TEXT 6. Is 'Escalate to Deescalate' Part of Russia’s Nuclear Toolbox?

TEXT 6. Is 'Escalate to Deescalate' Part of Russia’s Nuclear Toolbox?

The emergence of the phrase " escalate to deescalate" has generated much debate, not only between the U. S. and Russia but also among U. S. and Western military experts. Some U. S. experts object to it because it is not the phrase the Russians themselves use to describe their strategy. Other experts prefer resurrecting the classic Cold War terminology of escalation control. Still others see the phrase as glib and insufficient to describe the unpredictable outcomes a limited nuclear strike could cause.

These are all fair criticisms. Nothing—certainly no three-word phrase—could fully describe the possible effects of a limited nuclear strike. But the phrase serves a good purpose: It brings attention to an option for using nuclear weapons that remains in the toolbox for both Russia and the United States. It has focused military experts, political leaders and the general public on a dangerous problem that remains with us from Cold War days—the risk of a conventional conflict escalating into a nuclear war.

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TEXT 7. Russian Denial of ‘Escalate to Deescalate’

Russian policy makers acknowledge that they think about using a nuclear weapon to deescalate a conflict as well, but with a caveat: Moscow’s stated position has been that Russia might use a nuclear weapon first only if the survival of the Russian state were at risk. Russian ambassador to the United States Anatoly Antonov explained this in an April 2019 interview with Russian news service TASS, denying that Russia would use a nuclear weapon first in any other case to " deescalate" a conflict.

" The notorious concept [of] 'escalation for de-escalation' allegedly stipulating the possibility of becoming the first to use ‘a limited low-yield nuclear strike’ is another flagrant example of the unwillingness to hear us. … I call on all those who doubt to familiarize themselves with Provision 27 of the Russian Military Doctrine. ” That provision says that Russia “shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.

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