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Morphological Table of Alternative Scenarios for Ukraine's Development up to the Year 2003 2 страница
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Thus, the coincidence of the tendencies of the alteration of the estimation (worsening) of the condition of security in Europe and in Ukraine testifies to the lowering of the level of the " historical optimism" of specialists in our country and to their concern about Ukraine's prospects, rather than to dangerous shifts in these spheres.
In providing Ukraine's international security, the leading role in the spring of 1998 is played by economic factors - 71. 8% and also, by political factors - 30. 8%. As before, the experts consider that the readiness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is getting worse (79. 5%), with 0% thinking that it is getting better. The extent to which one could rely on the Armed Forces in providing national security has essentially decreased compared to 1997, when, according to the experts' estimations, the importance of the AF was gradually growing - in March, 1998 being closer to the " low" level. In the realization of its foreign-policy goals, Ukraine has to, to an extent greater than in December, 1997, rely on its allies, which first of all include Poland, the USA (the condition of bilateral relations with both is worsening, see below), the EU, the Baltic states, Germany, the Council of Europe and NATO. On the other hand, in the spring of 1998 Ukraine was subject to the dictates and expectations of other states or alignments to a " medium" extent, even if this was in conflict with its national interest.
However this index cannot be interpreted positively without reservations - it is also an indicator of ever growing sentiments of Ukraine's instability, its relegation to the " gray zone" of European and world policies.
Providing a general estimation of Ukraine's foreign policy according to such features as stability, deliberateness and predictability, the experts say that in March, 1998 it was close to " low". In the second half of 1997 these indices essentially increased compared to March 1997 and almost did not change during the year (being close to a " medium" estimation), while at the beginning of 1998 they roughly decreased again, to the level of March, 1997.
One could hope for improvement in the situation on condition of a reasonable structuralization of the newly elected Verkhovna Rada and more professional work on the part of its Committee for Foreign Affairs. (Let us recall that according to the Constitution the Verkhovna Rada is the main body in charge of foreign policy). The new leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should provide a positive impact. In any case, objective indices indicate that the replacement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs was not only desirable, but also necessary.
According to the experts' estimations, a permanent process of Ukraine's integration in Eastern or Western directions exists, the intensity of integration in one of these directions decreasing as integration in the other direction increases. Thus, in December 1997 the process of integration with Russia and the CIS, which was gaining in intensity until that time, essentially slowed (ranging between " slow" and " zero" ), while the vice versa process of the integration with NATO, the EU, etc., became more intensive (closer to " medium" ). However these fluctuations were short-lasting, because in March, 1998 the experts pointed out an essential increase in integration processes in the Eastern direction (between " medium" and " slow" ) and a slowing of integration in the Western direction (closer to " slow" ). In addition, integration with the Black Sea region and CEE, which increased to some extent during 1997, has become less intensive (in the spring of 1998 the state of integration here is closer to " slow", especially in regard to CEE). Thus, the estimation of the state of the integration processes in the mentioned directions in March, 1998 ranged between " medium" and " slow", being closer to " slow" to this or that extent.
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In the experts' opinions, in the spring of 1998, the present crisis in the CIS - its not being able to acquire effectiveness - either did not affect Ukraine's international situation (58% of the experts) or had a more positive than negative influence on Ukraine (32%). This estimation points out the prospective (desirable) directions of the country's integration efforts.
Among the Ukrainian political elite there are certain groups striving for integration in the western or in the eastern directions. Among the adherents of integration with Russia, up to uniting into a coherent state, the experts constantly mention " politicians of a pro-Russian orientation" (79. 5% in March, 1998, 67-88% overall), and the " left-wing deputies of the Verkhovna Rada" (69. 2% in March, 1998, 51-79% overall ). Less concerned are " regional leaders of the East and the South" (35. 9% in March, 1998, 31-35% overall, 19% in December, 1997), " entrepreneurs from Ukrainian-Russian groups" (25% in March, 1998, 31-53% overall), " leaders of MIC enterprises oriented toward cooperation with Russia" (25. 6% in March, 1998, 25-36% overall), " socially deprived strata of the population" (23. 1% in March, 22-39% overall), " officers of the Armed Forces" (2. 6% in March, 2-10% overall) and other groups (2. 6% in March, 2-7% overall). The experts stress that " right-wing deputies of the Verkhovna Rada" (81. 6% in March, 1998, 68-88% overall) are the main adherents of integration with the West, up to accession to NATO.
