Главная | Обратная связь | Поможем написать вашу работу!

Morphological Table of Alternative Scenarios for Ukraine's Development up to the Year 2003 1 страница

Morphological Table of Alternative Scenarios for Ukraine's Development up to the Year 2003

State of " East-West" Relations		Worsening of " East-West" Relations		Continuaton of a current state of " East-West" Relations		Improvement of " East-West" Relations. Beginning of Formation of N. W. O.
		State of Ukrainian-Russian Relations
		Worsening of Relations with the RF. Growing Economic Contradictions	Rapprochement with the RF. Loss of Economic Sovereignty. Formation of Confederate Relations	Dominant Orientation Toward the RF with Preservation of Political and Economic Sovereignty		Dominant West-ward Orientation. Establishment of Equal Economic and Political Relations with the RF
				Under the Conditions of Slow Reforms and Absence of Western Investments	Under Administrative Reforms and Weak Cooperation with the West
Domestic Situation in Ukraine	Continuation of Present Day Tendencies of Systemic Economic Crisis	A₁ Free Fall	-	-	-	-
	Termination of Progressive Economic Downfall in the Absence of Visible Reforms	-	-	C₂ Marking Time	-	-
	Irresolute Reforms. Slow Stabilization of Economy and Weak Growth	-	B₃ Belarus Option	-	D₃ Eurasian Model 1	-
	Successive Administrative Reforms. Moderate Growth	-	-	-	D₄ Eurasian Model 2	E₄ Western Authoritarianism
	Radical Reforms Based on Democratic Principles. Rapid Growth	-	-	-	-	E₅ European Choice

orientations. The differences among the scenarios of this group are in the forms and mechanisms of the stimulation of reforms.

Scenario E₄ - " Western Authoritarianism"

Establishment of a " de Gaul" type of liberal western authoritarianism in the state in a situation of inevitable economic crisis. Radical economic reforms assisted by administrative stimulation. A successive policy of a multi-dimensional rapprochement with the West. The simultaneous support of mutually beneficial relations with Russia based on clear economic grounds. Purposeful activity in order to form a domestic consensus. Moderate economic growth with good perspectives for its acceleration.

Scenario E₅ - " The European Choice"

Similar to scenario E₄, but based on democratic grounds. The formation of an internal consensus and consolidation of society around generally accepted interests and priorities such as " survival", " prosperity", " social justice", " development". Sustainable economic growth. Entry into European economic and security structures as an associate member, with full membership in the future. Transition to a European mode of development.

The probability of the realization of the developed scenarios has been evaluated with the help of the standard " Delphi technique" (see table 2).

According to table 2, the most probable are the scenario C₂ " Marking Time" (the probability of its realization is 22%), the scenarios of Group D - " Eurasian model 1" and " Eurasian model 2" (the combined probability of their realization is 35%) and the scenarios of Group E - " Western Authoritarianism" and " The European Choice" (the probability of their realization is 26%).

The above mentioned scenarios are not alternatives in the strict understanding of this word. " Mixed" versions are possible as well as transformations of one scenario into another. Thus under certain conditions scenario A₁ can be transformed into scenarios B₃ and C₂. Scenario D can logically develop into scenario E (E₄; E₅). Moreover, according to numerous experts in Ukraine as well as abroad, a " reasonable dose" of authoritarianism could prove not only useful but even desirable at the first stages of radical reforms.

The probability of the realization of the developed scenarios is not constant. Data listed in the table corresponds to the state of affairs as of November, 1998. Thus, directed efforts of legislative and executive branches of power can significantly influence the probability of the realization of these scenarios (including the scenarios of group E).
Table 2.

Results of Expert Evaluations of the Probability of the Realization of Scenarios (The Delphi Technique)

Scenario	Probability of Realization in Percentage	Variation in Estimation of Percentage
Scenario A₁ - Free Fall		4 - 7
Scenario B₃ - Belarus' Option		10 - 15
Scenario C₂ - Marking Time		22 - 25
Scenario D₃ - Eurasian Model 1
Scenario D₄ - Eurasian Model 2		10 - 20
Scenario E₄ - Western Authoritarianism		14 - 17
Scenario E₅ - European Choice		8 - 12

Appendix. A Sociological Study of Ukraine's Foreign Policy and Geopolitical Orientations and its National Security Policy

Introduction

In June, 1998, pursuant to the " Monitoring Ukraine's Foreign and Security Policy" Program, which has been in effect since January 1997, the Ukrainian Center for Peace, Conversion and Conflict Resolution Studies (UCPCCRS) carried out a regular quarterly expert poll. The Project is supported by the Freidrich Ebert Foundation (Germany). Polls were conducted in March, June, September, December, 1997, and in March, 1998. All six polls involved an analogous set of instruments, with a certain program, additionally depending on the latest course of events.

