b) The USA and Canada

The main Western geopolitical priority after the disintegration of the USSR and the de-facto formation of a mono-polar world structure is the consolidation of victory and the consolidation and global spreading of western values, democratic principles and institutions, and the liberal-democratic ideology. It is characteristic that among the main geopolitical priorities of Euro-Atlantism, and first of all of the USA, are strict and pragmatic orientations concerning the limitation of adversaries' influence and the strengthening of strategic potential on regional and global levels. The above go together with measures intended to stabilize and spread traditional liberal-democratic values and institutions. Also of prime significance is the strategic political and economic strengthening of the Rimland. These are the reasons for NATO's present eastward expansion, plans for integrating CE and the Baltic states into the EU, the profound geopolitical importance of Ukraine's position, and western anxiety concerning the political and economic orientations of the Transcaucases and Central Asia.

The prevention of Russia's transformation into a Eurasian regional hegemony hostile to the USA was declared as one of the USA's vital interests of the 21st century. This idea was presented in a well-known 1995 report, entitled " National Interests of the USA", prepared by Harvard University, the RAND Corporation and a number of other US analytical centers. Ukraine and the Baltic states are also included in the USA's zone of vital interests. The fundamental importance of preventing Russian aggression, pressure or blackmail toward these states is underlined in the paper as well.

Another core document entitled " National Security Strategy in the Next Century", signed by President Clinton in May, 1997 stresses that the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 12 new independent states, the Baltic states included, are of vital importance for US interests.

US Undersecretary of State Strobe Talbot emphasized in June, 1997 that the Transcaucases and Central Asia are today also strategically important regions for the USA. Turkey plays a key role in this region as a leader in spreading Euro-Atlantic influence in counterbalance to the influence of Islamic fundamentalism (Iran) and Eurasian ideology in general, along the " Moscow-Teheran" strategic axis. Thus a strong basis exists to speak about the formation of a Baltic - Black Sea - the Caspian zone of US and Euro-Atlantic interests.
Ukraine holds a key position in the South-Western flank of the Rimland and in fact controls the main transportation corridors between two spheres of civilization both in latitudinal as well as in longitudinal directions. This strategically important Ukrainian position can be effectively utilized (although this is not yet the case) for the implementation of Ukraine's basic national interests and its accelerated integration into European economic and political space and security structures.

It can be stated without exaggeration that Ukraine's entry, or more correctly its return, to western civilization will significantly influence the entire geopolitical structure of the world. Leading western analysts unanimously affirm this fact. The priority of Ukraine's orientation toward integration into EU, WEU and NATO political structures, etc. has to be accompanied by a wide-ranging program of measures directed toward comprehensive integration into European socio-cultural space, and an openness not only to economic investments but also to cultural and informational ones.

The policy concerning principal strategic partners (in the West as well as in the East) should be thoroughly reviewed. In a geopolitical sense US dependence on Ukraine is not much smaller, if not greater, than Ukrainian dependence on the US. The US, by the way, understands this. It would be good for Ukraine to understand this as well, and to also let the US understand, that it understands. Otherwise the repeat of the greatest Ukrainian error concerning strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is inevitable. The surrender of nuclear weapons was not a mistake. This was the only possible and correct decision. The mistake lay in giving up the weapons for practically nothing in exchange. American analysts maintain that Ukraine could have received much more, we stress much more, for the world's third most potent nuclear arsenal. This includes both economic aid as well as assistance with transformational changes.

Ukraine's relations with the USA. The future of Ukraine will no doubt depend on its relations with the United States. Present relations have to be regarded as beginnings, even despite bilateral declarations that the partnership between the two states is strategic. The reason for this is, first of all, because of the undetermined character of these relations and in the unpredictability of each state for the other. The USA's undeterminate position concerning Ukraine is visible, first of all, in a noticeably inconsistent American-Ukrainian tactical course. Thus, George Bush's position after Ukraine's declaration of independence was too careful and, in fact, was reduced to being a policy, coordinated with Russia, for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. Bill Clinton's administration, starting with support for Ukraine and the establishment of a strategic partnership has gradually and noticeably changed its course and has resorted to using Ukraine as a chip in the USA's game with Russia. It was the USA that at first supported the idea of a Ukraine-NATO Charter and then did much to prevent this document from being signed in a form that Ukraine was interested in. It was the USA that " hooked" Ukraine on the " drug" of aid and then played a leading role in considerably cutting foreign financial aid to Ukraine. Desperately needed in the time of the growing Russian monetary crisis foreign credits were forthcoming only after a considerable time-lag. Furthermore, Ukraine was presented with a whole new series of conditions, which were considerably more rigid than those demanded of Russia.