In regard to the estimation of the level of concern of the leaders of finance and the banking business, it is constantly and essentially fluctuating — from 28% to 66. 7% in estimation of the experts. Thus, in December, 1997 this group was pointed out by 56. 7% of the experts, while in March, 1998 - by 28. 9% of the experts. The experts also stress a certain adherence to integration with the West among such groups as " the centrist deputies of the VR" - 26. 3% in March, 1998 (30-40% overall), " medium-level businessmen" - 21. 1% in March (26-35% overall), " the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the generals" - 18. 4% in March (16-28% overall), " arms and specialized technologies manufacturers" - 13. 2% in March (2-15% overall) " leaders of MIC enterprises" - 7. 9% in March (4-7% overall). The groups of officers of the AF and heads of military educational institutions were not mentioned at all in March, 1998, although they had previously attracted certain attention (2-7%).
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According to the experts' estimations, the situation regarding the external security of Ukraine became safer in June, 1998 compared to March, 1998, when the level of the experts' anxiety became considerable: in the summer only 15% of experts thought that a threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity existed (40. 5% in March). At the same time, 50% still feel a tension and expect an " emergence of the threat at any moment" (29. 7% in March). Thus, the anxiety about Ukraine's external security did not vanish, but to a certain extent became concealed. Only 15% of experts stressed that there was no evident threat and that all the preconditions to prevent it existed (24. 3% in March). 7. 5% and 12. 5% respectively think " one should expect that a threat will emerge in 1-2 years" or " in 3-5 years".
In June, 1998, most experts estimated the condition of Ukraine's international security as " unchanged" - 65. 9%. In March, 1998 such an opinion was shared by 43. 6% of the experts. At the same time, the opinion that the condition of Ukraine's international security was " getting worse" was significant, 41% of experts saying so. In the summer of 1998 the number of adherents of this idea was more than twofold smaller - 17. 1%. Those who thought that this condition is " getting better" constitute only 9. 8% (in March, they constituted 12. 8%). The experts' estimations also testify to the absence of any significant alterations in the condition of international security in Europe - 68. 3%. Only 9. 8% of the experts think that it is getting better (in March, 1998 this group was twice larger - 20. 5%), while 19. 5% of the experts consider that it is getting worse (25. 6% in March).
Alongside this, the experts think that the level of international guaranties of Ukraine's security has been falling from the beginning of the 1998 and estimate it as close to being " low", although previously the estimations had been steadily growing and had almost reached the " medium" level. Among the crucial determinants of Ukraine's international security, as before, the experts first of all in the summer of 1998 mentioned economic factors (61%) followed by political factors (43. 9%) and other factors (not more than 10%). In the same way, in the providing of Ukraine's defense capacity, the greatest role is played by economic factors (78%) in comparison with other factors. Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of the experts think that the readiness of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the summer of 1998 is still getting worse (70%, compared to 79. 5% in March). In June, 1998 compared to March, 1998 the estimations of the extent to which Ukraine can rely on its Armed Forces in providing its national security increased, but they still ranged between " medium" and " low", now being closer to " medium", while in March they essentially decreased, coming closer to " low".
In general, in the summer of 1998 the experts consider the foreign policy of Ukraine to be more stable, deliberate and predictable compared with the spring of the same year. At the beginning of the year the indices related to these characteristics noticeably decreased, almost coming close to a " low" estimation. In June they almost reach the " medium" level. There are grounds to consider that the condition of these indices was positively influenced by the vigorous steps of the new leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and, probably even to a greater extent - by expectations connected with its further activities.