The polls involved 39-44 experts representing the following four groups:

1. Officials from the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and associates of research structures engaged in rendering advice to state power bodies (the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine, etc. ).

2. Deputies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, primarily members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Relations with the CIS and the Committee for Defense and State Security. They represent the entire political spectrum - right, center, left.

3. Servicemen with the Armed Forces of Ukraine holding the rank of not lower than Lieutenant Colonel, officials from the Ministry of Defense, professors and specialists of higher educational institutions and research centers, most of them having scholarly degrees (the military-professional intellectual elite).

4. Leading journalists specializing in international themes and representing the most influential mass media. There are grounds to consider that they have an influence not only on public consciousness regarding the issues of our research, but also on the standpoint of the political elite (establishment). The results of the expert polls testify to the fact that in Ukraine two basic points of view regarding further ways of development that would correspond to Ukraine's national interest exist.

These are: the orientation of " Ukraine's accession to NATO independently from other countries" and the orientation of " Ukraine's neutral and/or non-aligned status". At first the former orientation predominated (47. 6% of experts in March, 1997, versus the adherents of neutrality at 28. 6%), while in the course of 1997 the latter variant gradually gained importance. By the spring of 1998 both orientations had equalized each other, each having 43. 6% of adherents. There is also an insignificant group of experts assuming an unrealistic " accession to NATO together with CIS countries" orientation. In March, 1998 this orientation was supported by 2. 6% of the experts. Its general strength during the period of the research did not exceed 7%. There are few adherents of such variants as " Ukraine's accession to a military alignment of CIS countries as an alternative to accession to NATO" - 5. 1% in March, 1998 (7-9% overall, zero in December, 1997) or of any other variants, totaling 5. 1% (7-9% or zero overall).

On the one hand, these results could be explained by a certain disappointment in the condition of Ukraine's integration potential (that can be confirmed by other indices), on the other hand - by the activation of the Russian direction of foreign policy under conditions when the RF is gradually losing attractive features (taking into account, for instance, its concept of relations with its most closely " integrated" partner - Belarus').

In this regard, the electoral preferences of the experts are interesting. They actually remained unchanged from December, 1997 until March, 1998, with the following exception: on the eve of the parliamentary elections the number of experts intending to vote for a candidate deputy if he would adhere to Ukraine's earliest accession to NATO increased more than twofold (12. 5% in December, 1997, 28. 2% in March, 1998). At the same time, an advantage was gained by the adherents of a balanced development of Ukraine's relations with both Russia and the West (65% and 61. 5% respectively) and of a comprehensive economic integration with the West (47. 5% and 33. 3%). The adherents of the priority of developing relations with Poland could count on the support of one tenth of the specialists. (The total percentage exceeds 100% since the experts could give two variants in answer). The adherents of a union with Russia, up to unification into a coherent state, almost failed to find support among the experts.

According to the results of the expert poll of June 1998, the main foreign-policy orientations of Ukraine remain as follows: first, orientation toward " Ukraine's accession to NATO", and second, orientation toward " Ukraine's neutral and/or non-aligned status". For one and a half years - a rather long period of time for Ukraine, both alternatives have been supported by firm adherents and are rather stable. In March 1998, against the background of, in the experts' estimations, the general worsening of the relationship between Ukraine and NATO, the orientation toward Ukraine's accession to NATO lost a certain percentage of adherents (from 51. 2% at the end of 1997 to 43. 6% in March, 1998), but this situation did not last long. In June, 1998 the group of experts supporting the pro-NATO orientation regained adherents - to 50%, which, with insignificant fluctuations, became a stable result in 1997. If we assume that the adherents of the least realistic " accession to NATO together with CIS countries" orientation, who constituted 5% in June (2-7% overall), join the above-mentioned group, we can assume that the pro-NATO orientation, among others, remains the overwhelming one. The other basic orientation - toward Ukraine's neutral and/or non-aligned status - was as firm as the former one in March, 1998 (43. 6%), but never dominated prior to that time. It gradually gained adherents during the past year (from 28 to 41. 5%) and in the summer of 1998 was supported by 40% of the experts.

