a) The Middle East

On account of the great geostrategic importance of the region, the interests of global economic powers and of several great states, such as the US, some European countries, and the Russian Federation overlap in it. Western concerns and, and following them, governments of correspondent states, are directly interested in control over natural resources in Middle Eastern and Central Asian states, and Black Sea-Caspian region countries. In the least, they are interested in profiting from their exploitation. The realization of large-scale trans-Asian transportation projects promotes the reorientation of Central Asian states toward the West. In this case Ukraine becomes one of the unifying links between the West and the East and thus has a chance of becoming a focus of one of the new systems of international interchange.

Ukrainian national interests in the Middle East demand the preliminary development of economic relations with regional states. This is expressed through traditional (since USSR times) trade-economic cooperation; the considerable scope and relative modesty of goods markets; the annual growth in the exchange of goods with a stable balance favorable for Ukraine; good opportunities for the sale of military-technical production and for the repair of Soviet military equipment and weaponry; the presence of stores of raw materials and energy resources; the possibility for participation in projects involving the development of the infrastructures of these countries; the opportunities to supply transit facilities for the movement of these states' goods to European markets and vice versa.

In view of the necessity for resolving the problem of the diversification of energy supply sources, the development of Ukraine's policy concerning states of the risk group - Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, demands special attention. In mind here is a more flexible and possibly non-explicable way of behavior, which borders on the acceptable. Dividends from this can significantly exceed some moral losses. In order to increase cooperation with Middle Eastern countries it may be prudent for Ukraine to activate its diplomacy toward agreements with the RF and with European states.

Potential Ukrainian interests regarding Israel include its possible help in the solicitation of investments from sources controlled by Jewish financial circles, the obtaining of modern technologies and know-how, and the utilization of the US Jewish Diaspora's lobby potential for promoting Ukrainian interests. The realization of the mentioned interests in the nearest future, however, will remain problematic. Expectations for receiving considerable funds from world financial establishments do not seem justified today. Israeli interests concerning Ukraine consist of the prevention of the increase of Ukrainian cooperation with Islamic states, and of the development of new markets for its own goods in correspondence with the strategy of export diversification. It is important to maintain a tolerant and deliberate position concerning Israel, to develop relations only on a bilateral basis, taking into account potential opportunities without exceeding the framework of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Ukraine has to bear in mind the attitude toward Israel of leading European states that demonstrate a more balanced position to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israeli or US counteraction to concrete projects of Ukrainian cooperation with unreconciled Islamic states can be considered only in the case of adequate compensation in the form of financial aid or favorable credits.

It is necessary to constitute that the effectiveness of economic interaction in the widely advertised Israel - Ukraine - US triangle is far from being optimal. Ukraine's strategic partners mostly use " special relations" primarily to put pressure on Ukraine in order to promote their political interests (it is sufficient to recall issues relating to rocket technologies, the supply of turbines to Iran etc. ). Additionally, in exchange for significant political concessions and direct economic losses Ukraine in the best case is proposed new credits, which will have to be returned. At the same time, a symbiosis of Israel's new high technologies and capital with cheap Ukrainian raw materials and labor could serve as a basis for the development of mutually beneficial Ukrainian-Israeli relations. Of no lesser importance is the fact that Israel could obtain an unhampered outlet through Ukraine to the markets of post-Soviet space. Ukraine, meanwhile, with Israeli help could more effectively solve many of its problems in its relations with the USA.

Ukraine's position concerning the states of the Persian Gulf remains groundlessly passive. This region, however, holds a position of exclusive interest for Ukraine because of the opportunities for the diversification of energy supply sources and for possible participation in oil extraction, metallurgical processing and transportation projects that it provides. It is also of interest as a promising market for weaponry and military equipment. It would be a mistake to forget that the Persian Gulf is a source of powerful investment capital, whose general volume exceeds 300 billion US dollars. The drawing of at least part of this capital to Ukraine for the purposes of financing the construction of transportation corridors between the Middle East and Europe through Ukrainian territory could become a reality in the case of the creation of an attractive investment climate in Ukraine.

Increasing Ukrainian cooperation with Turkey and Israel should not assist the involvement of our state in the pro-American military-political triangle that is being formed in the region as this will result in significant losses in relations with other Middle Eastern states.

Among the Middle Eastern states, Egypt, whose initiative started the Mediterranean dialog, is the closest to the pro-European paradigm. Egypt is one of the leaders of the Arab-Islamic world, but in contradistinction to other Arab countries it holds a more balanced position in its relations with the international community. The main features of this course are an orientation toward own national interests, and a balancing between the different political and ideological schemes of orientation influential in the region. Egypt is interested in finding in Ukraine a trusted and coequal partner in order to put forth its interests concerning the European world as well as to solve regional problems.

