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b) The State of the CIS and its Future Perspectives
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The CIS, as a union of 12 post-Soviet states emerged according to the Treaty of Minsk, the Declaration of Alma-Ata, and the Minutes of the Treaty of Minsk, after the disintegration of the USSR. During its inception it was defined that the Commonwealth is to be built according to the principles of international law. Membership in the CIS is voluntary and each member has the right to suspend or to withdraw its membership. The bodies of the CIS have purely consultative and coordinative functions.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the creation of the CIS in 1991 represented only the beginning of a complicated flow of integrative and disintegrative processes within the territory of the last world empire. The CIS proved to be a politically and economically incapable and unstable structure. The ineffectiveness of the CIS's functioning is determined by the contradictory nature inherent in the concept of its existence. The CIS in fact, appeared as a mechanism for solving the contradictions that came into being under Soviet conditions between the union center and the periphery, made up of Soviet republics, during the time of " perestroika".
The struggle between centrifugal and centripetal tendencies of development led to the creation of new independent states with their own understanding of their national interests. The function of the " center" was appropriated by one of the newly created states, the Russian Federation, which declared itself to be the USSR's sole successor and in time began to direct its politics toward the restoration of a new union, that is, to once again " gather territories" around Moscow. The growing bi-polarization of CIS relations along the " center-periphery" axis has effectively led to the formation of two blocs of states that have opposing views on the role, functions, organization, and future of the CIS.
The functions of the CIS and difficulties in their fulfillment. On the whole, the creation of the CIS can be regarded as historically justified at the stage of the formation of the new states, but at present, when this process can be seen to be complete, the existence of the CIS becomes problematic. In order to investigate the positive and negative sides of CIS activity during the past seven years an analysis of its actual functions and goals should be made. However, it is worth highlighting that each function also has a double nature (centrifugal and centripetal) in keeping with the different conceptional schemes of viewing the CIS:
a) The cultural-historical function is based on a common past and shows itself in the maintenance of a feeling of solidarity among post-Soviet nations, which had been formed during a prolonged common existence within the Russian Empire and the USSR. A certain " civic-minded" unity also exists among CIS states, marked by similar systems of education, the use of the Russian language, familial ties, etc. Due to the creation of the CIS the shock to populations of post-Soviet states caused by the dissolution of the USSR was lighter than would otherwise have been the case. The regime of free movement across (new) borders was maintained, as was the recognition of educational documents and scholarly degrees, the maintenance of the compounds of a common informational realm, etc. On the other hand, the RF's " civic-minded - informational" hegemony (demands for the protection of the " Russian-speaking population", the introduction of dual citizenship, the tendentiousness of the Russian mass media, etc. ) has became widespread in post-Soviet space. The fact that the Russian language has been established as the only working language of the Commonwealth can hardly be termed fair.
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b) The international-law function. The creation of the CIS promoted a more civilized way of solving the problems connected with the transformation of the former Soviet republics into independent states (the mechanism of " divorce" ). The completion of this process will occur as a result of the strengthening of national states, their entry into the international arena, the signing of bilateral agreements with the RF, etc. At this point the international-law function of the Commonwealth in its present state will lose its sense and will have to obtain different obligations.
As matters stand, the Commonwealth, as a union of independent states, is gradually transforming itself into a pro-Russian supra-state structure. Despite the fact that according to the terms of the Treaty of Belovezhsk, Minsk was established as the capital of the CIS, its main components and structures abide in Moscow. The RF in all manners attempts to establish in the mind of the international community its right to dominate on the territory of the CIS. Proof of this is its attempt to establish status for the CIS in the UN and to promote its interests in an unrestrained fashion under the aegis of this organization. Wide propagandist measures have been taken by Russia in order to turn world opinion away from the new independent states and to form a negative image of them.