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According to the experts' estimations, the Eastern and Western integration processes have turned in opposite directions in June, compared to corresponding vectors in March. This calls in question the very stability and deliberateness of Ukraine's foreign policy, because it is difficult to determine any certain trend. There are fluctuations of integration vectors (and thus - geopolitical orientations of the country), which have a short-term character (short amplitude).
The intensification of the process of Ukraine's integration in the Eastern direction - with Russia and the CIS, which was marked out in January- March, 1998, changed to the decline of this process in April-June, 1998. Let us emphasize, the last estimation of the condition of this process is close to being " zero", while in March it was very close to the " medium" level.
Instead of this, there is a certain intensification in the process of integration in the Western direction - with NATO, the EU, etc. In March, 1998, the index of this process was at the lowest level ever registered during the monitoring period, and in June, 1998 it is still estimated by the experts as " slow".
The most positive changes, compared to other directions, were taking place in the process of Ukraine's integration into the Black Sea region (the Black Sea Economic Cooperation - BSEC), the estimation of its rate having been constantly growing from the beginning of 1997, ranging between " medium" and " slow".
Instead of this was the intensity of integration of Ukraine into the Central-Eastern European region. Most experts estimate the rate of this process as " slow" in June, 1998.
We can conclude that the experts are right - their estimations create the feeling of a kind of vacuum around Ukraine. We should stress that its integration (in any direction) potential is by no means determined by the efforts of Ukrainian diplomacy, but is a direct result of the situation within the country - political, economic and social.
Among the Ukrainian political elite, as we mentioned above, there are certain groups which are adherents of Ukraine's integration either in the Western or in the Eastern directions.
Among those most interested in integration with Russia, up to uniting into a coherent state, the experts first of all mentioned in June, 1998 the politicians of a pro-Russian orientation - 70. 7% (overall, during the latest 1. 5 years this group gained 67-88%) and the left-wing deputies at the Verkhovna Rada - 61% (51-79% overall). Then come the " regional leaders of the East and the South" (31-36% overall), " entrepreneurs from Ukrainian-Russian groups" - their significance ranges between 25% and 53%, but they occupy the 3rd and 4th positions; and " socially deprived strata of population" (22-39% overall). Less important, according to the experts, is the group of the " leaders of MIC enterprises oriented toward cooperation with Russia" - 24. 4% (25-36% in 1997-98 overall). Almost disinterested is the group of " officers of the Armed Forces" - 2. 4% (2-10% overall). Other groups, which gained 2-7% in previous polls, were not mentioned.
Among the main adherents of integration with the West, up to accession to NATO, the experts first of all mentioned in June, 1998 right-wing deputies at the Verkhovna Rada - 87. 8% (68-88% overall during the latest 1. 5 years). After them, the experts always mention the group of the " leaders of finance and the banking business" - 48. 8%, although the estimation of their concern is not stable. According to the experts, the groups of " medium businessmen" - 41. 3% (21-35% overall) and " centrists in the Verkhovna Rada" - 39% (30-40% overall) are concerned about integration with the West. Besides the mentioned groups, the experts also pointed out the " leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the Generals staff" - 17. 1% (16-28% overall), " arms and special technologies producers" - 14. 6% (2-15% overall) and " leaders of MIC enterprises" - 4. 9% (4-17% overall). Such groups as " officers of the Armed Forces" and " heads of military educational institutions" were not mentioned in June, 1998 at all, though previously they had attracted certain attention (2-7%).