The USA's double standard of policy toward Russia and Ukraine clearly emerged during the preparation and signing of the agreement concerning the reduction of conventional arms weaponry in Europe, in the issue concerning Ukraine-Iran cooperation, etc. The sudden change in American attitude toward Ukraine after the Bill Clinton - Boris Yeltsin summit in Helsinki in the spring of 1996 is also worth mentioning.

It seems that the inconsistency of a tactical Ukrainian-American course is the direct result of an absence of a decided American strategic position concerning Ukraine.

Ukraine's strategic line toward the USA is also vague. During his speech to students of the Diplomatic Academy, H. Udovenko, as then Head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, defined the following, by now traditional, priority strategic directions of Ukraine's foreign policy: reintegration into European structures; the intensification of transatlantic cooperation with the world's developed states (" the G7", West-European states) and with the RF and other CIS states; cooperation with Central-Eastern European countries; with Latin American, Middle-Eastern and Central Asian, African and Asian-Pacific countries; activity in international organizations... ". Thus, almost all world states and regions were seen in priority terms. Unfortunately, it is impossible to concentrate foreign political efforts in all directions at once, as Ukraine like any other state has limited means, especially considering all of its current hardships. The strategic line toward the USA has somehow become lost in the above-mentioned thesis about foreign political priorities, and has been timidly hidden in the phrase concerning transatlantic cooperation. Both indecision in intentions and unsureness in means can be hidden behind this phrase together with the desire to develop cooperation. This indetermination and unsureness together with, unfortunately, a lack of professionalism, are clearly seen in well-known to all Ukrainian tactical mistakes concerning the USA. The creation of a clear notion of Ukraine-US relations demands an awareness of the sense of " strategic partnership".

At present, in addition to the US, Israel, Germany, and Poland have been declared as Ukraine's strategic partners. It is interesting to note that strategic partner Poland, that produces a GNP almost two hundred times smaller than our strategic partner the US, in 1996, for instance, had an exchange of goods level with Ukraine greater than that of the US. Its investment total was all of two times smaller. Relations on a strategic level are probably the relations, whose course and results determine whether the corresponding strategic goals of partners will be achieved. If this is true then it is possible to speak about an asymmetry in the strategic partnership between Ukraine and the US. In order to explain the reasons for this we will examine the national interests of Ukraine and of the US.

In the overwhelming majority of directions in the European region these interests coincide with each other, or in the least, do not contradict each other (in opposition to the situation concerning Russia's national interests vis-à -vis both Ukraine and the US). The above is applicable to questions connected with the possibility of the formation of a new geopolitical power in the region, in opposition to the Euro-Atlantic community; with questions connected to NATO expansion; the general structure of European security; potential corridors for the transportation of Caspian oil; and Ukraine's potential geopolitical orientations. Namely, these corresponding interests can serve as a basis for Ukrainian-American strategic partnership.

However, a fundamental difference in approach also exists. Ukraine views the US as its principal partner in its attempts at integration into European economic, political, and security structures. Ukraine for the US is only a tool, or to be more exact, one of many tools in its grand geopolitical game with Russia.

A popular thesis among Ukrainian, and not only Ukrainian, analysts, is one that holds that an improvement in Ukrainian-US relations occurs only in the case of worsening Russian-US relations, and that the reverse situation also holds true.

Undoubtedly, however, today the main destiny of Ukraine as a tool of US policy is, first of all, its role in manipulations with Russia. Thus H. Kissinger and Z. Brzezinski regard Ukraine's role to be of great importance for the USA, but still consider the results of the emergence and existence of independent Ukraine through the prism of Russia. Z. Brzezinski writes that independent Ukraine's emergence is one of the three most important geopolitical events of the 20th century, as it indicated the end of imperialist Russia¹. H. Kissinger² acknowledges that the role of Ukraine is " of crucial importance" for the US, because " after the establishment of reforms Russia continues to produce reasons that arouse doubt as to the real ability of this state and its leaders to abandon former expansionist traditions". ¹ Z. Brzezinski, Suchasnist', 1992, No 9.
² H. Kissinger, Diplomatiya. - Moscow, Ladomir, 1997.
After winning the Cold War and having broken the imperialistic essence of the Russian Federation the " idea" of American manipulations of Russia consists of preventing Russia from losing its influence in Europe and Asia. After all, Europe with the EU, and Asia with China are two important geopolitical theaters where the US is struggling to maintain its present and future world dominance.

The US, thus, is the only superpower in the world that is truly able to conduct, and exert, direct and indirect multilateral (with the help of international organizations, Europe, Japan, and even Russia, etc. ) influence over Ukraine. It is logical to affirm that strategic partnership with this - only such state in the world - has to become priority number one of Ukrainian foreign policy. And thanks to the USA's unique means and role the pre-eminence of our transatlantic priority will not only not contradict our general line toward strong regional policy, but will indeed even promote it.

