d) Ukraine and Turkey

Turkey is a powerful sub-regional leader with its own system of interests. In the circumstances resulting from recent structural changes in the post-communist world Turkey is giving new geopolitical shape to its foreign policy. Ankara is no longer faced by a communist treat from the North and from the Balkans. In connection with the Arab-Israeli peace process Ankara becomes a regional player that is looking to exercise its policy in more distant peripheral regions. The Turkish foreign political course has been dually oriented since World War II. On the one hand it is a policy of industrial development headed toward the joining of the EU and on the other hand, in connection with an Oriental and Islamic orientation, Turkey is looking to identify itself with the Middle East and Central Asia. During the time of the Cold War, however, Soviet domination in Central Asia and the Caucasus hindered Turkish efforts in this direction, while Turkish association with Israel and its alliance with Washington clouded direct relations with the Middle East. Turkey served as NATO's southern flank and as a stronghold of US security. The result of this was political isolation from the Middle East and confrontation with the North¹.

Turkey's special position in relation to Europe, on the one hand, and with the Islamic South on the other, creates a specific geopolitical configuration of its national interests. It is difficult for Europe to accept Turkey as its integral part, instead it is accepted as something alien. Turkish participation in the North Atlantic Alliance is more a consequence of the Cold War and of US geostrategic interests than a result of a consciousness of common European interests. Long-term conflict with more " European" Greece, the problem of Cyprus, its special position on the Bosnian crisis, on issues concerning Kurds - all of the above does not promote speedier Turkish integration into European structures.

Turkish ambitions in the Balkan region are based on the conviction that the disintegration of the USSR and of the SFRY gave Turkey a unique chance to in new forms bring back its political, economic, cultural, and military influence in the measures of the former Ottoman Empire. The Muslim population is to become one of the main tools of this influence.

Powerful US support gives Turkey special courage. Turkish analysts believe that all so-called Eurasian circles of security, including the CEE, the Balkans, the eastern Black Sea area, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Central Asia cross over precisely where Turkey is located. In consideration of this, Turkeys's significance as a member of NATO and the possibility for its development into a regional leader are increased. Obvious aspiration toward regional domination is covered by humanitarian rhetoric: Turkey seemingly provides aid to " new states" in their search for " real identity free from external factors and pressure". ¹ See: Sariolghalam M., The Future of the Middle East: the Impact of the Northern Tier, Security Dialogue, vol. 27, No. 3, September 1996, pp. 303-317.

At present Turkey is increasing the size of its navy, which in our opinion can be explained by the presence of serious problems in the Mediterranean (Cyprus) and Aegean seas. The priorities of Turkish policy are clear: the maintenance of a constant and significant advantage, marine inclusive, over its main adversary - Greece. This is determined by the necessity for the protection of Turkish interests in the Aegean sea, where Greeks, despite international agreements, are re-militarizing islands adjacent to the Turkish seashore. It is also necessary for the prevention of a forceful revision of the Cyprus reality, formed after the Turkish occupation of the northern part of the island.

In the next century Turkey plans to become a state that utilizes aircraft carriers for the protection of its interests. State power, geography and historical factors force Turkey to become a regional leader. Its navy should not confine itself to seashore borders. Turkish forces participated in UN peacemaking activity in Somalia, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. This indicates that Turkish interests should not be limited only to adjacent states.

Turkey has a well-grounded alternative to the European dimension of its interests. This alternative consists of Turkey's southern, Islamic and Central Asian interests. The architect of new Turkey, Turgut Ozal, has started to use Turkish symbolism toward the projection of Turkish economic and political power into the Central Asian and Caucasian regions. Since 1991 T. Ozal, and later Souleman Demirel have made a number of visits to new states and have signed numerous treaties pertaining to political cooperation, military aid, and cultural and economic transformations. Turkey is a member of institutional structures that increase its regional status: the Black Sea Consortium, the Union of Tiurkic states, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation.

This obviously causes Russian anxiety. The RF is examining its attitude toward Turkey in a wider context and is beginning to limit Ankara's pan-Tiurkic advancement, first, at the Tiurkic Congress and later by forming the CIS's Convention of Kurdish Organizations in Moscow. Moscow's intervention in Chechnia undermined both states' perception of each other. Although Turkey posseses significant resources, and advances its geopolitical role in countries that emerged from the former USSR, this role is not unique. Turkey faces competition from other states, particularly, from Iran.

