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3. Europe - the USA - the Islamic World - Ukraine - the Russian Federation
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Following the gradual disappearance of confrontation along the " West-East" line deeper forms of global interaction have risen to the surface of international life. New forms of contradictions along the lines of " rich (developed) states" - " poor states", " South-North" etc. are sometimes mentioned. The search for deeper grounds for world order leads researchers to the creation of inter-civilizational models of interaction between large groups of states and to attempts at defining new possible lines of confrontation. S. Huntington began discussions about the " clash of civilizations", first of all between the West (" North" ) and the Islamic world (" South" ). At present, however, there are a number of considerably developed states in the " South" group and a number of states in the " North" group that can hardly be classified as being " rich", particularly in the post-Soviet region.
From the " South" states' point of view there is no substantial difference between the developed western states and the countries of the former " socialist system" because of a certain similarity in their mentalities, which are grounded on a generally European axiological system. The reality of the situation is more complex than it seems to be from the point of view of a classical geopolitical scheme that presents mainly pro-European ideas about world order.
The European model of civilization created colonial empires and attempted to lure colonial countries to its world-view, to modern forms of technological progress, and to a European type of sociopolitical system. Although the European experience was partly adopted by the " South" states, in many countries its conflict with local civilizations awakened the aspiration for the foundation of their own sociological and technological forms of progress, and for the separation of their existence from the Western axiological paradigm. Admittedly, this occurred along with the utilization of the West's achievements, but only to a certain extent, that is, without the loss of native identificational schemes.
Thus, the new world order must be developed taking into account both socio-technological as well as cultural-civilizational factors. It is possible to define several, at times alternative, at times concurrent and interactive directions for the formation of society in the future:
· westernization - radical modernization of socio-economic life according to western models; a quick transformation into a market economy and democratic system; monetary gains by the ruling é lite;
· radical conservatism (the fundamentalist model) - consists of a restoration of the traditional schemes of mentality and behavior and is based on the rejection of the rapid and non-understandable by the wide strata of population reforms, and of the entire process of modernization in its western modus; it is also based on the rhetoric that corresponds to the regeneration of traditions, national culture, and historical experience;
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· a gradual transformation of the existent system toward the direction of a synthesis of a traditional national-cultural model and elements of the western economic system. In this case the ruling é lite becomes transformed toward the direction of modern systems of values.
Existent strategic perspectives for the development of Oriental societies create a field of choices that will come into being with the passing of time. But intentions directed toward the future are also subject to adjustment from the point of view of a spacial dimension, in accordance to the structure of the geopolitical landscape that will come into formation in the region and its environment. The choice of a strategic path of development and its actual implementation depend on dominant geopolitical forces.
There is no doubt that the modern high-technology advantages of western civilization, whose leading states are becoming aware of their interests in this region, will influence the choice of this path. This applies specifically to the USA, which actively promotes the reform of the economic and political systems of the East and regards this region as an important sphere of its own interests. But here it once again faces a confrontation with the forces of Islam, which exercise considerable influence in this region. Influences, that have at their core interests of the Russian Federation, are also important here. Russia enjoys the support of several local ruling elites in this region and depends on former economic relations and the orientations of certain segments of the population.
The collapse of a bipolar model of international relations caused considerable changes in the geopolitical situation of Asian states. To some degree these changes are similar to those in Europe. A new map of the geopolitical reality here is being formed. Local actors (India, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Pakistan, etc. ) that are waging an internal regional game for leadership and also aspire to occupy a central place in Asian geopolitics play a considerable role in the complex network of interactions and criss-crossings of global interests and intentions.
Industrially developed West-European states and Japan are heavily dependent on oil supply from the Middle East. A number of states in this region (members of OPEC) have became extremely rich by displacing multinational corporations from Middle Eastern oil fields and by drastically raising the prices of oil. Control over energy resources and supply lines provides these states with substantial geopolitical advantages. Due to the considerable concentration of financial resources under the control of mainly authoritarian regimes, these governments are able to support their internal stability. At the present stage of the struggle for the world fuel-energy order the USA is attempting to squeeze out such oil exporters as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Russia in favor of its traditional ally - Saudi Arabia, along with the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. West-European countries are working on the question of developing alternative energy supply lines, particularly from Caspian sources.