In terms of geopolitics Ukraine has to place itself as a player on the US side in Europe. This, however, in no way excludes the necessity for the comprehensive maintenance and development of equal mutually beneficial relations with Russia. Ukraine has to build its relations with Russia in order not to give Russia a reason to renew its imperialistic ambitions. German political scientist K. Grobe writes: "... a westward oriented Ukraine could become... a source of spreading stability into other " difficult" regions of the former USSR. This would be beneficial for Russia".

Ukraine represents a vitally important factor in the formation of a new geopolitical power on the territory of the former USSR. Russia understands this and actively strives to pull Ukraine over to its side. More importantly, Russia constantly outplays the US, which is always late on the scene. While the US discussed issues concerning the freezing of aid to Ukraine and promoted a blockade of new international credits, Russia actively and systematically increased its presence in Ukraine and aspired to establish direct or indirect control over all strategically important enterprises and spheres of production. This is the case even when today such a tactic proves to be economically unprofitable. This concerns oil-gas pipelines as well as strategically important industrial plants, together with key objects of the military-industrial complex. Russian pressure to involve Ukraine in military-technical cooperation with states of the Tashkent Treaty is on the increase. Russian attempts to establish control over the Ukrainian mass-media are especially alarming. At a certain stage these processes can become irreversible. President Kwasniewski of Poland (in Zeshuv, in May, 1998) was entirely correct in stating that the window of opportunity for helping Ukraine is closing.
At present the issue concerning the stabilization of the territorial integrity of Russia appears as one of its thorniest problems. The state's predicament is complicated by governmental and social instability, set against the background of an economic crisis. Russian state bodies are weak and unsure of themselves. The armed forces, according to Defense Minister I. Sergeev, are battle-ready only " in places". The Institute for Defense Studies (" INOBIS" ) of the Russian Federation openly recommends to the State Defense Council making nuclear tactical weapons the cornerstone of Russia's defense. However, the use of nuclear weapons against neighbors (at issue are tactical weapons) is suicidal for a state where the government shows discord well before the start of any war.

Thus, Russia's territorial integrity cannot be guaranteed by its (insufficient) present potential, but by a security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok, with Russian participation in it. Despite the abyss that separates Russia and NATO, the realities of life push both sides toward rapprochement. Z. Brzezinski has written about the growing economic potential of China as a reason, first of all for Russia, to seek such rapprochement.

The " American" dimension of Ukraine's policy has to exist in connection with policy concerning NATO. NATO has not yet developed into a pan-European security system. However, it has already lost its adversaries - the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. The Partnership for Peace Program as well as eastward expansion of the Atlantic organization were undoubtedly initiated and carried through by the US, as the alternative to NATO expansion was its folding. The US supported the growth of NATO, first of all, in order to remain in Europe in a political sense in conditions when the strengthening of an integrative Europe has created a repelling effect for the US. Thus, NATO today appears as an " anchor" for the political (including military) presence of the US in Europe. If so, closer Ukrainian ties with NATO mean closer ties with the US. This is the reason why the recommendations of professionals who continue to insist that Ukraine should conduct a more decided policy concerning NATO are accurate.

Strategic partnership between Ukraine and the USA under any conditions, if it is strategic, should be filled with real content, not with declarations. Ukraine is internally ready for reforms on all levels. Only a push is needed. It is difficult to disagree with the western position that reforms rather than discussions about reforms are needed. However, funds are necessary to conduct reforms. The West has these funds and they can be provided in the form of credits. Otherwise the realization of the so-called " Belarus' option" is entirely possible.

There is no doubt that the loss of Belarus' represents one of the biggest western strategic mistakes since the end of the Cold War. Belarus' had a democratic government and sought western support and aid, which is did not obtain. As a result Belarus' became practically lost to the West.

Taking into account Ukraine's possible role in Russia's transformation into a new empire, the consequences in the Ukrainian case could be much more serious.

More active western, particularly US, support for Ukrainian efforts to diversify the sources of energy supply and to ensure the transportation of at least part of the Caspian oil flow via Ukraine is needed. This, by the way, is economically the most profitable route and an alternative to the Russian route.

For Ukraine, the diversification of sources of energy supply means first of all the freedom of political choice, particularly in the sphere of integration into European economic and security structures.

Decisive measures should be taken by both Ukraine and the US in order to ensure the mutual transparency of policy. This is especially true in the sphere of relations with Russia. The fact that the American side is concerned about certain aspects of Ukrainian Russian military-technical cooperation has been stressed many times. At the same time Ukraine is no less concerned about the thick mist surrounding American-Russian agreements that deal with the division of spheres of interest in CE and in the former USSR.