Turkey is attempting to compete with Russia and in a certain way with Iran, for influence over post-Soviet Tiurkic-speaking Central Asian states. Its trump-cards in this game are the following: ethnic closeness with Turkish-language regional nations (Turkmens, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghizes, Kara-Kalpacks, Uygours); denominational similarity (Turks, as all other native post-Soviet Central Asians are Sunnites of the most moderate Khaniphist persuasion, unlike Iranian Shiites); its nature as an economically developed and militarily-political powerful Tiurkic-Muslim state, which as such should serve as a model for Tiurkic-Muslim states that have, unlike Iran, chosen a secular road of development; its influence over western developed countries, namely the US (for which Turkey represents the most important, except for Israel, strategic partner in Western Asia), and henceforth, in relation to possible Turkish lobbying of the interests of a certain circle of states in the West.

However, the increase of Islamic feelings in Turkey and its attempts to come closer to other Islamic states are capable of leading to a certain change in Turkey's traditional pro-western course in the nearest future. Moreover, the RF is actively counteracting Turkey's growing influence in Central Asia as well as in the Caucasus and Balkans.

Turkey is increasing its regional role on a wave of pan-Tiurkism. This, to a certain extent, weakens the Islamic renewal of regional states that are considerably secularized. Instability in the Balkans and Caucasus signals a threat to Turkish territorial integrity, on account of the emergent threat of immigration to Turkey. Russia aspires toward the reestablishment of a system of collective Asian security that would counteract Turkish interest in the regeneration of pan-Tiurkism. On the other hand, regional states are more inclined to develop their own economic and political models than to simply adopt the Turkish example. At the same time, with the testing of the pan-Tiurkic idea, CA states have intensified relations with other countries aspiring toward the diversification of their own foreign policies. This is typical for all post-Soviet states. As a result, pan-Tiurkic influences were weakened in the middle of the 1990's and have developed into a more normal course.

The growth of Turkish positions in the region is connected with Turkey's own experience of modernization, which is taking place with the help of modern technologies of development, where regional economic interests and the energy of private capital are emphasized. Private Turkish companies are actively functioning in the region. Construction industries constitute the main thrust, a market in which Turkey is capable of occupying a prominent place on a global scale. Turkey builds inexpensively and with relative quality. Moreover, Turkish companies are involved in the creation of the manufacturing industry for consumer goods and food production. Turkish capital also cooperates with leading multinational companies in the role of an intermediary. The Turkish state also finances the penetration of Turkish capital.

The idea of pan-Tiurkism today has more of an economic base: Turkey vigorously supported the independent states by way of providing trade privileges and credits. The anti-Russian factor, that is, Turkey's search for a certain counterbalance, also played its role. The changeover of Central Asian states to the Latin alphabet has occurred on the ebb of the pan-Tiurkic idea. Intensive cultural contact between political é lites is growing. On the other hand, a certain romanticism in attitude toward civilized Turkey, a search for coequal allies and for a suitable model for modernization have also played their roles.

Regular meetings of leaders of Tiurkic-speaking states have become the main factor of pan-Tiurkic influence (Ankara, 1992; Istanbul, 1994). The idea of closer cooperation within the Tiurkic Alliance was discussed at the Bishkek summit in August 1995. A declaration regarding further cooperation in culture and information, the development of highways along the Great Silk Way, in improvement of bilateral relations etc., was ratified at the fourth meeting of leaders of Tiurkic-speaking states in Tashkent (October 1996).

One of the main Ukrainian priorities in the southern direction is the development of relations with Turkey. An agreement of great importance regarding friendship and cooperation between the two states in the next 10 years has been signed. No evident tension between Kyiv and Ankara has become apparent since Ukraine gained independence. The direct and immediate interest of both states is centered on the solution of problems concerning the military and ecological protection of the Black Sea region, and of its demilitarization. Ukrainian and Turkish interests can also coincide in the search for a balance of power in the new and complex geopolitical situation that has developed in the region in recent years. Turkish sensitivity to problems connected with the return of the ethnically related to Turks Crimean Tatars is sympathetically understood in Ukraine.

Turkey is a key state for Ukraine because the most opportune transportation routes to the Mediterranean and the Middle East pass through it. In the last while Turkey is developing diversified paths for the course of its own foreign policy, which on the whole remains pro-western. Turkey's prolonged conflict with Greece makes its entry into the EU problematic. Its strategic meaning as NATO's southeastern flank is becoming lost with the decreasing level of confrontation between Russia and the West. Motives for Ukraine's friendliness with Turkey appear sufficiently grounded: the necessity to ensure the transportation of energy carriers to and through Ukraine, the correspondence of economies, cooperation within BSEC etc. At present, trade with Turkey accounts for almost half of Ukraine's trade with all Middle East states. The development of partnership with Turkey should be conducted within a framework of bilateral economic cooperation or within the BSEC system, avoiding its transformation into a strategic political-military Alliance

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  5. The South-Eastern Axis