Such variants in the development of the situation as " Ukraine's accession to a military alliance of CIS countries as an alternative to accession to NATO" or any other variants are gradually losing support. In June, 1998 they gained fewer adherents (2. 5% each) than in March, 1998 (5. 1% each) or during the last year (not more than 7-9%).

In the course of the poll conducted in June, 1998, it was suggested for the first time to the experts to estimate the main goals of Ukraine's foreign policy. This was intended to provide more detailed information compared to the above-mentioned orientations within the framework of the " NATO - neutral and/or non-aligned" dichotomy.

According to the experts, the most important goals of current Ukrainian foreign policy are as follows:

· First, the creation of conditions under which Ukraine would not have to worry about its security and would be able to focus on its internal problems (74. 3% of the experts).

· Second, the establishment of a general security system which precludes war as a means of solving international conflicts (58. 3%).

· Third, the establishment and development of partnership relations with Russia (53. 8%).

· Fourth, the intensification of partnership relations with Central-Eastern European and Baltic countries (50%).

· Fifth, Ukraine's assumption of the function of a North-South, East-West transportation (transit) corridor— (47. 1%).

After that, the experts mentioned as important but less significant such goals as the intensification of partnership relations with CIS countries, and managing to obtain wide-scale assistance and investments from the West.

Most experts mentioned the following goals of Ukraine's foreign policy as secondary ones:

· First, the development of cooperation with " new nuclear states" (India, Pakistan).

· Second, the reformation of the United Nations organization.

· Third, the strengthening of the missile technologies non-proliferation regime.

The experts had various (indefinite) opinions as regarding such goals as Ukraine becoming (and being strengthened AS) a regional leader of Central Eastern Europe, the initiative of further disarmament, and the complete and ultimate banning of nuclear tests.

The General Characteristics of Ukraine's Foreign Policy

According to the experts' estimations, the situation of Ukraine's international security could be deemed comparatively safe in December 1997 (at least, compared with the other periods of research in 1997). The smallest concern of the experts about the presence of an external threat to Ukraine during the entire year was registered at its end, while the greatest threat was marked in March and September 1997, somewhat less, in June 1997. In December only 19. 5% of the experts stressed the presence of a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity (1. 5 times fewer than in March and September, in June - 22. 5%). The possibility of the appearance of a threat at any moment was emphasized by 31. 7% of the experts (50% in March, 42. 5% in June, 43. 9% in September). In turn, the absence of such a threat and the existence of all the preconditions for preventing its emergence was stressed by 34. 1% of the experts (twice more than in March - 14. 3%, and three times more than in September - 9. 8%; in June - 27. 5%). The assumption that the emergence of a threat should be expected in 1-2 years or in 3-5 years was shared by an insignificant group of the experts - ranging from 2. 4% in March to 7. 3% in September.

These evaluations coincide with the results of the poll attesting to the realization by the foreign-policy environment of Ukraine of positive changes regarding the status of international security in Europe as a whole compared with the beginning of 1997, though the positive character of the experts' evaluations suffered a certain decline in September. According to their estimations, since March the status of international security in Europe has not worsened, but has remained unchanged and, to a certain extent has become better. As for the determination of the status of international security in Europe during the year, according to most Ukrainian foreign-policy experts, it is slightly lower than in Europe as a whole. Since June, when, in the experts' opinions, the situation grew better compared to March, no essential changes in this respect have taken place. At the same time, the level of international safeguards to Ukraine from other countries gradually increased during the year. In December, 1997 the experts estimated it as close to " medium", while in March they consciously estimated it at as " low". Furthermore, since June, when estimations of a certain worsening of the state's international situation according to this index were registered, in the foreign-policy environment one could observe a growth in importance of the presence of the Armed Forces in providing national security and an increase in its share of doing so - the extent to which Ukraine should rely on its own Armed Forces in providing national security. However, according to the experts' estimations, the readiness of the Armed Forces is constantly worsening. The poll shows that during 1997 the role of economic determinants (stressed by 63-73% of the experts) and political determinants (stressed by 24-46% of the experts) in providing national security for Ukraine was on the rise.

These factors were connected with the pre-election campaign to the Verkhovna Rada (elections were held in March, 1998) and the realization by Ukraine's partners of the weaknesses of democratic institutions in the state.

The estimation of the situation concerning Ukraine's constraint to follow the lead of other states and alignments, to be subject to their dictates and expectations, even in the case of conflict with its national interest, was rather ambiguous. According to the experts' estimations, in June and September, 1997 such " constraint" was growing, ranging between " high" and " medium" (closer to " medium" ), but lessened in December, ranging between " medium" and " low" (closer to " medium" ). At the same time, the experts' estimations of the extent to which Ukraine " has to rely on its allies in the realization of its foreign-policy goals", which had almost not changed as of December, 1997, grew somewhat and came closer to " medium" than previously.

