a) West-European States and the Problems of European Integration
The " strategic openness" of both partners is one of the potential promotional factors in the development of relations between Ukraine and leading West-European states and in the integration of Ukraine into European cooperation and security structures. Ukraine as well as the European community (both the institution and national states) formulate strategies for their development and attempt to determine their specific roles and models of survival for the future. This search for identity in a rapidly changing environment allows partners the opportunity to actively participate in determining each other's goals and priorities. This process is already taking place. Let us recall, for instance, Ukraine's efforts in promoting the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO members or the European Council's actions in persuading Ukraine to abolish the death penalty. However, strategic openness and geopolitical indetermination can become a barrier on the road to Ukraine's integration into the European community. Moreover, threats to Ukrainian security, including the conflictogenical process of the formation and growth in power of national and local political and economic é lites, the neglect of democratic norms in the day-to-day existence of Ukrainian governing organs and society, etc., can only drive attention away from " external" relations with West-European states that do not propose adequate solutions for acute Ukrainian domestic contradictions. In order to prevent a " turning away from Europe" it is necessary to underline the geopolitical importance of broadening bilateral relations with West-European states and of strengthening integrative processes. It is also necessary to demonstrate the practical benefits that arise from this kind of cooperation, and the opportunities for the adaptation of European experience on Ukrainian ground. One of the possible scenarios for the strengthening of these integrative processes is proposed below. In order to maximize westward policy it would be worthwhile to more fully utilize the advantages of the poliarchic model that was developed in the bilateral relations of West-European states. The essence of this model is based on the premise that regional integration is closely connected to the processes of decentralization and regionalization. Additionally, interstate relations in the EU, for instance, are determined and formed not only by state bureaucratic institutions or the bodies of the Union itself. Growing in importance are contacts between separate individuals, non-governmental organizations and structures, and direct relations between regions (federal lands, provinces) of various states. It would therefore be important for Ukraine to begin the process of the diversification of relations with West-European states, giving priority to the non-governmental level of these relations and involving as wide as possible circle of societal sectors.
Also worth keeping in mind is the structural and organizational multi-facetedness of European integration, of which Ukraine aspires to become an active member. On the one hand, this is a process of state blocking inside the EU. The activity of temporary (or regular) coalitions and unilateral initiatives of this or that state are directed toward solving those problems that belong to the spheres in which these coalitions or states are leaders. The " breakthrough" of some leads to the " gingering" of others. Coalitions and alliances within the parameters of the CIS, for instance, are directed first of all toward disintegration, toward the blockage of these or other generally integrative initiatives. On the other hand, the EU as the heart of European integrative processes is not the sole mechanism for the bringing together of member-states. We can mention a whole number of institutions (the Council of Europe, NATO, the WEU etc. ) that add their own specifics to the integrational complex. In the development of foreign-policy strategy it would be important to consider the fact that despite their long-standing tradition of cooperation, West-European states have not solved the problems of delegating state mandates to the center. This dilemma finds its most vivid expression during the trials of the development of mutual foreign and security policies of the EU, and in discussions concerning defense policy and the creation of a European army. This contradiction will apparently never be fully resolved within the framework of the EU. This is why European integration is acquiring the form of a balancing of national interests and a balancing of relations between state and supranational bureaucracies. This balancing ensures the preservation of national sovereignty and ably used becomes one of the factors that stimulates the majority of integrative processes. Ukraine should more widely utilize the experience of EU member-states in defending its national interests, in searching for mutually acceptable compromises, etc. Relations with the region's states and with European institutions should not develop into a " game with one net", where one side forces the other to accept its prescriptions and scenarios. The poliarchic model of development became possible in Europe due to the fact that integration was at first born and developed in the economic sphere, gradually evolving to the level of the development of common political approaches. The establishment of one state's political domination is made impossible by the prime importance of the economic sphere, the " dictate" of its market model, and the severe necessity to compete with the USA and with APR states. The bureaucratic system of the European Union has used the same principle and has rendered impossible one state's control of any committee or of any direction of integration. West-European integrative processes have never been the object of short-term political speculation and maneuvers, always having remained as issues of strategic weight. Supporters and adversaries of integration have stable aware positions, calculated aware strategies and are forced to adapt them according to the conditions of their environment. Something opposite frequently occurs in Ukraine, and instead of being a strategically aware priority, integration becomes a declarative concept that is used as a tool in political battles.