The formation of a ramified structure of CIS components can be viewed as the result of the existence of old Soviet stereotypes of bureaucratic consciousness. Principles of the Soviet system were carried through into the Commonwealth's activity, which in large part contributed to its ineffectiveness. Commonwealth bodies' resolutions are in fact non-obligatory in nature and each member-state complies only with those resolutions that are beneficial and in agreement with its national demands of law. Thus Ukraine, for instance, is only an associate member of the CIS, is not a signatory to the Statute of the CIS, does not participate in its customs and payment unions, takes no part in bodies of military cooperation, and holds the position of observer in its Inter-Parliamentary Assembly.
c) The Economic function. In the creation of the CIS it was important to maintain the rational economic ties that had been formed in the conditions of the former singular national economic plan. The complementary nature and interdependence of member-states of the CIS do exist, as do common problems in the carrying out of economic transformations that could be solved in a coordinated manner.
But the expected hopes for the creation of an effective model of economic cooperation have not been fulfilled. Russian domination has become fixed in the economic components of the CIS. The Customs Treaty in many cases does not function and significant protectionalist barriers discriminative toward members of the Commonwealth exist in Russian trade with CIS states. The RF uses the fact of the dependence of the economies of the CIS states on Russian supplies either for the purpose of increasing its prices much higher than world levels or for the purpose of political pressure. All the above-mentioned will force many Commonwealth states to search for alternative solutions for their economic development.
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d) The military-political function and security issues. Common elements of military leadership and of the military infrastructures of strategic forces were maintained during the first stage of the CIS's existence. With the development of national armed forces, the transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and Kazakhstan to the RF, and the settling of the problem surrounding the Black Sea fleet, this function gradually disappeared. Attempts at its reanimation by way of the Tashkent Treaty were unsuccessful, in practice military cooperation took on the form of bilateral cooperation. The RF took upon itself the function of defending the external borders of Commonwealth states (except Ukraine), but with the establishment of national border troops of CIS member-states this function will also gradually disappear.
Supporters of the reintegration of post-Soviet space based on the principle of Russian domination consider that without a Russian military-political presence interethnic and interdenominational conflicts will inevitably occur in the new independent states. However, these cases have largely emerged as a result of Russian intervention. Georgia has expressed its dissatisfaction with Russian behavior in the Abkhazian situation. Azerbaijan is similarly dissatisfied with Russian support of Armenia. Ukraine could have found itself threatened by large-scale conflict in the Crimea inspired by the RF. The Chechen conflict emerged precisely as a result of non-constructive Russian policy, etc. Thus the thesis arguing for the necessity of the Russian military presence in CIS states does not stand up to criticism and more readily satisfies Moscow's geopolitical ambitions rather than the interests of other CIS states' military security.
Seven years of the CIS's existence have shown that as an integrative union of post-Soviet states, the Commonwealth has not proven succesful. The approximately 800 documents adopted within the structures of the CIS do not function in fact. The coordinating institutions have in no way influenced the economic development of CIS states. Whatever elements of integration have come forth have done so due to bilateral agreements. The amount of Russian trade with other members of the Commonwealth is 2. 5 times less than with other countries of the world.
In overall terms it must be stated that the Commonwealth shows a tendency toward the transformation of itself into a mechanism for the realization of exclusively Russian interests. Because of its domination in the working components of the CIS, the RF, in fact, has opportunities to make the decisions that correspond to its national interests and contradict the interests of other member-states. The domination of Russian interests in the CIS has in no way promoted the development of the cooperative potential at first present. This has understandably caused natural anxiety and opposition on the part of the new independent states, which quickly developed their own state structures and intensified their understanding of their own interests.
Economic, political and legal contradictions have been accumulating in relations between CIS states and Russia. Dissatisfaction with the state of affairs became evident during the last meetings of CIS Heads of State, where the non-constructive Russian position was subjected to harsh criticism. The tendency toward the creation of special integrative substructures beyond the framework of the CIS (the Union of the RF and Belarus', the Customs Union of the Four, the Central-Asian Economic Union, GUAM, etc. ) is telling. The Commonwealth is gradually transforming itself into a multilevel structure with varying degrees of separate states' participation in integrative processes.