It is evident that the final estimations by the foreign-policy circles of the lessening of the extent of Ukraine's dependence on the standpoint of other states and alignments were influenced by certain objective circumstances connected with the signing of bilateral political treaties with Russia and Romania, the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, and important documents with Central European countries. From the formal, objective point of view, in the second half of 1997 Ukraine's foreign policy acquired a measure of self-sufficiency (with respect to independence from external determinants) that it had never had since the Proclamation of Independence in 1991. This situation was caused by the almost simultaneous settling of the most acute and contradictory matters in relations with Russia and Romania (that instantly led to the minimization of actual or evident determinants of external threats) on the one hand, and on the other hand, by the establishment of a certain level of institutional linkages with NATO - as the most important defensive and military-political organization of the West.

Taking into account the stable Ukrainian tradition of foreign-policy balance in the international arena, one could forecast the strengthening of the elements of a demonstrative " equal distancing" alongside with the ever growing regionalization of practical interests and tasks of diplomacy. This balance will acquire features of a certain functional distribution of interests and spheres of cooperation: economic aspects dominating in relations with Russia and other post-Soviet countries and military-political plots in relations with western states.

However there are a number of objective determinants which could cause an essential strengthening of Ukraine's external dependence on foreign partners. These include first of all economic and financial circumstances and certain subjective determinants. In relations with Russia this dependence may result in the " conversion" of debts in the form of a transfer of shares of some economically attractive enterprises. In relations with the West (the USA and EU countries), the budgetary deficit and non-stability of the Ukrainian financial system will cause an aggravation of dependence on external loans and investments. This process is multi-faceted. The unwillingness of Western investors to invest in the Ukrainian economy can result in the gradual lowering of prices for Ukrainian investment entities. Conditionally speaking, the lowering of prices to a certain level, alongside with the growth of the government's financial dependence on international financial institutions can reach the point where the profitability of investment conditions will exceed the influence of economic risk factors.

At the same time, in December 1997 the experts' estimations of the extent to which Ukraine should rely on its allies in the realization of its foreign-policy tasks increased somewhat. By the end of the year these estimations, which earlier had not changed, came closer to being " medium".

With respect to integration processes, certain correlated changes, especially in the Eastern and the Western directions, took place during the year. As the process of integration with Russia and the CIS became more and more intensive, the rates of integration with NATO, the EU, etc. decreased. According to the experts' estimations, in December, 1997 the situation changed essentially - the process of eastward integration essentially lost its pace, while westward integration became more intensive, coming closer to its initial level (of March, 1997) - now approaching the " medium" level. In general, the process of integration with NATO, the EU, etc. is more intensive than the process of integration with Russia and the CIS, the status of the latter approaching a " slow" level.

Furthermore, the experts' estimations testify to the fact that since March, 1997 a certain intensification of Ukraine's integration into the Black Sea region and into Central and Eastern Europe was taking place. According to the estimations, integration in these directions is not as intensive as westward integration, but is also not as slow as eastward integration. On the average, the status of this process ranges between " medium" and " slow".

One could ear-mark three groups among the Ukrainian political elite that are adherents of integration in this or that direction. Thus, during 1997 " pro-Russian politicians" (mentioned by 70-88% of the experts, 67% in June) and " left-wing deputies of the Verkhovna Rada" (51-61%, 70% in June) led among those striving for integration with Russia, up to unification into a coherent state. Other, less important groups consist of " entrepreneurs from Ukrainian-Russian groups" (31-37%, 54% in September), and " socially deprived strata of the population" (34-39%, 22% in June). The share of the former increased significantly in September and decreased in December. According to the experts, the groups of " leaders of MIC enterprises oriented toward cooperation with Russia" (24-36%), " regional leaders of the East and the South" (31-35%, 19% in December), " officers of the Armed Forces" (2-10%) also belong to the adherents of this direction. Other groups are not significant (2-7%).

