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c) Euro-Atlantic Structures
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At present it is possible to define four main options for Ukrainian policy concerning Euro-Atlantic structures and structures of regional security:
1. Relying on one's own forces.
2. Joining an existent bloc or alliance.
1 S. Kononenko, CEE in the System of Current Foreign Policy of Canada, Doctor Thesis, Kyiv, 1996.
3. Creating regional security structures within a framework of a broader universal system of general European security.
4. Neutrality:
a) support of the existent status of self proclaimed neutrality;
b) permanent neutrality, guaranteed by world nuclear powers or by the UN Security Council;
c) active neutrality, distinctive relations with NATO and orientations toward the EU and the WEU.
These options of national security policy are not alternatives in the strict sense of this word. Some of them can come into being in different combinations or can be transformed from one into another. They also have different weight from the point of view of the possibility of their realization. Many of these options are " prohibited" because of various economic and political reasons or certain Acts of Parliament. For instance, the first option is " prohibited" because of at least two reasons. It is well known that the national security of a state of Ukraine's size and geopolitical position can be ensured either with the help of a powerful (nuclear, if possible) potential of deterrence or by participation in influential and strong military blocs or alliances. Ukraine's rejection of nuclear deterrence and its joining of the NPT have practically canceled the opportunity of realizing the first option. Moreover, purely economic limits exclude the possibility in the nearest future of the development of a conventional potential of deterrence able to protect Ukrainian national interests with its own forces.
The second option is also currently blocked by the Declaration of Independence, according to which Ukraine should become a " non-nuclear and permanently neutral state, which does not participate in military blocs". It should be mentioned that it would not be difficult to change this regulation, as the majority of the Ukrainian ruling é lite have already understood the danger of the simultaneous establishment of both a non-nuclear and non-bloc state. Regardless, in the nearest future this option will remain conditionally prohibited for Ukraine. However, entry into NATO and the WEU, at least in partial forms, becomes a real possibility in a more distant future, after the year 2000.
The idea of the creation of regional security structures in CE is not new, having being discussed since the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact. Proposals concerning the creation of " NATO-Bis" (by Polish President L. Walesa in 1991-1992) and " zones of stability and security" (by Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk ) together with other numerous proposals to form a " Baltic-Black Sea security belt" were a natural response of the political leaders of different states to the perception of an existent vacuum in regional security.
It is important that all these initiatives were not directed against a particular country and were not meant to replace existent structures such as OSCE, NATO or the WEU. Regional security structures can potentially become subsystems of a more general European security system. They can make a significant contribution toward the introduction of a " division of work" between OSCE, NATO and the WEU in the framework of the popular in Europe concept of " interlocking institutions". Unfortunately, it is must be acknowledged that the plans and processes of NATO enlargement have considerably undermined the altogether sound idea of regional security structures. Current changes in the general political climate in Europe can lead to the resurgence of this idea in a new geopolitical situation. The Tallinn meeting of the presidents of the Baltic states, of Poland and of Ukraine became the first, yet very important, step in this direction. Moreover, having ensured their joining of NATO, states of the Vishegrad group, first of all Poland, will probably renew their interest in the creation of new regional security structures. In the final outcome, this extremely important to Ukraine and the Baltic states idea would be brought into existence.
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Neutrality as the fourth option can be attained in at least three different versions. The " weakest" version is the prolongation of the existing status of unilateral self-proclaimed neutrality and the staying out of blocs. Under conditions of NATO expansion and the " de facto" western recognition (independent of " political games" in Helsinki) of post-Soviet space as a Russian sphere of " special interests" and " special responsibility", Ukraine can become very vulnerable to political, economic and military Russian pressure and can be forced toward a gradual political and military integration with this country.
The second version, permanent neutrality guaranteed by the " great powers" or by the Security Council of the UN, is much more acceptable from the point of view of Ukrainian interests. Austria has had this kind of status since 1955. It should be mentioned that Ukraine has already obtained security assurances at Budapest's summit of the OSCE. Continuing consolidation of these obligations can be regarded as a next important step in the ensuring of stability and security of CE. However, a problem exists in that Russia will probably block any attempts to grant this status to Ukraine, as this development of events departs " too far" even from the program of " finlandization". On the other hand, such Russian behavior can only push Ukraine (as has already happened with other states) to closer relations with Euro-Atlantic military-political structures.