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The Domestic Determinants of National Security Policy
From March, 1997 until December, 1997 the experts gave a somewhat higher estimation of the current level of confidence in and influence of elite leaders on heads of state structures in charge of Ukraine's foreign and defense policies. In December the general level of confidence of elite leaders in the heads of the mentioned structures ranged between " medium" and " low", while in March, 1997 it was closer to " low". According to the experts' estimations, since March the level of influence of elite leaders on the structures in charge of foreign policy was somewhat higher than that on the structures in charge of Ukraine's defense policy. However despite the fact that since March the evaluation indices grew better (with a certain lowering in September), by December this difference remained unchanged. According to 1997 summing-up data, the general level of influence of elite leaders on heads of state structures in charge of Ukraine's foreign and defense policies could be evaluated as close to " medium", and in the case of foreign-policy structures - as equal to " medium", while in March it was close to " low".
The level of the military's support of state leadership policy had also been growing since March, but the growth was not significant. In December it ranged between " medium" and " low" (in March it was generally " low" ).
One could assume that the estimations connected with the status of the Armed Forces and the level of confidence in governmental officials in charge of the military sphere and military policy are of an imbalanced and subjective character. This can be explained by both the difficult problems of the Armed Forces as a whole and the vagueness of the prospects of reformation of the army. Thus, during 1991-1997 the Ukrainian Armed Forces were reduced by 400 000 persons, including 70 000 servicemen. This reduction is to continue in 1998, during which 17 000 servicemen are subject to release.
At the same time, the difficult situation of the army can also be explained by the lack of the financing of the Armed Forces during the last few years. For the first time in the last few years, the law " On the State Budget of Ukraine for 1998" provides for an increase of allotments to national defense by more than UAH 200 million - to the level of UAH 1 678 269 000. In 1998 they constitute 6. 855% of budget allotments.
As for divergences among regions (the attitude of regional é lites to the state leadership's policy, the level of divergences in situations of different regions of the country and the peculiarities of their general attitude to governmental policies), the experts' answers were ambiguous, but the opinion that these aspects remain unchanged was overwhelming - in June and December, 1997 36. 6% of the experts adhered to this standpoint. In turn, 29-24% of those polled thought that regional divergences were " leveling", 27-19% regarded them as " deepening". In March and September, 1997, 45% and 56% of those polled considered that regional divergences remained unchanged, 19-14% thought that they were " leveling" and 29-19% regarded them as " deepening".
In March, 1998 a comprehensive lowering of the levels of confidence and influence of the most influential elite leaders in regard to the leaders of state structures in charge of Ukraine's foreign and defense policies was registered. In December 1997 these indices increased and were close to the " medium" level, while in the spring they were close or equal to the " low" level. The crisis of state power structures is also obvious in the sphere of objects of the monitoring.
The " military's support of policies of the leadership of the state" increased to some extent in December 1997, though not essentially, ranging between " medium" and " low". Ukraine's progress in the sphere of moving toward arms markets has led to the increase of chances of overcoming the current stagnation of the Ukrainian MIC. In March, 1998, 39% of the experts deemed the preconditions for it " medium" (compared to 26% in December, 1997), 44% - " low" (47%), 14% - zero (21%).
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Pre-election uncertainty and the play of political forces affected the experts' optimism as for the prospects of the establishment of an effective system of civil control over Armed Forces' activities. 35% of the experts deem such prospects " medium" (21% in December, 1997), 49% - " low" (67% in December, 1997).
In regard to the divergences among regions in attitude to foreign policy, the number of experts who considered in March, 1998 that they are aggravating increased to 33. 3% (compared to 19. 5% in December 1997), while the share of those thinking that they are leveling decreased to 17. 9% (24. 4% in December). Almost as before, 38. 5% of the experts (36. 6% in December) deem them unchanged.
The indices of the elite's leaders' influence on and confidence in both the politicians responsible for foreign policy and those responsible for the defense policy of Ukraine decreased considerably in March, 1998, as mentioned above. In general, the estimations were almost equal to being " low". Alongside of this, the estimations of influence were a little higher than those of confidence (?! ). In June, 1998 the level of influence and confidence of the leaders of é lites increased to some extent in all indices and even reached the " medium" level. The experts estimate the level of influence on both the politicians in charge of the defense policy and those in charge of the foreign policy of Ukraine in the same way - between " medium" and " low". The estimations of confidence differ. The level of confidence of elite leaders in heads of state structures in charge of the foreign policy of Ukraine is higher than that of influence and is close to " medium". It is also higher than the level of confidence of elite leaders in heads of state structures in charge of the defense policy of Ukraine. The latter is lower than the level of influence and is close to " low".