Based on the development of partnership with Egypt and having garnered the support of European states (France, Italy), Ukraine has a chance to enter the Mediterranean dialog, analogous to the BSEC system, where Egypt holds the status of observer. In both cases these are outlying economic areas of west-European spheres of influence that can become more integrated with each other in the future. The development of a strategy for the formation of a general zone of economic cooperation from the Gibraltar to the Caucuses under the EU's aegis, which together with the TRACECA transportation system would create favorable space for the realization of Ukrainian interests.

Holding a separate position in the region is Iran, which thanks to the efforts of American diplomacy finds itself in a certain foreign political isolation, at least in relations with the West. The Islamic revolution in Iran is an example of the warding off of western modernization, and is also an attempt at the adaptation of society to change sans the destruction of its cultural values. In the pre-industrial epoch Iran's geostrategic position had allowed it to function as a bridge between Central, Southern, Eastern Asia and Europe.

After Saudi Arabia Iran holds the second place in the world as an oil-producing state, with an annual profit of approximately 20 billion US dollars. This allows Iran to maintain significant armed forces and to undergo large-scale rearmament. The thought that Iran, with China's help, is creating an infrastructure for the production of nuclear weapons predominates in the West. Central Asian experts, however, do not regard Iran to be a threat to regional security, as the main goal in the increase of its military potential is to form a regional center of power in the Persian Gulf.

Iran regards itself and its strategic interests and goals to be placed into three spheres: as the savior of Islamic values, as an important member of the Third World in the struggle against neo-colonialism and as a player in the game of oil-gas policy in the international arena.

Through the Alma-Ata Resolution Iran immediately recognized the newly independent states on December 25, 1991. Preceding this, Iran was taking into consideration the delicate nature of its relations with Moscow. The decision was made because of the fact that changes in the USSR had a direct influence on Iran's national security. Iran greeted these republics at the meeting of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in Teheran (February, 1992), supported their entry into the Non-Alignment Movement and into the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and initiated the creation of the Organization of Caspian states. Restored as a result of Iran's initiative, the ECO includes Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and from 1992, all states of Central Asia and Azerbaijan. It is planned that in future this organization will form the basis for an " Islamic common market".

Iran today actively pretends to the role of the power that is able to affect political and economic patronage of the region. Iran has vital interests concerning the guaranteeing of stability in the region, but its international isolation considerably restrains its activity. Iran's chances are also reduced as a result of the domination of its own static economic model. The weakening of the private sector has resulted in a disadvantage of quality of Iranian goods in comparison with Chinese goods. Iran is not able to offer the modern technologies that are desperately needed by the new independent states of the region.

Iran is conducting an independent foreign-policy game, counteracting western states, competing with Turkey and Pakistan, and trying not to sharpen its relations with Russia. It is developing economic and political cooperation with its northern neighbor Turkmenistan, has considerable influence over ethnically and culturally related Tadjikistan, and supports the Shiite-Tadjik-Uzbek anti-Taliban coalition in Afghanistan.

After the USSR's collapse Turkey and Iran found themselves in a situation of conflicting interests, struggling, in fact, for influence in the region. Moreover, Iran is attempting to force so-called " political Islam" onto the region, that is, to create possibilities for directly influencing the policies of new states through the help of an ideological hegemony. Turkey is also actively using the factor of political and economic influence within the environment of Turkish nations. Growing awareness of the role of ethnic proximity increases the intensification of the consolidation processes of Turkish states, which have recently become especially active.

Iran is especially interested in attaining nuclear capability. The West regards the penetration of Soviet nuclear technologies and weaponry into Iran to be another danger, separate from the spreading of Iranian-Islamic influence. Publications have appeared in the western mass media about former Soviet nuclear scientists helping Iran with the production of nuclear weapons, about the transfer of nuclear materials to Iran, etc.

The possibilities for the gradual transformation of Ukrainian-Iranian relations into a strategic partnership have seemed problematic from the time of the Ukrainian refusal, under US pressure, to supply turbines for Iran's NPS. In general, however, Ukraine is interested in the development of friendly partnership relations with Iran. Despite insignificant present trade-economic cooperation between both states, they have great potential due to the development of trade within the Ukraine-Turkmenistan-Iran triangle, the development of the trans-Asian transport network (TRACECA), the possibilities of oil supply from the Persian Gulf, etc.