So-called active neutrality, distinctive partnership with NATO, and a course toward political membership in this organization together with an orientation toward the EU and the WEU is probably the most rational and " best possible" Ukrainian strategic response. " Active neutrality" here means a status similar to the Swedish one in its relations with European security structures. In this case officially neutral Ukraine gradually and systematically increases the level of its cooperation with NATO in the framework of the EAPC, the PfP and in relations of a distinctive partnership. The signing of a Charter between Ukraine and NATO became an important step in this process. Issues concerning Ukraine's joining NATO as a full-fledged member under the conditions of distinctive partnership, political assurances from NATO and the general course toward integration into the EU and the WEU will lose their actuality and can remain open for only another 5-10 years. These questions will depend on the success of Ukrainian economic reforms and on the general development of the geopolitical situation in Europe and in Russia. At the same time, this course will objectively weaken Russian opportunities for involving Ukraine in its zone of domination and will prevent new political " games" concerning the division of CE into " zones of influence".
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In these conditions Ukraine can remain a non-bloc state for only a certain period of time. L. Kuchma justly emphasized in Madrid that today this position is advantageous to a number of our Western and Eastern neighbors. Ukraine's role here can be described in different ways: as a " key link in the European security system" (J. Solana), as " a bridge between the East and the West" (L. Kuchma), as a " cross-road with two-way traffic" (V. Horbulin). A dozen more euphemisms can be invented but the essence of the matter will not change. Most important is the fact that Ukraine today has no other alternative, because of its geopolitical and domestic political and economic situations. Second, the main Ukrainian national interest - political survival and a course toward integration into European space - corresponds to this status and to this role, and the West is well aware of this fact. Ukrainian independence (military inclusive) and territorial integrity has already become one of the main components of a future vision of Europe and of the entire Atlantic community. Ukrainian geopolitical orientations will have an important influence on any attempts to build a new regional security structure in the region. These orientations will significantly depend not only on the West's words and assurances but also on its real actions in support of the Ukrainian process of internal transformation as well as of integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures.
Relations between Ukraine and NATO have fundamental importance in the sphere of peacekeeping activity, which takes place under the UN's political management. A Ukrainian military contingent participates in SFOR stabilizing forces, operatively led by NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This participation opens additional opportunities for more active Ukrainian involvement in the " privileged" sphere of peacemaking.
The development of relations with NATO can also have indirect effects. Connections between Ukraine and other partner-states increase because of Ukrainian participation in the EAPC and PfP programs. Direct Ukraine-NATO relations can have a positive, from the point of view of Ukrainian national interests, " balancing", and if necessary " restraining" effect on its relations with Russia.
The West's position toward Ukraine within the context of NATO expansion demands a more detailed analysis and remains one of the most delicate issues that is to be solved by western as well as by eastern politicians, analysts and other representatives of government and academic circles. The issue of Ukraine joining the North Atlantic Alliance in the nearest future is practically out of the question. This fact underscores the necessity for both Ukraine and the West to develop a strategic course directed toward the strengthening of Ukrainian independence and toward assuring Ukraine's development according to the western model. This problem is to be solved by Ukraine and by the West. Ukrainian leaders fear that eastward NATO expansion can leave Ukraine in a " gray zone", where it will feel Russian pressure as before and will lack protection from possible Russian neo-imperialistic ambitions.
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NATO has often announced that the enlargement of the military-political union will lead to the enhancement of European security and will not create new lines of division. This statement will gain force if an appropriate place in general western strategy is found for Ukraine. The Ukrainian issue in light of NATO expansion inevitably refracts in the domestic policies of Russia, the USA and other European states. This issue is to become an important factor of NATO actions and in relations between the West and Russia.
The western attitude toward Ukraine continues to be rather ambiguous. Many Europeans deep in their hearts are not sure if Ukraine is a " real country" and are not inclined toward investing significant funds in stabilizing Ukraine, even more so because of the number of economic problems that have beset their own countries. Others are worried that too much western attention to Ukraine can cause Russian counteraction and will complicate relations with Moscow, which are already strained because of NATO expansion.
In other words, seven years have passed since Ukraine declared independence and there is still no clear unified understanding in the West of Ukraine's place and role in the European security system after the end of the Cold War. Ukraine is not a member of the West-European Union or of the European Union. According to western analysts (Stephen Larrabee, " The Complicated Equilibristics of Ukraine", Survival, special issue, autumn 1996) it is doubtful that Ukraine will join them in the near future, if it is ever going to join them. At the same time Kyiv continues to remain in serious economic dependence on Russia and continues to fall under its growing pressure, as Russia uses political and economic levers to limit the choices of Ukrainian decisions and security. Thus, Ukraine continues to remain in a strategically desperate situation, torn between a drive toward closer relations with the West and persistent RF efforts to involve Ukraine in its sphere of interests.
Neutrality continues to be the official Ukrainian policy. Ukrainian state officials have no reservations as to NATO expansion. They have supported the entry of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO, emphasizing that no state has the right of veto over another state's participation in a military-political alliance. At the same time, however, they have called for gradual, evolutionary expansion, maintaining that NATO has to take into account the security interests of other states that do not participate in the bloc, particularly those of Ukraine.