Finally, it is clear that if the USA is Ukraine's strategic partner number one, bilateral relations between Ukraine and the USA must be regarded as being of prime importance. The development of Ukrainian-American business should be given adequate attention in light of President's Kuchma's requirement of the " economization" of our foreign policy. American business is searching for opportunities to penetrate into Ukraine and to take root here. However, the current domestic atmosphere for foreign business is in no way conducive for facilitating these opportunities. The establishment of effective economic (as well as other) bilateral relations between Ukraine and the USA demands not only actualization and an increase in economic goal-oriented action by the Ukrainian embassy in Washington, or the replacement of certain officials. Measures of a systematic character that would unite legislative, economic, informational, diplomatic, etc. efforts are necessary. The concept of relations with the world's number one state has to be developed and all components of this concept should be subject to planned coordination. Only this way can lead to the transformation of relations with the USA from the beginning stage of indetermination to the level of productive long-term interaction that will prove beneficial for " all states of the region".
In contradistinction to the USA, Canada is an average (according to its status in international relations) country. However, despite this and despite its overseas geographical position, the establishment of active relations with this state is of great importance for Ukraine. Its economic means do not represent Canada's main attractiveness, as Canada is integrated into the North-American region on the basis of the CAFTA and NAFTA treaties, and the functioning of the Canadian economy is limited by the borders of this region. Two external overseas functions of Canadian economic organization are trade and the export of capital. They occur in Western Europe and South-East Asia, to where the majority of non-continental export is directed. At the same time Central Europe remains in a marginal position and is situated far from the sphere of direct and immediate Canadian interest. Thus, it is not expected that the Canadian economy will achieve a high level of economic linkage with " marginal" Central Europe, including Ukraine. The presence of a large Ukrainian Diaspora, Canadian activity in international organizations and an inclination toward programs of aid for Central Europe are specific Canadian strong points (from the point of view of the importance of relations with Canada). Canada's participation in OSCE, NATO, the G-7 is an example of Canadian activity in international organizations.

Thus, Canada plays a particular role in the process of the distribution of western aid. Canada plays the role of mediator, coordinator and initiator of western aid at meetings of the G-7, of Ministers of Finance, of the directors of the central banks of the 10 largest financial donors to post-communist states, and of the 24 developed industrial states. Canada's inclination toward aid programs can be explained by the fact that the political and economic relations of this country with Central Europe are not and will not become either close or active. Thus, the amount of Canada-Ukraine trade (according to 1996 data) consisted of 8 million dollars, while the amount of aid reached 56 million dollars. It is necessary to take into account that Canadian help to Central European states as a percentage of its GNP exceeds the levels of aid of its partners in the G7. Canadian programs of technical aid to Ukraine are connected with the following priorities: democratic development, government administration, development of the private sector, agricultural farming, health care, nuclear (energy) security, and the ecology. The successful resolution of problems dealing with human rights is one of the most important conditions for obtaining aid and augmenting its level. All of the above-mentioned dimensions of aid correspond to Ukrainian national interests and should thus receive the comprehensive support of our national government.

It is possible to outline the most promising spheres of Ukrainian cooperation with this state taking into account Canadian activity and authority in international organizations. Ukraine and Canada can actively cooperate within multilateral international organizations. First of all, this concerns the OSCE and the joint participation of Canadian and Ukrainian diplomacy in the regulation of regional conflicts, especially in peacekeeping operations. Moving toward a more comprehensive integration into the world community, Ukraine should appeal to Canada as a mediator. Canadian diplomacy can become a connective link between Ukraine and the G-7 states, promote the adjustment of Ukraine-Russia contradictions, bring Ukraine closer to NATO states, and provide advocacy for Ukraine in international financial institutions.

The adaptation of Canadian foreign political experience should become an even more important sphere of Ukrainian-Canadian cooperation, as Ukrainian experience in international relations is insufficient. In this regard Canadian experience of accommodating relations with a powerful large neighbor can prove to be very useful. Many analysts advise Ukraine to build its relations with Russia using Canadian-American relations as a model. Canadian experience testifies that the only substantial counterbalance to US influence is not an orientation toward a single state, but active participation in international relations and mainly in multidimensional international organizations. Thus, in its relations with a large state, an average state like Ukraine should rely more on the principles of internationalism and multilateralism rather than on the principle of a " balance of power" ¹.

Consequently, the development of relations with Canada as well as with the USA initiates not only the effect of self-sufficiency but also the effect of the strengthening of one's own positions toward neighboring Russia. Finally, let us emphasize economic relations between Ukraine and Canada: despite their low level and doubtful potential they should be developed, as economic interaction and not the milking of aid constitutes normal relations between two states. The possibility of the growth of effective economic cooperation between the two countries is obvious. It has already been initiated by Canada as a whole, as well as by separate provinces (Quebec, Saskitchewan, etc. ).