Having lost control over oil extraction, multinational oil corporations are recently re-orienting their business strategies toward the middle stage of the production process and the (generally local) refining and transportation of the product to the market of consumption (mainly western Europe). As a result of this, competition over control of transportation routes, including those that pass through Ukraine, has intensified. Admittedly, sea routes are currently regarded to be more reliable because of the unstable conditions in transit countries.
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The struggle among global powers for economic and political control over processes in this region can develop into a new cycle of confrontation and can seriously influence European stability and security. Apart from the traditional forces that strive for consolidation and the formation of an Islamic model of order, three groups of players - the USA, Russia and the European states are waging a severe political and economic war for control over core regional transportation corridors and a model for world order. Each of the great powers aspires to establish its own model of international order for the purpose of fulfilling its interests. Each of the existent models of order that has a chance to prevail and establish its domination in the region depends on the support of corresponding domestic political forces and on foreign powers. The analysis of these models allows for the definition of the perspectives for the development of the region in the future and in this way for the determination of Ukrainian policy in Asia.
The Islamic model of order is being formed in connection with the processes of the Islamic renaissance and also as a result of increased foreign political pressure on Islamic states and disenchantment with the ineffectiveness of the component of the Arab-Israeli peace process that deals with Palestinian interests. The growth in Islamic fundamentalism is caused by the reaction of the populations of the region's states to the processes of the modernization and westernization of socio-economic life that is connected with a rejection of a number of traditional values.
The victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran (1979) and the Islamic movement's success in other states of the region has led to the development of Islam as significant geopolitical force, whose organization and internal consolidation is on the rise. Since the collapse of the USSR Islamic movements have spread into post-Soviet space and have created the so-called " Islamic Threat" to the new independent states. Influential pro-Islamic political forces act even in the countries that espouse pro-western orientations (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt), where they enjoy massive public support and are capable of coming to power and changing the general course of foreign policy. This can result in a substantial sharpening of the clash of global interests in this region.
Islamic thinking is directed against western expansion and Zionism. The moderate muslim movement aspires for a renovation of the Islamic order aided by cooperation and the promotion of Islamic unity. But the pan-Islamic forces lack worked-out plans, programs, and projects that are adequate to ensure economic development. Extremist Islamic groupings have chosen the tactic of terrorism and a military solution of existent problems, (Libya, Afghanistan, Tadjikistan, Chechnia) which creates a threat to security and stability.
The confrontation of Islam and the West bears more of a cultural rather than political or economic flavor. The easy option is to regard Islam as a threat, the pan-Islamic movement as a monolithic in nature historical enemy, whose faith and intentions are diametrically opposed to the West. This position, however, leads to the support of authoritarian governments that despite their pro-western orientations create more risk than do pro-Islamic oriented forces. The more difficult option entails rejecting stereotypical solutions.
The US Administration together with the western media are inclined to identify Islamic fundamentalism with radicalism, terrorism and anti-Americanism in the same way that Moslems are inclined to regard the West as a threatening monolith, in the process creating the image of an enemy. In reality " Islamic fundamentalism" is internally heterogeneous, and many local governments often utilize the threat of Islamic radicalism to control the Islamic movement.
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Modern Islamic policy represents more of a challenge than a threat. It is a challenge to the western knowledge and understanding of the diversity of Islamic experience. Diversity rather than monolithic unity is more the norm in the Islamic world. Proponents of Islam believe that Islam ensures a complete system of faith, provides a model for the integrity of society and government, and represents a modern alternative to capitalism, communism, democracy and other western socio-political and ideological systems. They also beleive that corrupt regimes and foreign influences bring " infidelity" into their societies, undermine the natural order of relations between husband and wife, destroy the family and promote amorality. They aspire for the elimination of the problems of corruption, of foreign influences, and to develop their nations on religious principles.
From an objective point of view all of the discussions concerning " the increase of Islamic pressure from the South" should be regarded as residue of the confrontational mentality of the past. This is caused by a search for new global threats, which can justify the military, political and geostrategic concepts of large states. In general, the Islamic movement is not aggressive. The Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (1972) and the General Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (1981) define that the principles of this movement are based on general democratic precepts in keeping with the UN Charter. Islamic radical terrorist groups are uncoordinated and pursue local goals. The last high-level forum of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which took place in Teheran in December 1997, demonstrated the high level of consolidation of Islamic states and also asserted Iran's leadership. Iran played the main role in attempts to solve the Tadjik conflict and actively promotes the overcoming of the Afghani crisis.