In the opinion of Ukrainian officials, a more cautious process of expansion will give Ukraine time to stabilize itself and will reduce the chances for its transformation into a buffer between Russia and an enlarged NATO. It will also permit the formation of a new European security system and will promote NATO's transformation from an organization oriented toward collective defense into a structure that guarantees collective security.
In other words, Ukrainian strategy continues to be directed toward the gaining of time and the maintenance of the opportunity to choose (to the benefit of western priorities). At present Ukraine will not be applying to joining NATO (E. Primakov's visit to Ukraine in May, 1998). Ukrainian officials understand that such a step can be interpreted by Russia as a provocation and can lead to an intensification of political as well as economic pressure on Ukraine.
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At the present stage the " coerced" Ukrainian refusal to join NATO causes the necessity for the development of a reliable strategy for relations with the West concerning the support of the security and independence of Ukraine. Four political and strategic imperatives should be taken into consideration here.
First, the West should support Ukraine and prevent the formation of a " Korean syndrome" that could take place in Ukraine, if NATO's policy of enlargement leads to a split of Ukrainian society into groups of proponents and opponents of Ukraine's entry into NATO. Opinion polls of the last months (see appendix) convincingly testify to the growing favorable attitude of the population of all of Ukraine's regions toward integration into NATO).
The second imperative (irremovably connected with the first) is the necessity to foresee the possible influence of the enlargement of the Alliance on regional security in Central Europe and, particularly, on states that do not belong to the first wave of enlargement (there is an opinion that the second wave may not occur in the nearest decade, therefore this is the time-frame the West would need to " digest" new members of the Alliance).
The next, third imperative, states the necessity of allowing easier access to the European Union for Central European states by way of solving questions concerning their security. There is no doubt that key instances of non-concurrence of political positions present in discussions concerning EU enlargement are connected with the division of financial responsibilities among members of the union and the process of economic reforms in candidate-states. Official representatives of the EU admit that entry of Central European states into the union seems to be impossible without the definition of all the arising consequences in the security and defense spheres.
The fourth imperative is more actual for NATO member-states. Any strategy concerning Ukraine should correspond not only to NATO's internal political needs but also to the principle of consensus, recognized to be the leading principle in the NATO decision-making process. In a wider context, the solution of the Ukrainian issue will be regarded as the main test of the resolve of repeatedly declared assurances of the North Atlantic Alliance that its enlargement will strengthen the security of new members as well as stability in Europe in general.
Relations between Russia and the West, therefore, should be considered together with the Ukrainian issue. Precisely Ukrainian questions are destined to become a complicated and delicate issue in negotiations between Russia and NATO as well as in the Russia-USA dialog. " Careless" NATO enlargement can complicate the problems of Ukrainian security and cause Russian counteraction. The latter can appear by way of efforts to accelerate integrative processes, together with all of the negative results of this development of events.
In order to correspond to the above-mentioned frequently contradictory imperatives, NATO strategy concerning Ukraine should be based on several complementary principles and should take into account the priorities of all interested sides. Conditioned by a proper level of coordination, the cumulative effect of all strategic compounds will exceed the arithmetical sum of the results of separate components. The following factors could become the key components of future strategy:
The support of political and economic reforms. The process of reform constitutes practically the basic grounds for the future independence and security of Ukraine. Its political as well as economic success is the core pre-condition for Ukrainian independence, Ukraine's integration into the western world and for western support of Ukrainian foreign political efforts. The faster Ukraine moves along the road to domestic political and economic reforms, the more probable will be possible western aid. In the case of the success of internal reforms, it will be easier for Ukraine to integrate into European structures. Moreover, successful reforms will reinforce its independence and will distance it from its Soviet past. On the other hand, the slowing down of the process of reform remains as a dangerous barrier in the way of successful advancement of the Ukrainian state into the western world. Results achieved so far impress, but it is evident that much more remains to be done, both in the political sphere, and especially in the economic sphere.
Defense cooperation with NATO. Cooperation in the defense and security realms should also become an important component of any strategy called upon to strengthen Ukrainian independence. It is natural that the regional security of Central European states should commence in the East, meaning with those countries that are geographically situated along the eastern borders of Europe and still remain in the process of the creation and development of their own national security and defense systems. At present the armed attack of any state on its neighbor seems impossible, but its full exclusion would be a mistake.
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Against this background, NATO should help Ukraine by consolidating existent agreements concerning military cooperation and the mutual protection of regional security. In the situation where ideas concerning the usefulness of joining the Alliance do not always concur among members of the country's political é lite, broadened military cooperation between Ukraine and NATO deserves support as a stage along the way to a more effective system of regional security and defense. Mutual military cooperation will, first, promote the more effective defense construction of the Ukrainian state and, second, will create conditions necessary for the normal advancement of Ukraine toward a western model of development, regardless of Ukraine's joining the Alliance. Finally, from the political point of view it is important for Ukraine to demonstrate that it is not an observer of European events, but an active participant in the construction of a European security structure.
