US, EU and other countries in various tranches since 2014, include travel bans for prominent individuals, prohibit long-term financing for some major corporates and ban assistance to Russian oil and gas companies for Arctic, shale and offshore projects. Few economists argue that the overall economic picture in Russia is better today than it would have been without any sanctions at all. Yet Moscow’s resilience has called into question the power of the extraterritorial restrictions imposed by the US and EU, and their worth as a foreign policy tool.
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