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III. Regional Directions and Peculiarities of Ukrainian Geopolitical and Foreign Policy Strategy
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III. Regional Directions and Peculiarities of Ukrainian Geopolitical and Foreign Policy Strategy
An effective foreign political strategy of a modern state has to be, on the one hand coherent, non-contradictory and self-coordinated, and on the other, flexible and sufficiently diversified, that is, it should have its own regional and specific features and peculiarities. The growth of regionalism and interdependence has today practically become a world tendency. A national state to an ever-greater degree has to coordinate its policy not only with its immediate environment but also with regional groups, coalitions, and supra-national structures. In accordance with basic geopolitical premises, geographical, political, economic, etc. parameters of the environment have a decisive influence over historical fate and the tendencies of development of any country.
Regardless of its historical past, its European national identity, and its efforts to return to European space, from which it was forcibly separated, Ukraine is fated to a common existence and close interaction with states and structures of its immediate environment, many of which belong to Eurasian and Asian spheres of civilization.
1. The North-Eastern Axis
a) The Russian Federation
As a result of the post-imperial historical legacy today's major complications appear along the northern and north-eastern axes of Ukrainian foreign policy. The construction of friendly relations with the RF demands non-standard approaches. A positive role here should be played both by Ukraine's historical role as the cradle of Rus'ian Orthodoxy, and by the mutually beneficial aspect of the development of cooperation in manufacturing. " Economic nationalism", after all, is totally ineffective for both Slavic states. Due to the geographical factor, Ukraine can even make use of Russian Black Sea interests in a manner that is mutually beneficial for both states. The first steps toward this end have already been made. A final resolution of the central issue concerning the delimitation and demarcation of borders is of special significance, as this will lead to a strengthening in substance of Ukrainian self-preservation and self-consolidation not only in post-Soviet space, but also in the evolution of a new world order.
Ukraine is situated at the focus of both European and Russian interests. Thus, it can be concluded a priori that Ukraine should develop an independent policy with a clear awareness of the importance and after-effects of both the officially declared doctrines of the above-mentioned countries and of those proclaimed through so called " non-articulated motives" by politicians of the second rank.
It is clear that despite the external differences and even the contradictions that can be seen between the official statements of diplomats and state bureaucrats and the declarations of " second rate politicians", a corresponding connection between them exists. In order to exclude an imagined " lack of correlation" it is necessary to change " optics", that is, to attempt to view them in a context of a wider discourse - in geopolitical dimensions.
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At present, Ukrainian relations with European states represent the most successful achievement of Ukrainian foreign policy. " Gradually, step by step, Ukraine is integrating itself into the European community and views the increase of continental integrative processes as a necessary precondition for the creation of a global security system that will correspond to the demands of the next century", asserts the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, Volodymyr Horbulin. Precisely the cognizance of the cardinal changes in all spheres of life at the brink of not only centuries but of millennia determines the multi-axial geostrategy of Ukraine in a post-bipolar world.
As such, Ukraine's role in world democracies', with the US at its head, opposition to the re-birth of the Russian Empire, which recently threatened the world under the " Soviet" name, becomes especially important. Well-known Russian philosopher George Fedotov stated in the middle of the 20th century that " there is no room left in the world for old empires". Zbigniew Brzezinski's warning that " it is impossible to state with full conviction that without Ukraine Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and subordinated Russia automatically becomes an empire" is also worth heeding. After all, it was " reunification" with Ukraine that more than three hundred years ago gave start to the Russian Empire. And it was with Ukrainian independence seven years ago, according to G. Pavlovsky's definition in the " Moscow News", that " Russia ceased to be an imperial union of the Moscovite Czarate and of Hetmanate Ukraine, created by the Romanov dynasty. Without abusing historical claims, it can be stated that at minimum two Russian states exist in Europe today: the Russian-Moscovite and the Ukrainian-Rus'ian".