Among the main adherents of another direction of integration - with the West, all the way up to joining NATO, the experts first of all mention the " right-wing deputies of the Verkhovna Rada". Since March, 1997 this group had been mentioned by 82-87% of the experts, in December - by 68. 3%, which by no means influenced its first-place position. In the experts' opinions, the second concerned group consists of the " leaders of finance and the banking business". In March they were mentioned by 66. 7% of experts, but in June - by half that number - 33. 3%. Despite this fact, this group kept the second-place position during the year, and was mentioned by 47. 5% of the experts in September, 56. 1% in December. Other, less important groups, according to the experts, consist of the " centrist deputies in the VR" (mentioned by 30 to 40. 5% of the experts, permanently occupying the third-place position) and " medium-size businessmen" (from 26% to 35% of the experts, maintaining the fourth-place position). The " leadership of the Ministry of Defense, General Staff" is also mentioned among the adherents of integration with the West, all the way up to joining NATO (in March - 16. 7%, since June - 28-24%). An ambiguous opinion is expressed by the experts as to " producers of arms and specialized techniques": in March and September this group was almost insignificant (4. 8% and 2. 5% respectively), while in June and December its weight increased somewhat (10. 3 and 14. 6% respectively). In the same way, the group of " leaders of MIC enterprises" was mentioned by 4-5% of the experts from March until September, but in December - by 17. 1%. According to the experts' estimations " officers of the Armed Forces" are not very concerned about integration with the West (5-7%), nor are " leaders of military educational institutions" (2-5%). The situation has remained almost unchanged since September, except for an insignificant decrease in the role of the former groups and an increase in the role of the latter ones, which had no essential influence on their ranking.

The experts' estimations of Ukraine's foreign policy as a whole from the point of view of its stability, balance and predictability increased in December, 1997 compared with March, 1997. In general, the estimations on all three indices almost coincided (the estimation of predictability being a little lower) and were very close to the " medium" level, while in March they were close to the " low" level.

Against the background of the December 1997 estimation of Ukraine's international security, which could be considered comparatively safe (19. 5% of the experts said that there was a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity, 31. 7% mentioned that " there is no such threat, but it can emerge at any moment" (total - 51. 2%), anxiety about the situation in March, 1998 becomes especially noticeable - 40. 5% said that there was a threat to territorial integrity, 29. 7% stressing the probability of its emergence at any moment (total - 70. 2%). This concern had almost reached the level of March, 1997 when the highest level of concern was registered: 31% of the experts stressed an actual presence of a threat, 51% - a probability of its emergence at any moment (total - 81%). In turn, the absence of such a threat and the presence of preconditions for preventing it was stressed by only 24. 3% of the experts in the spring of 1998 (in March, 1997 - 14. 3%, in December - 34. 1%). 5. 4% of the experts do not negate the presence of a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity, but forecast its emergence in 1-2 years. None of the experts said that it might emerge in 3-5 years. In general, each of the last two variants did not gain more than 7-9%.

Nevertheless, in our opinion, this " level of anxiety" reflected the situation of the domestic-policy instability of the pre-election period in Ukraine in January-March, 1998 and the tension between the branches of power and political alignments (parties) to a greater extent than the actual increase of a threat. In other words, a worsening of the potential of resistance to negative external impacts and not an increase of these impacts themselves, occurred.

Therefore, the beginning of 1998 has received rather low experts' estimations, compared with the end of the previous year (forecast by UCPCCRS experts). A number of indices testifies to this. Thus, according to 20. 5% of the experts, in January-March 1998 the condition of international security in Europe " has been getting worse", while in December only 2. 5% thought so; 25. 6% stressed that this condition " has been getting better (in December - 46. 3%); those considering that this condition " remains unchanged" constituted 48. 7%, almost as before (51. 2% in December). Such a distribution of opinion resembles the beginning of 1997, when the condition of international security in Europe was estimated as follows: its improvement or worsening was stressed by 24. 4% of the experts respectively, 41. 5% saying that it remained unchanged.

In turn, in March 1998 the condition of the international security of Ukraine has also been " worsening". This is the opinion of 41% of the experts, while 12. 8% think that it is improving, 43. 6% deeming it unchanged. The December, 1997 results were 26. 8%, 29. 3% and 36. 6% respectively, which was considered to be a good result compared to March, 1997, when adherents of the three standpoints constituted 9. 5%, 52. 4%, and 33. 3% respectively. Further estimations in 1997 got better, in general, while in March, 1998 the situation to some extent resembled that of March, 1997. The same way, the level of international safeguards granted to Ukraine by other countries, which had been increasing during 1997, getting closer to the " medium" level, was in March, 1998 closer to being " low".

⇐ Предыдущая 43 44 45 46 47 484950 51 52 Следующая ⇒

Воспользуйтесь поиском по сайту: