TEXT 2. Emulate Russian Realism

TEXT 2. Emulate Russian Realism

 Both Trump and many of the critics, despite their different perspectives about Russia, appear to share a belief that the key to expanding U. S. influence is to identify your friends, to stick with them through thick and thin, and to stick it to your adversaries. An oft-made contrast has been between what critics describe as resolute Russian support for the Assad regime in Syria and what the critics regard as too-weak U. S. support for Syrian opposition groups or anyone else they consider to be deserving U. S. clients. Certainly Trump has adhered to a rigid distinction between those countries defined as friends and those defined as enemies, as illustrated especially by his side-taking in the Persian Gulf.

But to match Russian influence—or indeed for any enhancement of U. S. influence, regardless of whether one is keeping score vis-à -vis Russia—one should learn from Russia’s diplomacy in a region such as the Middle East. That diplomacy is not based primarily on taking sides. Furnishing whatever support Assad wants is not the defining characteristic of Russia’s policy in the region. Instead, Russian policy features a willingness to engage with every significant player, on each side of the region’s multiple conflicts. Putin frequently pursues such engagement at the summit level in meetings not just with clients such as Syria but also with Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran.

In doing so, Putin is practicing foreign policy realism, which has no place for self-constraining side-taking in which one engages only with those we like and not with those we dislike. Realism does not divide the world into good and evil. It instead perceives that there are both conflicts of interest and parallel interests with just about everyone.

TEXT 3 Emulate Russian Realism

By engaging with just about everyone, the realist maximizes the ability to pursue one’s own interests wherever and whenever there is an opportunity to do so, taking advantage of any parallelism, even a modest amount, with the interests of other countries. Such engagement also maximizes opportunities for relations with one country to provide leverage over another country. As Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger demonstrated when practicing great power triangular diplomacy in the early 1970s, having better relations with each of two countries than the two have with each other means having the most influence of all three. Rigid side-taking sacrifices all of these influence-expanding opportunities.

Putin’s dealings with Iran, where he was earlier this month (in a trilateral meeting that also included the president of Azerbaijan) illustrate his approach. There are ample conflicts of interest between Russia and Iran, on top of historical animosity left over from repeated clashes between the Russian and Persian empires. But there also are significant opportunities to work together on the basis of parallel interests. The meeting featured the signing of deals on energy development, talks about Syria (where Russia and Iran have supported the same side in the civil war but also are in competition for post-war influence) and discussions of the future of the Iran nuclear agreement, with such discussions underscoring the self-isolation of the United States under the Trump administration.

Multilateral diplomacy is another variety of engagement with everyone rather than a dividing of the world into good guys and bad guys. Russia—and China—have effectively exploited multilateral fora, while Trump has accelerated a decline of U. S. influence by disdaining anything multilateral.

TEXT 4. IMF Staff Concludes Visit to Russia

An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission, led by James Roaf, visited Moscow and Kaluga during November 13-20, 2019, to discuss recent economic developments, Russia’s economic outlook, and the authorities’ policies. At the conclusion of the visit, Mr. Roaf made the following statement:

“Russia’s overall economic situation may be characterized by three main factors. First, adherence to a sound macroeconomic framework, which supports economic activity by reducing uncertainty, keeping inflation under control and providing confidence in the exchange rate. Second, structural rigidities limiting growth, notwithstanding important ongoing reform efforts in a number of areas, including under the national projects. Third, international sanctions which have pervasive effects in adding to business uncertainty, holding back both foreign and domestic investment, and reducing Russia’s international market integration. Taking these factors together, the medium-term outlook for the economy remains subdued, with growth projected at or below 2 percent through the next few years.

“In the near term, GDP is projected to grow by 1. 1 percent in 2019, held back by weak domestic demand and an unfavorable external environment. Growth is forecast to pick up to 1. 9 percent in 2020 as delays in government spending on the national projects are addressed. The inflation rate is projected to continue falling, to below 3 percent in early 2020, before rising gradually towards the 4 percent target as domestic demand strengthens and the effects of transitory disinflation factors fade out.

“The significant interest rate cuts implemented by the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) since June have been an appropriate response to weakening inflationary pressures. With inflation expected to remain below target throughout 2020, further interest rate cuts will be appropriate.