As early as 1929, in his letter to his son, a well-known Eurasian historian, V. Vernadsky, the first president of the Academy of Science of Ukraine, wrote that if Ukraine and Georgia depart from the USSR they will never return. This was very well understood by Stalin, who during the years of " the great break" exterminated the intelligentsia of Georgia and of Ukraine, the carriers of the idea of independence. At the end of his book " The Fate of Empires", George Fedotov predicted in 1947 that after the collapse of the USSR only " Great Russia appended by (probably) Belarus' and (for a lengthy period) Siberia" will remain. It is probable, however, that Belarus' will not be joining the RF. This makes expansion of the Russian state at the expense of other members of the CIS seem even the more fantastic.
The policy of the self-preservation and self-consolidation of Ukraine becomes especially important in relations with Russia. Moreover, some representatives of the Russian political establishment (A. Migranian) believe that Russia can opt for a global destabilization of all post-Soviet space in order to maintain control over Ukraine. They ground its geopolitical decomposition on the idea that " the existence of Ukraine within its current borders and with the status of " a sovereign state" is equivalent to a great blow to Russian geopolitical security, equivalent to intervention on its territory" (O. Dugin).
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The quoted Moscow professors, one a member of the RF's President's Council, the other, the author of the first Russian-language textbook on geopolitics, do not appear as exceptions. " A great majority of Russian leaders, whatever their political convictions", stresses H. Kissinger, " refuse to recognize the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the legitimacy of successor-states, especially Ukraine, the cradle of Rus'ian Orthodoxy".
Of great importance is not only the analysis, but also the prognosis of the development of events in post-Soviet space and Ukraine's participation in these processes. Such attempts are being made in the RF. Options for the structuring of post-Soviet economic space in the near future are considered below according to the degree of possibility of their practical realization.
1. The least probable scenario for the development of events is the restoration of a single state similar to the USSR. Not only the Baltic states, but Ukraine along with other CIS states are neither objectively nor subjectively interested in this scenario. The example of the recent Union with Belarus' only proves this point, despite the political uproar surrounding the event.
2. The reintegration of Ukraine and the CIS states under Russian aegis and patronage is almost impossible. The expectation of the adherents of this scenario that the new independent states are not viable and will ultimately collapse, and after some time will be forced into economic and political dependence on Russia, seem illusory. This scenario is impossible even in the case of the long-term economic stagnation of CIS states, let alone a situation wherein the first signs of economic regeneration become visible. Ukraine's return under " Moscow's hand" is highly unlikely, although up to now no intensification in the activity of enterprises as well as of the economy as a whole is visible.
3. The actualization of the opposite (westernist) scenario of development, with its maximal distancing of Russia from the new independent states is practically impossible. The aim of such would be to, first, get rid of the material expenditures connected with these countries' support and, second, to benefit from an autonomous integration into world economies. In addition, adherents of this scenario demonstrate exaggerated expectations. The idea of the preferentiality of interrelations between new post-Soviet states already finds and in the nearest future will find even more noticeable practical embodiment. The recent far-reaching treaty between Ukraine and Russia represents convincing confirmation of this conclusion.
4. General agreement on mutual preferences in trade and economic relations and the signing of numerous " integrative" documents should not become objects of deception. Agreements in reality function only on a bilateral basis. Even the only currently functioning multilateral construct, the Customs Union, is already being tested and is threatened with collapse as a result of the incompatibility of different members' interests. As well, the demands of economic reason will in the future lose ground to the forces of national particularity. However, the development of multilateral relations in the CIS is impeded by the objective fact that Russia wields 70% of the entire economic potential of the Commonwealth. Only the taking into account of this single fact makes the integrative growth of equal and equivalent states with progressively narrowing national sovereignty, as is the case in today's European Union, where a mechanism of taking mutually binding decisions on integrative issues has been developed, difficult to imagine.