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The main reasons for the non-viability and instability of the CIS are:
1. The inequality of relations among CIS states and RF pretensions for political, economic, informational, and socio-cultural domination;
2. RF efforts to view the entire post-Soviet area as its zone of " legitimate" vital interests;
3. The incompatibility of constant RF demands concerning the coordination of the foreign and economic policies of CIS states, along with the practice of totally ignoring its partners' interests and priorities;
4. Constant RF attempts to form a new military-political block or system of collective security (for whom and against whom? ) within the framework of the CIS.
5. The RF's strategic course toward the development of supra-state structures, under its control, within the CIS; the progressive integration of post-Soviet states into a new powerful geopolitical block.
The RF's policy concerning the CIS. The main strategic priorities of RF policy relating to the CIS have always been determined by its attempts to use this structure as a tool for the reintegration of the USSR in whatever form, and as a means of advancing and materializing the RF's economic, political, military and territorial ambitions beyond its current borders. Established as a union of independent states, the CIS gradually transformed itself into a political and economic structure fully controlled by Moscow. The RF not only wants to be the leader and new center of the CIS, but openly declares its right for complete domination in this organization. The Russian version of the CIS that was first presented at the 1994 Moscow Summit could not be characterized as anything but a long-term program for the reintegration of the USSR. Moscow became the center for the entirety of CIS activity, breaking all previous agreements. All key committees and ruling bodies of the CIS are headed by representatives of the RF. The totally Russified Committee on Defense was transformed into a puppet that formally asserts RF military operations in CIS states. One more shocking example of the " equalité a là Russie" that reigns in the CIS is constituted by the International Economic Committee, where the RF has reserved for itself 50% of all votes. Persistent RF attempts to consolidate the CIS's status in the UN can potentially be used for the purposes of demanding financial support and the sanctioning of RF military operations under the umbrella of peacemaking activity. They can also lead to the transformation of the CIS into a powerful tool for the advancement of RF interests within the entire geopolitical area of the former USSR and far beyond its borders.
The main directions of RF geopolitical strategy concerning CIS states were provided in President Yeltsin's well-known Decree No 940, dated September 19, 1995, entitled " Russia's Strategic Course Concerning Member-States of the CIS", where the entire post-Soviet space is proclaimed to be " first of all, a zone of Russian interests". The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) elaborated this strategy in its report entitled " Russia and the CIS: does the Position of the West Require Adjustment? " This report asserts that " objective" re-integrational processes will inevitably precondition the restoration of " a new economic defense zone" under RF leadership within the CIS. This report proposed two clearly defined alternatives. The first proposes complete integration in the economic and military spheres along with the formation of a " mutual defense zone", united leadership and military units that would guarantee stabilization, democratization and the advancement of reforms. The second alternative proposes the complete destabilization of the CIS, which would " constitute a threat to the whole of mankind".
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It is entirely clear that the RF has no intention of building relations with CIS countries based on equal partnership and the norms of international law, or of respecting their economic and political sovereignty and territorial integrity. " Integration", the necessity and benefit of which are widely declared in the document, in practice signifies the erosion of the sovereignty of CIS member-states, the subordination of their activity to RF interests, and the regeneration of a centralized superpower.
The creation of a unified state on the territory of the former USSR first based on confederate and later on federal principles was also predicted in the report entitled " Will the (Soviet) Union be Re-born in 2005? ", prepared in Moscow by experts of the influential Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. The majority of former Soviet republics except for the Baltic states are to enter this creation. Russia certainly has to become the heart and center of this new state. This document underlines that the core factors in Russia's relations with neighbors that have not joined the new Union are, first of all, Russian vital interests, meaning that " it has to be ready to resort to all means including the use of force to defend its interests".