Ukrainian cooperation with other Central European states. In order to take root as a European state along with a corresponding orientation, Ukraine should strengthen its relations with other Central European states and organizations such as the Vishegrad group and the Central European Initiative (CEI) (F. Stephen Larrabee, East European Security after the Cold War [Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-254-USDP, 1993], pp. 105-108). This process, however, is occurring relatively slowly. The majority of Central European officials do not always regard Ukraine as a " Central European" state, either from a cultural, or from a political point of view. Moreover, the Ukrainian economy is less developed than the economies of some other Central European states. Thus, although Central Europe fully supports Ukrainian independence, it does not hurry in accepting Ukraine's propositions, especially those concerning regional cooperation.
Ukrainian efforts to establish closer structural relations with the Vishegrad group were met with little enthusiasm, mainly due to the slow development of economic reforms in Ukraine. A good number of Central European state figures fear that Ukrainian membership in the Vishegrad group can destroy the group's solidarity and introduce undesired complications into relations with Russia. This is the reason for the cool reaction to Ukrainian propositions for establishing closer ties on an organizational level. Nevertheless, this situation is gradually changing.
As long as NATO and the EU keep expanding and including new members from Central Europe, Central European linkages will carry even more weight. Closer relations with Central Europe could strengthen Ukraine's European orientation and help decrease its dependence on Russia and the CIS. Today there is no doubt that the Ukrainian road to Europe lies through Warsaw, Prague, and Budapest.
Ukrainian entry into the EU. The enlargement of the European Union has to become an important, if not the most important, component of Ukrainian strategy toward the West. Undoubtedly, Ukrainian membership, or at least associate membership, in the EU would be ideal. However, at the present stage the status of full membership for Ukraine does not measure up to EU demands.
Nevertheless, over the last few years a whole series of important steps was made directed toward strengthening Ukrainian connections with Europe. In July, 1994 the European Union signed a treaty on partnership with Ukraine. This was the first treaty of its kind signed with a member of the CIS. This treaty guarantees Ukraine most favorable nation status and includes a promise to consider the question concerning the creation of a free trade zone in 1998, in the case of Ukraine demonstrating sufficient progress in the construction of a stable economy (which in our opinion, unfortunately, has not occurred). However, in contradistinction to treaties regarding associate membership signed with Central European and Baltic states, there was nothing said in this document about possible Ukrainian membership in the EU. Ukraine's associate membership in the EU could fundamentally change the whole situation and today appears as one of the priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy.
In November, 1995 Ukraine achieved an important step on its road of advancement toward European structures in becoming the second, after Moldova, CIS state that has been included into the ranks of the Council of Europe. In its decision The Council clearly recognized the progress Ukraine has made, after gaining independence in 1991, in the construction of a pluralistic, democratic society, with adherence to human rights principles. The fact that Ukraine became a member of the Council earlier than Russia, whose application was being considered at the time and was accepted only in January 1996, caused certain aggravation in Moscow.
Relations between Ukraine and the West-European Union consist of a regular exchange of visits and information. On May 9, 1994 the Council of WEU ministers agreed in the Kirshberg Declaration to provide associate partner status to those countries that had already signed or would soon be signing agreements regarding associate membership in the EU. Six Eastern European states plus the Baltic countries, but not Ukraine, were in this group. Such a position on the part of EC and WEU bureaucrats, as was underlined by president Kuchma in Vienna in October 1998, can lead to the creation of new division lines in Europe, in that number along the Polish-Ukrainian border.
The " open door" strategy. The possibility of Ukrainian membership in the North Atlantic Treaty (in the case of a corresponding decision on the state level) should become the next key aspect of western strategy concerning Ukraine. Some western analysts believe that in 2010 and even earlier Ukraine will meet NATO standards. (Z. Brzezinski, Kyiv, May 1998).
It should be mentioned that the absence of an opportunity to join NATO can create a great deal of political damage to Ukraine and undermine current Ukrainian reform processes. Thus, while accepting new members (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic) into the North Atlantic Alliance it would make sense for the Alliance to discuss possible candidates of the " second phase". The " second phase" should consist of new Central European states and states of the former USSR that have expressed their will to become full-fledged members of the Alliance.
In our opinion, members of NATO should at least analyze the difficulties and hardships that lie in the way of these states' (Ukraine included) possibilities for membership in the Alliance. These actions must be based on the thesis that these countries separately will not be able to overcome the numerous problems that lie along this road. Thus, NATO states could take important preventive measures in solving these problems and in elaborating a specific strategic course for each potential member of the Alliance.
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