The American modelof order in the Islamic region is based on a strategic partnership of the US with Israel and also on close relations with Turkey and a number of Arab states (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, monarchies of the Persian Gulf, Pakistan). According to this model all regional conflicts can be regulated by means of a plan through which economic cooperation is coordinated with political agreement (the Kissinger-Peres plan). The Arab-Israeli peace process from the 1970's on was developed according to this model, although at present its unsteadiness and unpredictability are evident.
The state of Israel enjoys the substantial support of influential Western and US financial circles through the presence of a strong Jewish lobby in the political circles of different countries. Israel controls significant world financial flows and is able to influence the political and economic development and foreign policy of many states. A geopolitical triangle (USA-Israel-Turkey) is under formation as a result of the strengthening of Israeli-Turkish military cooperation (1993, 1996 agreements for cooperation in the defense sphere). Further steps in the introduction and strengthening of the american paradigm is based on this triangle. At the same time the USA is attempting to balance its pro-Israeli Near East policy by relying more than before on separate Arab states, particularly on Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
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Regardless of certain successes of the American model, Arab public and political opinion view the idea of a common American-style market with either suspicion or hostility. This approach meets with the opposition of the political regimes of a number of Middle East states. In addition, the proliferation of this approach has introduced a split into the system of Arab unity and forced the countries of the region to seek other grounds for consolidation, particularly, the idea of Islamic unity.
American support of repressive regimes (the Shah of Iran, Lebanon, Noumaristic Sudan) has led to anti-American sentiments and the growth of an anti-western mood. Under current conditions American policy should be more diversified and directed toward cooperation with friendly Islamic governments, combining clear and consistent policy with the defense of human rights.
After the USSR's disintegration, from approximately 1994 onward, the USA has begun to regard Central Asia as a strategically important region that is situated at the crossroads of transasian traffic. On a certain level the USA is in agreement with Russian policy in the region, which is directed at supporting the region's stability. The defense of ethnic minorities' rights, and of democratic and economic reforms corresponds equally to US and to RF interests.
The region is important to the USA both as a possible future counterbalance to China and as a barrier against Iranian influence. However, America's interests here are not of sufficient vitality to prompt it to take on full-scale responsibility for the region's security and to fill the existing geostrategic vacuum. Up to now the USA has supported the regional leadership of Turkey, its strategic partner. The major USA interest here is to prevent the development of existent problems into crisis situations that will spread into other Asian regions. The best way to reach this goal is to develop democracy and a market economy in the states of the region. This will prevent the development of ethnic, religious and political extremism.
The European paradigm is attractive to a number of Oriental states. It has many adherents in the Arab world. In particular, it deals with the re-evaluation of history and current policy in the strategic project of articulating and uniting the national interests of states on both shores of the Mediterranean. The idea of Mediterranean cooperation was proclaimed at the European-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona in 1995. The basic principles for such cooperation are: closer and more substantial cooperation of countries with differing cultures; economic benefit to all parts of the region; mutual security; the reduction of tensions and the decrease of the risk of armed conflict. North Mediterranean states regard the full-scale development of South states to be an important factor of Northern security. In contradistinction to the pro-American model this partnership does not evoke hostility in the Arab-Islamic world. This is due to the absence of the USA in this process and also to the fact that the Israeli issue does not dominate.
It is to be expected that this more flexible and non-confrontational approach in foreign policy thinking will become dominant in the whole region, as it better corresponds to the interests of Middle East states.