Accordingly, long-term RF strategy should include:
· the reform of geopolitical priorities and mechanisms of the RF's foreign policy with the aim of increasing Russian domination and influence in each CIS state;
· a shift of emphasis in CIS activity away from the signing of treaties toward the development of cooperative projects in political, social and economic spheres. The creation of financial-industrial groups, customs unions, stock exchanges, joint banks and credit unions with the aim of gaining entry into and establishing domination for the RF in these structures. The Russian language and Russian cultural and informational expansion should play a particular role in this;
· the formation of a wide network of formal and informal contacts with economic and cultural é lites in the CIS in order to create the necessary conditions for the dissemination and implementation of a given strategy " from the inside".
Analogous recommendations are found in another report of the Council on the Foreign and Defense Policy of the RF entitled " The CIS: the Beginning or the End of History? " (1997), where the following is said: " it is necessary to admit that without severe therapy Russian-Ukrainian relations will not recover. Although the decomposition of Ukraine is a problematic alternative for Russia, it is better to promote its decomposition than to suffer from constant Ukrainian challenges and the erosion of our efforts in the near abroad. "
Thus, despite all of the differences among the representatives of the RF's ruling é lite, among different parties and political groupings, Russia's general line concerning Ukraine entirely corresponds to two basic directives:
1. The Maximal Program entails the disintegration or complete subordination of Ukraine, the return of Ukraine to its former semi-colonial status in the confines of a new Union, confederation or federation, and the establishment of total control over the foreign, military and economic policies of Ukraine.
2. The Minimal Program entails the " finlandization of Ukraine" in a " legitimate zone of Russian influence", progressive economic, socio-cultural expansion into Ukraine with the purpose of closely adjusting its policies with the RF's national interests, and the ensuring of the political obedience and economic dependence of Ukraine.
Taking into account a number of internal and external factors it can be stated that the support of the integrative processes in the CIS was and remains an extremely important issue for the Russian Federation. At the same time the RF's policy of the " forced integration" of CIS states has failed. Among the main reasons for this are:
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· the scarcity of material and financial resources of the RF and the impossibility of a determined expansionist policy in these conditions;
· the chronological coincidence of NATO's eastward expansion and the stratification of the CIS that considerably weaken the RF's superpower potential;
· the broadening and strengthening of relations between CIS states and countries of both the West and the East and their gradual integration into other economic zones (the EU, BSEC, CEFTA ).
In these conditions Moscow must expeditiously search for new models for its relations with its CIS partners, primarily with Ukraine.
Ukraine in the CIS. Two diametrically opposite ideologies concerning the sense and perspectives for development of the CIS came into being at the very beginning of the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Ukraine regarded the CIS to primarily be a mechanism for the " civilized divorce" of the former USSR's component parts and as an organization that Ukraine would remain in only for a short period of time, until its final integration into a united Europe. The RF's position is quite distinct in that it has and continues to view the CIS as an intermediate stage in the restoration of a former empire and sees the CIS in its present form as a sphere for the domination of Russian interests.
From the point of view of Russian geopoliticians, Ukraine's westward orientation and attempts to separate from Russia's sphere of influence will undoubtedly lead to the emergence of a permanent source of internal conflicts. With no evidence at all to prove their assertions, they ascribe Ukrainians, supposedly relying on the West's support, with hopes of " gradually deporting a part of the Russian population from Ukraine and of Ukrainianizing the rest of it, together with Russian speaking Ukrainians". Precisely such thinking more accurately reflects the mindset of Russians themselves (how they would act in our place) rather than how Ukrainians (for whom this is inconceivable) think.
In order to counteract the RF's " telurocratic" ambitions Ukraine has had to block any propositions concerning the creation of supra-state structures within the CIS. The necessity for these structures had been explained in terms of the supposed impossibility in their absence of the coordination of economic relations and of the regulation of thorny political problems among Commonwealth members on their territory. In a similar way, decisions taken by leaders of respective states would have no chances of being fulfilled. Meanwhile, RF aspirations for guaranteeing the domination of its interests in the Commonwealth's collective bodies remained unspoken.