Discrepancies between regions in the attitude to the foreign policy of Ukraine in June, 1998, according to 50% of the experts, " remain unchanged" (38. 5% in March, 1998); only 12. 5% think that they are " deepening" (three times fewer than in March - 33. 3%) and 27. 5% consider that they are " leveling" (17. 9% in March). As before, 10% of experts do not have a certain standpoint. We assume that the opinion about the greater aggravation of discrepancies in the spring was grounded in the conditions of the pre-electoral campaign, when numerous discussions on the regions' attitudes to the country's geopolitical orientation took place. The mentioned discrepancies vanished as the elections were completed.
The Estimation of Bilateral Relations
with Other States and Alignments
The experts were unanimous in 1997 with respect to the countries relations with which should be developed in the first place. These are Russia, Germany, the USA and Poland. On the other hand, according to most experts, Ukraine's relations with these very countries had been developed most intensively. Such a situation was emphasized during the year for all the countries mentioned in the polls, except for Russia and Belarus'. In March, 1997 the experts placed Russia in first place (in June - in second) among the countries with which it would be most desirable for Ukraine to develop relations, but at the same time it was last among the 24 mentioned countries with which Ukraine's relations had been successfully and intensively developed. But in June, 1997 Russia occupied third place according to this criterion.
An intricate attitude of Ukrainian foreign policy circles toward Russia is caused by the absence of long-term euphoria arising out of the fact of the signing of a number of important documents in May, 1997. The course of relations at the state and governmental levels causes a careful and to a certain extent skeptical attitude of the experts toward the prospects of Ukrainian-Russian relations. In this regard, noteworthy on the one hand is the realization of the extreme importance of relations with Russia, and on the other hand, an understanding of the imbalance in the character of the achieved settlement of controversial matters, which at any moment can change into a new outburst of hatred. Among the experts, as well as among politicians (with the exception of those on the left), two main orientation groups predominate: the adherents of a gradual normalization of bilateral relations with Russia and skeptics who deem the establishment of normal, equal and mutually profitable relations with Russia to be almost impossible.
Belarus' was never mentioned as a country with which bilateral relations were successfully developed. According to the experts' estimations, in March, 1997 the development of relations was most successful with the USA, Poland, Germany, Italy and Georgia; in June - with Poland, Russia, the USA, Romania, Germany, Hungary and Moldova; in September - with Poland, the USA, Russia, Germany, Canada, Georgia, Israel and Romania; in December - with the USA, Poland, Russia, Canada, Germany, Georgia, the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea. The share of other countries in these indices was insignificant.
Thus, in June and September, 1997, Poland was the absolute leader among the countries according to estimations of the intensity and success of relations. The estimation of bilateral relations with it was highest compared with other countries during the year, except for March (3. 90 according to a 5-point scale). One could say that the general rating of Poland began to increase from June. In September it was at its peak and in December, 1997 slowly declined. Thus, in June the evaluation of bilateral relations with this country increased from the March level to 4. 13, in September - to 4. 27, in December it decreased to 4. 10 points. On the other hand, in March and June it occupied 2nd. place (52-53% of the experts) among the countries relations with which were successfully and intensively developed, while in June and September it held in 1st. place in this respect (61% and 73% of the experts respectively). A similar situation is observed at estimating Poland as Ukraine's ally in general and as a country Ukraine could rely on in the process of the reformation of the Armed Forces: in March and December it was mentioned as an ally by 43. 9-48. 8% of the experts (the 2nd. position) and by 26. 8% (the 4th. and 3rd. positions) of the experts as a country Ukraine should cooperate with in the reformation of its Armed Forces; in June - 50% (2nd. ) and 41% (2nd. ) of the experts respectively; in September - 63. 4% (1st. ) and 40% (2nd. ) of the experts respectively. The experts kept granting high estimation to the activities of Ukrainian diplomats in the international arena in relations with Poland - in March, 1997 - 3. 31 points (1st. ); in June and September - 4. 03-3. 95 (1st. ); in December - 3. 90 (2nd. ).