5. The most probable axis of economic cooperation will come to fruition as a result of the development of bilateral relations. In this case diverse multilateral in character beginnings will inevitably become permanent. The CIS as a group of states will gradually become less homogeneous in the sense that some states will begin to distance themselves from Russia (even though their short-term economic contacts may intensify). Others, meanwhile, will be drawn to Russia, maintaining varying institutional forms of linkage to Russian economic, and especially political, space. However, emerging from the point of view of the logic of the strategic development of post-Soviet states rather than from the occasional subjective arising of events of a conjunctural nature, it is possible to prognosticate the futility of Russia's urge to return to its position of dominance in this region. It bears keeping in mind that the axes of the political orientations of new state formations are directed away from Russia. This is an expression of an objective given, based on geopolitical and economic factors, independent of the subjective interests of political leaders of post-Soviet states.
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In the situation where geographical space is changing its geopolitical configuration before our eyes, Ukraine must react adequately, based on its own interests.
A large number of experts quite fairly evaluate the level and character of interstate relations between Ukraine and the Russian Federation as incommensurate with the true potential of both states. Moreover, this evaluation relates to a very wide spectrum of factors that correspond to the entire system of political, economic, and socio-cultural life. At the same time, such objective factors as the history, economy, social stratification and culture of both societies, which determine the specific character of Ukraine's and the RF's development, should considerably influence the rapprochement and active interaction of both countries. In the category of the objective group of factors that bring together Ukraine and Russia as subjects of interstate relations are the common Ukrainian-Russian (2250 km. ) border and the high level of cooperation in all areas of the MIC. Also, the interdependent nature of transport and communications linkages must be mentioned.
At the same time, in order to provide a full and objective picture, the distinctions between the two states have to be taken into account. First of all, this entails a difference in the constitutional systems of both states. According to its constitution Ukraine is a unitary state, whereas the Russian constitution declares the principles of a federal structure. The posing of the question relating to the ethnic closeness of the two Slavic ethnoses seems politically incorrect and ethically unacceptable precisely because of this factor. The mutually complementary relations of these two Slavic ethnoses can (quite objectively) cause well-based circumspection on the part of those ethnic groups that do not identify themselves with the Slavic totality.
The considerable difference between both states as to their self-orientation in geopolitical space should also be included as an objective factor in the lack of concurrence between Ukrainian and Russian political interests. Thus, if Ukraine's place, in terms of geopolitical coordinates, is in Central Europe, Russia's place is primarily in Eurasia, moreover, in the major part of its own territory: the Urals, Siberia, the Far East and the Extreme North. This condition determines the character and axes of the geopolitical development of both states in common directions as well as in diametrically opposite ones.
In the context of the above-mentioned, the concept of Ukrainian foreign policy being formulated today so far seems to be little and unpersuasively articulated. No distinct goals and tasks, which could determine future state development, can be seen in it. Precisely this circumstance can explain the absence of independent initiative actions that would show a solid and decisive Ukrainian position. It seems that the method of searching for counter-arguments in answer to various Russian state claims toward Ukraine, a kind of " playing with black chessmen", puts the country in a position of the defending side. For instance, the problem of the equitable division of the Black Sea fleet became not only " the talk of the town", but also the cause for a whole row of political and economic concessions. However, it was not mentioned at all in connection with the division of the Northern and Baltic fleets. This is despite the fact that these fleets are an integral part of the " common inheritance" of all former Soviet republics and as such should also be fairly divided among the new states that emerged from the once integral USSR.
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Also typical of interstate relations between Ukraine and Russia are Russian officials' frequent claims concerning the " reduction in space of Russian language functioning in Ukraine". However, even the most basic analysis of the language situation shows quite the opposite _ that the informational sphere of Ukraine belongs almost completely to the RF. This condition produces a marginalised type of social consciousness, in large part oriented toward an ideology formed beyond its borders.
More similar examples could be provided - they only serve to illustrate the immaturity and inertness of Ukraine's concept of the part of foreign policy that concerns the strategic interests and tactical initiatives of the state. This shows, at the same time, a lack of determination of the state's policy in the search for its place in post-Soviet space in the capacity of an independent subject of the international community. The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the departments of foreign policy in the President's Administration, the Verkhovna Rada, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine are in part not ready to fundamentally react to the political expansion of both official state structures of the RF and of individual groups and fractions. This is precisely due to the absence of a strategic position for Ukraine's own national state development. The logic of Ukrainian actions is based on the search for counter-arguments rather than on national interests, and an integrative concept of the historical-cultural and national-state development of Ukraine.