In the conditions of the deepening economic crisis adherents of the concept of state status for the CIS can rely on substantial support. This support comes from the populations of Russia as well as of Ukraine and the other new independent states that nostalgically sustain memories of the relatively stable economic conditions of the former USSR.
Ukraine in the near future is fated to not simply preserve, but also to intensify and develop ties with former component parts of the USSR. This is due to its dependence on eastern energy resource supply, the absence of alternative markets for Ukrainian goods, socio-political, individual ties etc., and the fact that post-Soviet connections still carry profound weight while the alternatives to them are too uncertain.
Ukraine made a stake on the development of generally bilateral rather than multilateral relations within the CIS. Being prepared for signing are international programs for the long-term (10 year) economic cooperation of Ukraine with Belarus', Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Uzbekistan. Support of the idea of state status for the CIS would signify activity based on the principles of " telurocracy". But here as well it has become clear that even in tê te-à -tê te relations with each of its Commonwealth partners the RF, as a more powerful state, enforces its will. The absence of unity among members of the CIS, on the issue concerning the RF's hegemonic aspirations inclusively, is beneficial only for the latter.
Other post-Soviet states have already partly chosen their own logic of existence, eg. " talasocratic" (the Baltic states) or " telurocratic" (Belarus'), but the majority of them, like Ukraine, are at the search stage. To the point, it is well known that the unification of Germany and the fear on the part of its neighbors of the possibility of German hegemony over them was one of the factors that sped-up the consolidation of the European Union. In the same way a mindful and consistent Ukrainian policy aimed at closer coordinative efforts with Georgia and Moldova, the Transcaucases states, the countries of former Soviet Central Asia, and especially Kazakhstan, would help to strengthen Ukraine's international standing.
The main drawing force of the CIS for Ukraine, Moldova and Azerbaijan lay precisely in the liquidation of a center. These countries categorically reject the idea of the creation of a new center in Moscow. Precisely for this reason Ukraine constantly emphasizes its status of associate member and carefully avoids close participation in political and military cooperation. Moldova has declared that its participation is to be limited only to the economic sphere. Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan in large measure abstain from or refuse to sign CIS agreements instead of participating in real cooperation. Most CIS summits have also ended in failure. Leading Ukrainian ministries have come to the conclusion that the Moscow prepared propositions concerning the customs and monetary unions together with other RF propositions regarding Ukraine's joining of the economic union as a full member are premature. This is especially the case in view of the fact that Ukrainian propositions concerning the defense of the economic sovereignty of CIS states were taken into consideration during the preparation of pertinent documents.
Moreover, Ukraine's participation in the proposed unions can be interpreted as a change of foreign policy and can undermine its image as an independent state in the eyes of members of the European community. Ukraine's acceptance of the above-mentioned treaties can give Russia the reason to pressure Ukraine with the aim of further involving it in other supranational CIS military and political structures.
Thus, full Ukrainian membership in the above-mentioned structures can only lead to its political and economic estrangement from Central and Western European countries.
Ukrainian strategic policy concerning the CIS can hardly be termed consistent and optimal (from the point of view of national interests). Nevertheless, in the years 1991-1998 Ukraine in large part managed to counteract RF attempts to force its economic and political domination, mainly due to its self-proclaimed status of associate membership in the CIS, and the constant pressure of national-patriotic forces inside the country.
The further evolution of the Commonwealth into a structure analogous to the EU will in large part depend on the pace, consistency, and results of economic and socio-political transformations in Russia and Ukraine. Unsolved crucial socio-economic phenomena, especially set against the background of weak integration into the world economy and a growth in serious political risks connected with the upcoming presidential elections in both countries strengthen the probability of undesirable scenarios for the development of the situation. In particular, powerful political forces will come into being that see the solution of the existing problems in the reintegration of the countries of the CIS and in the creation of a self-sufficient geoeconomic and geopolitical entity on the territory of the former USSR. The consequences of such for the new independent states, Ukraine in that number, will be isolation from overall-civilization processes, the prolongation of technological backwardness, the loss of sovereignty, etc.