As for Canada, with which Ukraine enjoyed its best bilateral relations in March, 1997 - 4. 13 points according to a 5-point scale (1st. position), in June it lost its rating of a priority partner - 3. 80 points (5th. ) and began to regain it from September - 4. 07 (3rd, ). In December, 1997 it almost managed to achieve its former position - 4. 07 (2nd. after Poland). This was not surprising because in December Canada shared 3rd. place (25%) with Russia (after the USA and Poland) among the countries relations with which had been lately successfully and intensively developed. In September Canada was in the 4th. position (18%), in June - the 9th. (7%), in March the 6th. (17%).
According to a direct estimation, Ukraine's relations with Poland are the best, while by other indices the USA is the absolute leader, especially in March and December, 1997. According to the estimation of bilateral relations, in December, 1997 the USA occupied only 3rd. place (in September - 4th. place). As for the estimation of the success of real actions of Ukrainian diplomacy in relations with the USA, it especially increased in June and September (3. 50 and 3. 60 points respectively) and was a little lower in March and December (3. 10 and 3. 29 points). Achievements of Ukrainian diplomacy in the development of relations with the USA were estimated as 2nd. in March, 3rd. in June, 5th. in September and 4th. in December. However, as mentioned before, in March and December the USA was first among the countries relations with which were most intensively developed (58-61% of the experts) and by the end of the year became first among the countries developing relations with which was the priority of Ukraine's foreign policy (80 and 90% of the experts in September and December). This coincides with the data that 41-63% of the experts regarded the USA as the top-rating ally of Ukraine, especially with respect to the reformation of the Armed Forces (51-63%). It was only in September that Poland attracted greater attention as an ally, in other cases it followed the USA.
Despite the shifts in rankings, the first five countries having the highest estimation of bilateral relations with Ukraine remained unchanged during 1997. Other than Poland, Canada and the USA, included are the Baltic countries (3. 80-4. 23 points) and Georgia (3. 79-4. 05 points). The Baltic countries had a high estimation of bilateral relations with Ukraine compared with other countries in June and September (2nd. place), Ukrainian diplomatic activities in this direction also having been highly estimated in September (3rd. place after Poland and the UN) - 3. 68 points. Furthermore, the Baltic states were mentioned as an important ally - after the USA and Poland (29-44% of experts during the year), especially in September (37%) and in December (44%), except for June (21. 1%).
6th. place, with almost no distance from 5th. place, is occupied by Germany (3. 95-3. 85 points), in March, and in June - 8th place. (3. 63-3. 55 points). According to the experts' estimations, Ukrainian diplomacy acted in this direction more successfully from the start of 1997. In general, the experts do not estimate Germany too highly as an ally, though higher than at the beginning of the year (from 19. 5% in March to 26. 8% in December). This country is especially regarded as one Ukraine could rely on in the reformation of its Armed Forces.
The following places are occupied by countries which, according to the experts' estimations, are able to move forward periodically, depending on the latest circumstances. Thus, in March 6-13th. places were occupied by: Israel, Hungary, Germany, Slovakia, Italy, the Czech Republic, Moldova, Kazakhstan - 3. 79-3. 47 points; in June: Moldova, Azerbaijan, Hungary, Israel, Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Kazakhstan - 3. 69-3. 33 points; in September: Germany, Hungary, Azerbaijan, Moldova, the Czech Republic, Israel, Great Britain, the Republic of Korea - 3. 95-3. 59 points; in December: Germany, the Czech Republic, the Benelux countries, Hungary, Finland, Israel, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Korea - 3. 95-3. 40 points.
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