The utilization of the catch-words of European integration only as some kind of trump-card in the domestic political game and for the purpose of receiving the next portion of international aid will push Europeans away from Ukraine and will make our state less attractive for West-European capital. Despite the declarations about the geopolitical importance of orientation toward European states and structures, Ukraine has not developed a viable strategy for European integration, either on the basis of bilateral relations or on an institutional basis. The concept of strategy here indicates a complex model for the definition of the importance of this or that initiative, its goals and priorities, the ways and means for its realization, and the resources necessary to attain the announced goal. Ukraine, from this point of view, does not have a general national strategy concerning the solution of the complex tasks of European integration. Dozens of state institutions and official groups and committees are involved in the decision-making process along this direction. Because of the improper coordination of their efforts and the vague definition of their responsibilities and authority a significant part of the decisions made by state bureaucratic machinery are never put into practice. While meeting time constraints on all integrative initiatives Ukraine disperses its intellectual and material resources and frequently deals with routine secondary problems, leaving truly important initiatives without due attention and adequate resources. In other words, Ukraine's policy concerning West-European states and European institutions is too wide-ranging and non-constructive to be effective. An intensive approach to integration and bilateral relations should replace the extensive approach (where the number of events, trips and visits, and signed agreements overshadows their practical output, and political symbolism drives attention away from constructiveness and beneficial cooperation). Such " renewed" activity could be started in several priority directions: 1. The development of a national strategy for European integration. Such a strategy should become a document of " principal steps". It would be comprehensively strengthened by a material and intellectual plan of action that clearly defines the authority and responsibilities of various bodies, their reporting etc. Internal Ukrainian adaptation to European realities and the transformation of integration into a powerful generator for domestic change can be regarded as the main goal of strategy according to President Kuchma's Decree no. 615, dated June 11, 1998, entitled " The Strategy of Ukraine's Integration into the EU". 2. The reaching of a correlation of values, norms and principles of Ukraine's internal political and social life with the norms and principles of the Euro-community. The following should be mentioned in this connection: · the democratization of the process of state decision-making (through the retraining of officials and the creation of conditions necessary for the effective activity of the mass-media and non-governmental institutions in controlling the processes of making and implementing decisions); · the attainment of a general national consensus concerning the main directions of Ukraine's European policy; · the creation of mechanisms of civil control over state institutions;
· the conducting of a comprehensive educational campaign for primary and high-school students (assisted by the preparation of specific manuals) aimed at explaining the advantages of and the necessity for integration into the European community; · the arrangement of a youth exchange program based on existent European models; · the development of state policy for Ukrainian students/professionals studying abroad, the purpose of which would be the accumulation of a competitive national intellectual potential; · the organization of a coordinated long-term " Euro publicity campaign". Its goal, through the skillful use of the principles of mass-media techniques and influence over a mass audience, would be the orientation of society to the benefits and inevitability of integration. 3. The search for a strategic partner among European states. However paradoxical it may seem, the US is Ukraine's main lobbyist in Europe, especially in Euro-Atlantic structures. However, American support will soon only partly satisfy core Ukrainian demands in Europe, especially in the case of the " EURO's" successful introduction. This is on account of the growing political and economic world influence of the EU, the aspiration of Europeans for gaining leadership in the solution of the security problems of the continent, and the development of a conflict of interests between the European Union and the US. The " Europeanization" of Ukraine's continental lobby could commence in the following spheres: · the intensification of cooperation with West-European states; the establishment of a wide-ranging dialog between experts and scholars which could promote closer ties between Ukrainian and West-European political é lites; · Ukraine's active participation in discussions concerning NATO's new Strategic Concept and NATO's role in Europe, with an accent on the strengthening of the European pillar of the Alliance; · the intensification of the dialog with the EU and the WEU in the spheres of domestic and security policy, as these institutions will determine the future of continental security policy; · the intensification of regional cooperation (particularly with neighboring countries' border regions) and leadership in the effective resolution of regional conflicts; · the realization of the strategic " European transport aircraft" project. This undertaking should be given proper state support and should symbolize Ukraine's ability to complete difficult high technology projects. Moreover, the success of the project would mean the freeing of European dependency on American strategic transport aviation. The new aircraft will seem especially attractive to member-states of the Euro-corps, which already have experience in using Ukrainian " Antonovs" in strategic maneuvers. 4. The creation of conditions necessary for the attraction of European investments. This direction will certainly demand the most serious efforts since it deals with fundamental changes in Ukrainian economic life. In the meanwhile, it would be prudent to consider the interstate patronage of investments, and measures that would prevent the over-indulgence of officials in servicing foreign investments in Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukraine could take part in strategic European projects such as the " Trans-European Network" (the development of continental communication systems). The Federal Republic of Germany, which has vital economic interests in Central and Eastern Europe, could become Ukraine's prime strategic investment partner. The level and intensity of Ukrainian cooperation with West-European states are integrative indicators of the presence or absence of the government's political will to continue the policy of European integration, to conduct economic and political reforms, and to instill democratic norms and principles into Ukrainian life. It is also important to transform cooperation with West-European states into an active tool capable of ensuring one of the most important national state interests - survival in a competitive international environment, and the ensuring of the prosperity and security of the populace.
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