Ukraine's rational policy concerning the CIS should, first of all, be based on national instead of clan and corporate interests, and second, be directed toward the establishment and support of alternative leadership in this organization and in the region as a whole. As mentioned, the CIS in fact already has a bipolar structure. The formation of the GUAM group (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) under Ukrainian leadership and with the support of other states has been only the first sign of the commencement of new extremely important integrative processes on the territory of the former USSR. These countries understand all of the advantages and benefits that arise from the creation of regional groupings founded on the principles of equal and mutual support. The final result of these processes will be the formation of regional structures and unions " without Moscow" and Ukraine can and should seek for itself the place of " the first among equals" in this new creation.
The meeting in Ashkhabad of the leaders of Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan) in January 1998 demonstrated the growing tendency for equal mutually beneficial cooperation among the above-mentioned states as well as the rapid dwindling of Russian strategic positions in this extremely important region. The GUAM states plus the Central Asian states together number nine countries of the CIS that decisively support the idea of the creation of new, equal, and mutually beneficial structures of cooperation. The tendency toward the development of integrative processes in post-Soviet space becomes wholly obvious when added to the above is the growing cooperation between Ukraine and the Baltic states and the creation of the Baltic-Black Sea Alliance (Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania) in May, 1997.
The future of the CIS. The frequent postponement of meetings on the highest level by CIS state leaders testifies to their unresponsiveness regarding the future of the Commonwealth. In fact, except for history, the CIS states have little in common. The axes of the priority interests of separate CIS states are ever increasing in an outward direction from the CIS. Criticism aimed at the RF, which uses the structures of the Commonwealth for pursuing its own goals while disregarding other members' interests is on the increase, as was evidenced by its coming to a head at the Kishinev summit of CIS state leaders.
It is necessary to develop in the nearest future Ukraine's new concept concerning economic cooperation, which will take into account the new realities of post-Soviet geopolitical space and will suit the structure of the state's national interests. Economic cooperation in sub-regional systems that is formed according to states' own spheres of interests, and not according to the principle of existence in post-Soviet space, is worth developing.
The creation of one more system in Eurasian space similar to the European model is hardly possible and rational in view of Ukraine's chosen course toward integration into existent European structures. The strict connection of Ukraine to a new strengthened model of the CIS will mean a renouncing of Ukraine's independent European policy and in time any independence in foreign political and economic affairs. A competitive struggle for geostrategic and geoeconomic influences will undoubtedly appear between the two above-mentioned structures, in which Ukraine will play a peripheral role. It is important for Ukraine to chart courses that will lead to the gradual transformation of the entire Eurasian geopolitical space from the Atlantic to the Pacific into one integrative union of sovereign states free from the domination of a single center. Ukraine is interested in becoming part of both the high technology European market as well as of the expansive Oriental markets, and particularly in finding an opening to the Asian-Pacific region via the RF and Central Asia.
The process of the integration of post-Soviet states according to a western model should occur with the simultaneous development of the mechanisms of integration into the European community. This process, however, has to take place according to a model of convergence rather than to one of parallel or confrontational movement. The history of the formation of the European community shows this road to be relatively prolonged and difficult. This route represents the development of a new system " from the ground up", from the very basement, instead of " from above", with the help of directives and authoritarian measures. We can expect that the time needed for this system to develop is comparable to the time needed for Ukraine to enter into European structures. An instance of Ukraine being forced " from above" will in practical terms mean the complete neglecting of its national interests and will lead to an economic and social catastrophe followed by Ukraine's absorption into the system of interests of Russian capital. . The Euro-Atlantic Axis
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