The Russian-Soviet Model. For a lengthy period beginning with the 1950's Moscow endeavored to mould its own model of order, based on anti-colonial and pro-socialist ideas, in the Middle East. The ideology of Arab socialist nationalism that emerged in the time of President G. A. Nasser of Egypt was connected with national liberation movements which targeted West-European colonialism and one its specific forms, Israeli expansionism. This was a unique secular form of political thinking that adopted the popular in the 1950s and 1960s ideas of socialism, and gained popularity in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya etc. Arab states found considerable support in their anti-colonial and pro-socialist aspirations from the USSR and states from the socialist camp, who provided substantial economic and military-technical aid. Defeats in the wars against Israel stimulated in the region a search for means of diversification of political orientations. This process was strengthened with the destruction of the socialist system and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The RF is also one of the main actors in the Transcaucasian region, where it is attempting to assert its presence, motivating its actions by the presence here of regional conflicts (Karabakh, Abkhazia). The dual character of Russian policy in post-Soviet conflict zones is worth stressing here, in that it is closely connected with the idea of the restoration, in whatever form, of a new federal (or confederate) state, which is the strategic goal of all mainstream Russian political forces. The essence of this policy, which clearly revealed itself in Abkhazia, Northern Ossetia, Transdniestria, Tadjikistan and other spots with high conflict potential such as the Crimea, Sevastopol and the Black Sea fleet, consists of a mixture of the inflammation, exploitation, and regulation of conflicts.
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The main interest of the RF in the region is to prevent any threat to its strategic interests, that is, to dictate its will, and to force its position toward events and the resolution of problems. The RF does everything possible to preserve its political, economic and military domination in the Transcaucases, to maximize the coordination of the foreign policies of Transcaucasian states with RF priorities and to prevent the growth of influence of third-party states (namely Turkey, the USA, Great Britain, the FRG and Iran) in this region.
Recently, an activation of Russian Federation foreign policy concerning the Central Asian region is noticeable. Fueled by the inertia of their political thinking, a considerable part of the ruling é lites of the states that emerged after the USSR's collapse could not imagine a future outside of the framework of a renovated USSR, or mutual coexistence in the paradigm of the CIS or other such organization. However, a certain prejudice against the transformations that Moscow was embarking upon also appeared.
After the collapse of the USSR the process of a breaking down of economic ties between the Center and the Central Asian periphery began to occur. As a result, the leaders of the new states were left without any strong arguments for the need to move closer to Moscow, discounting separate instances of military need. Precisely this military factor was used to keep the region within the sphere of Russian influence. Russia and the Central Asian states maintain some mutual concerns, however, such as the prevention of the spread to the North of Moslem fundamentalism and zones of armed conflict, from Afghanistan and Tadjikistan. A significant lever of Russian influence in this region is the Treaty concerning the collective security of CIS countries (which included nine states, excepting Ukraine and Turkmenistan; in early 1999, Uzbekistan ceased its participation in the Treaty, and Georgia and Azerbaijan declared an analogous intention), that have created a single sphere of defense.
Russian analysts proceed from the assumption that the emergence of a post-Soviet vacuum is a dangerous phenomenon, particularly in Central Asia, where the threat of internal conflicts and of the foreign intervention of Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, the USA, China, Afghanistan is on the rise. Thus, the intrusion of armed Taliban groupings into Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan is believed to be possible, and in the case of Islamic forces seizing power in Tadjikistan, its border with Afghanistan would become transparent, forcing Russia to evacuate its frontier troops. Also disturbing is the possibility of the heightening of Tiurk-Tadjik tensions combined with the inevitable intervention of Turkey. Thus, the only believed way to prevent future full-scale conflicts is once again an increase of the Russian presence in this region, a presence in which the USA together with the international community are seemingly interested.
Such a position is altogether based on the somewhat doubtful thesis that extreme inter-ethnic collisions and conflicts will inevitably emerge without imperial Russian domination in post-Soviet space. Meanwhile, historical experience attests to something quite different, to the fact that local inter-ethnic conflicts are often provoked and spread to large proportions precisely as the result of the intervention of external forces, who for their own reasons are interested in the escalation of these conflicts. The involvement of international security mechanisms and a display of tolerance by opposing sides can constitute a less painful way for solving spontaneous inter-ethnic tensions. The domination of a single power in the region can only lead to its provocation of all sorts of conflicts, while true stability is developed in a situation of balanced actions by different geopolitical forces.
As a result of the severity of the problems that emerge because of the factors mentioned, the region is marked by the most substantial armed conflicts of recent decades.
Ukraine's penetration into the East. The South-East direction of Ukrainian foreign policy (the Black Sea and Middle East regions, Central Asia, India, the APR states) is not burdened with confrontational problems and has significant potential for the development of Ukraine's active presence in the international arena. The economic ground for this is based on markedly better possibilities for mutually beneficial trade and the implementation of large economic projects. It is extremely important for Ukraine to ensure for itself the alternative supply of energy carriers and to have its own markets for Ukrainian products and equipment that are competitive with those of other countries. On the other hand, Ukraine can serve as a link in the economic connections between Central and Western Europe and the East.