Further distancing and intensification of the divergences between the interests of both states should objectively be expected to occur in the process of the establishment and development of state sovereignty. At issue is not the evaluation of whether this is positive or negative, but the comprehension of this process from the point of view of the objective and independent state interests of Ukraine that follow the logic of its strategic development.
This circumstance should, in our opinion, initiate the process of the formulation of Ukraine's strategic tasks and goals. These should adequately reflect the objective direction of tendencies of a centrifugal nature between our country and the RF, in order to promptly react to them following our own national interests.
Among the most noticeable changes in the political structure of the RF are the ever-increasing aspirations of federal subjects for an independent formation of their own economies and foreign policies. Moreover, these aspirations are on the increase not only among national-territorial subjects of the RF (autonomous republics and national districts) but also among its administrative-economic components (lands and regions). This process, of course, is not singular in nature and pace, although the taking into account of the centrifugal tendencies within the RF as a creative ferment that indicates a decentralized future for the RF should be made even today. This is especially true for Ukraine, taking into view (at least virtually, either in the near or in a more distant future) the potential opportunities for influence by the Ukrainian Diaspora on the domestic and foreign policies of RF subjects. In pragmatic terms this means that the shifting complex of political forces and influences in the RF demands active work with the Ukrainian Diaspora on Ukraine's part. To be even more pragmatic and to the point _ the Ukrainian Diaspora in the republics and regions of the RF should be harnessed in the role of an influential lobby, precipitated, of course, by the purposeful formation of such a lobby.
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The absence of a conscientious and targeted policy pertaining to representatives of the Ukrainian Diaspora seems to be unacceptable, as ethnic Ukrainians who live in almost every region and district of the RF are law-biding taxpayers with significant electoral influence.
The pragmatisation of Ukrainian foreign policy in its relations with the RF is also essential in issues concerning natural competition between the two countries in the domestic markets, weapons markets included, of third-party states. A vivid example of the above was seen in the problem that arose over recent contracts concerning the delivery of Ukrainian tanks to Pakistan that under existent conditions of interstate cooperation were to have cannons installed that were made in Russian military plants. Ukraine was forced to in as short a time as possible organize the production of the needed cannons in its own plants.
Even today, the problem relating to competition between Ukraine and the RF for priority in transportation-communication corridors is intense. In this situation Ukraine will have to show haste in making a rather extensive bundle of political, legal, economic and technological decisions concerning not only the RF but other CIS states as well.
On the whole, relations between Ukraine and the RF remain complex. A wide range of factors—Ukraine's heavy energy dependence on the RF, industrial-technological interdependence, a large proportion of Russian production in Ukraine's overall trade turnover, the significant informational influence of the Russian mass-media, transparent borders, etc. _ threaten Ukraine's national interests. Testimony of this is today's economic-financial crisis in the RF, which as a result of the actions of the mentioned factors has created a serious threat for Ukraine's economy.
Ukraine should develop a comprehensive program of a multi-sided lessening of economic dependence on the RF. Our country should take into account the experience of Estonia, which successfully conducted its program of overcoming dependence on the RF, having cut essential Russian imports from 80 to 20 percent. The viability of such policy is attested to by the situation today, where the Baltic countries have undergone significantly less hardship than Ukraine has in connection with the economic crisis in the RF.
A certain dependence of Ukraine on the RF's foreign policy also remains current, a fact which stands in the way of a more effective progression of our state on the path of integration into the European community, and its inclusion into the system of European security. The RF wastes no attempts in countering Ukraine's partnership and cooperation with NATO, in dictating to it its vision of international problems, and in drawing Ukraine into the current of its own foreign policy course.
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