Trade dealing with energy carriers represents one of the most important and difficult issues in modern geopolitics. Leading world states and powerful multinational corporations are waging a severe competitive battle for control over the sources of extraction and supply lines of energy carriers. Great financial and power-blocs are involved, as at issue is the present and possibly future division of geopolitical influence. Because of the predicted decrease in the 21st century of the export potential of its traditional oil-supplier, Russia, Ukraine is searching for contact with other sources. According to experts, most promising for Ukraine would be the Caspian oil market, although the Middle East states as suppliers should not be excluded.
The population of Middle East states is growing with the utmost of rapidity (approximately 3% per year) while the population of European countries, including Ukraine, will remain practically the same or will even decrease. This rapid growth of population will lead to a food supply problem that will be difficult to solve on a regional level. Thus, an increase in immigration from the Middle East to Europe and particularly to Ukraine, which will pose a significant threat to the existent system of security and stability, can be expected. This situation opens territorial possibilities for Ukraine to penetrate Middle East markets with its foodstuffs, in exchange for energy carriers. This will no doubt promote the development of the Ukrainian agriculture industry and will result in a decrease of rural migration to cities.
In order to fulfill its strategic interests in the South-East direction Ukraine stands before a choice of existent models of geopolitical thinking. Ukraine cannot unconditionally adhere to the American-Israeli point of view on the region's problems, as it similarly cannot accept Arab nationalist or Islamic models. The possible adherence to the American model that can occur as a result of strategic cooperation with the core countries of the US - Israeli - Turkish triangle both has its advantages and its drawbacks. The formula for strategic partnership along the Ukraine - USA line demands semantic elaboration that will take into account geopolitical and geoeconomic tendencies in post-Soviet and Central European regions. In the case of the acceptance of the American model Ukraine must take into account and use to its advantage the experience of Israel, which while supporting the US's interests in the region ensures its own national security with the help of American financial, political and military aid.
Insofar as Ukraine is a European state that aspires to join all European structures the most attractive for Ukraine is the European model of thinking, which provides ground for the coordination of interests of states with varying levels of socio-economic development and differing types of cultures. This means that in the case of disagreement between various states it is important for Kyiv to coordinate its conduct first of all with European countries, while overall maintaining the tactic of vagueness concerning delicate issues of the region.
In contradistinction to the unquestionably important for Ukraine road of integration into the European Union that, according to the most optimistic expectations, can continue for 10-15 years, relations with Oriental states can be of immediate use. Establishing mutually beneficial economic relations with states such as Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and many others will give the Ukrainian economy an opportunity to function, since there is a demand for Ukrainian goods in these countries. It can also strengthen Ukraine's international prestige as a state with real participation in international processes.
Ukraine regards itself to be a European state, thereby taking on the responsibility for acting as a conduit for European values entering the East, thus creating a new sphere of interests that the former Soviet Empire never dealt with. This especially concerns the new independent Central Asian states that lean toward European socio-political and economic models and do not obligate themselves to exclusively follow the " Turkish road" or to join Islamic fundamentalism. These states would rather enter into a dialog with an equal Ukraine instead of adopting a " big brother".
The best way for Ukraine to exit its northern neighbor's shadow is to conduct its own active political relations with countries of the East. Ukraine is interested in the creation of new security structures in the East and in the stability and development of the region's new countries. This would lead to consequential and long-term relations with these states, decrease immigration flows to Europe, and make control over drug trafficking and of the criminal element more effective.
Ukraine supports the creation of new security structures in the East, especially in the region of the Caucasus and of Central Asia, as a necessary counterbalance to certain pro-imperialistic forces that still exercise significant influence over the politics of large states.
As a large state, Russia has more opportunities than Ukraine to develop cooperation with states of the region that pose a risk, and can afford to pay less attention to the opinion of the world community than Ukraine can. Nevertheless, our country should not turn its back on the experience of cooperation with these states garnered in Soviet times, particularly in the military-technical realm.
The increase in economic, political, military and cultural cooperation with the new independent states (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and others) will promote the creation of a favourable balance of forces in the region.
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