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Morphological Table of Alternative Scenarios for Ukraine's Development up to the Year 2003 4 страница
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As well, whereas the Treaty on Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the European Union in 1997 did not come into effect, the Charter signed with NATO became the first document which registered Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic affiliation.
During 1997 the experts outlined the priority directions of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO as " providing additional security guarantees to Ukraine" from NATO and the " creation of preconditions for Ukraine's joining NATO in the future". The importance of these directions gradually decreased: from 57% of the experts in March to 41% in December, as for the first, and from 55% to 39% of the experts, as for the second. But this did not prevent these from being the most important directions. The experts did not overestimate the capability of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine, signed in Madrid, of providing for the national interest of Ukraine. 52% of experts determined its quality in performing this function as " medium", 33% - as " low". Only 5% of experts deem it " high", against 10% - " zero".
Among preferable directions of cooperation is " direct assistance in carrying out military reform", which occupied the 3rd. position in March and June, 1997 and the 4th. - in September and December. Overall, it was mentioned by 30-35% of the experts. The next direction which concerns " coordination of policies in view of NATO's eastward enlargement" lost its rating to a considerable extent in December, 1997. Until that time, this issue held the greatest attention and comprised the concern of from 28% in March to 38% in September of the experts and occupied the 4th. position, in September - even the 3rd. position. Against the background of a general increase of the rating of NATO, in December this direction (" coordination of policies in connection with NATO's eastward enlargement" ) was mentioned by only 19% of the experts, and shared 8-10th. places with such directions of cooperation as " coordination of military-technical policy and maintenance of the MIC" and " staff training". Instead, such a direction of cooperation as " arms, specialized techniques and services of military purpose", which previously placed in the last positions and acquired popularity during 1997, occupied 3rd. place at the end of 1997. In March it was stressed by 12% of experts, in June - by 15%, in September - by 23%, in December - by 36. 6% of the experts (this represents 10th., 9th., 7th. and 3rd. places respectively). The positions of the direction of " joint development of conceptual grounds of policy with NATO" remained almost unaltered, gathering 25-29% and occupying 5-6th. places. Similarly, the position of " participation in peace-making operations" in September and December (27. 5-29. 3%), held 6-8th. places (16. 7%) in March and 8th. place (15%) in June. The expert estimation of the priority of " joint exercises" was somewhat higher than in previous polls - 22%, which meant the 7th. position. In March this direction was mentioned by 17% (6-8th. place), in June by 8% (11th. place), in September by 15% (9th. place).
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As mentioned earlier, in December, 1997 such directions of cooperation as " coordination of military-technical policies and maintenance of the MIC" and staff training" shared the 8-10th. places. In general, during the year they were not of great importance. " Coordination of military-technical policies and maintenance of the MIC" was mentioned by 14-22% of experts, while " staff training" was mentioned by 16-19%.
Certainly, the experts' opinions were essentially influenced by the signing of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. In June, 1997 it was suggested to the experts to characterize the future document on cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. First of all, the experts would like this document to be a legally binding treaty with clear obligations and rights of the parties (57%). Only 9. 5% of the experts considered that this document was not necessary at all. The same percentage of experts said that it was going to be a political declaration not subject to ratification by the Verkhovna Rada. 14. 5% of experts stated that it had to be the same document as that between NATO and Russia. At last, 9. 5% failed to clarify their attitude to the contents of the future document. Among the provisions which, according to most experts should be included in the text of the document, the following were mentioned:
· Ukraine's participation in NATO's taking decisions which Ukraine is concerned about (78. 9% of the experts);
· banning the location of nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO member countries (53. 3% of the experts);
· amendment of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe taking into account Ukraine's interests (the issues of flank restrictions, etc. ) (47. 4% of the experts).
As mentioned above, after signing the Charter, in September, 1997 the experts estimated the extent to which it is able to provide for the national interest of Ukraine. The estimations ranged between " medium" (51. 3%) and " low" (33. 3%). Among the main shortcomings mentioned by the experts were, first of all, " the absence of effective security guarantees for Ukraine from NATO" - 58. 5%, " the absence of guarantees of Ukraine's integration into European security structures" - 39. 0% and the Charter's " declarative character" - 34. 1%.
However, in December the experts estimated rather highly the " positive character" of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine: it was stressed by 55% of the experts (the 2nd. rank among the most important international gains of Ukraine in 1997! ).
In March, 1998 the priority trends of cooperation with NATO remain as follows: first, " granting additional security guarantees to Ukraine" - 47. 4% of the experts; second, " the creation of preconditions for Ukraine's prospective accession to NATO" - 44. 7%. The third position is occupied by " direct assistance in carrying out military reform" - 42. 3%. In December 1997, such a trend of cooperation as " trade in arms, special techniques and services of military purpose", which had always placed in latter positions, became popular, being mentioned by 36. 6% of the experts (3rd. place), up from its 26. 3% 4th place position in March, 1998. The 5-6th. positions are occupied by " coordination of policies in view of NATO's eastward enlargement" and " participation in peace-making operations" - 23. 7% each. " Joint development of concepts of military policy" and " coordination of military-technical policy are in the 7-8th. positions - 21. 1% each. " Training of staff" remains in 9th. place - 18. 1%. The rating of such a trend as " joint exercises" decreased somewhat: in December it was 7th. (22. 0%), in March, 1998 it was 10th. (10. 5%). Two experts stressed that " there is no need to cooperate with NATO at all". In general in March, 1998 the priorities of cooperation with NATO have not essentially changed since December 1997.
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On the other hand, according to the experts' estimations, in March, 1998 NATO's rating significantly decreased, compared to December, 1997. The process of Ukraine's integration into NATO essentially slowed, while the rating of this organization as an ally decreased from 34. 1% (4th. ) to 13. 2% (7th., next to last). Moreover, in March, 1998 the expert estimations of the efforts of Ukrainian diplomats in the development of relations with NATO are noticeably lower than in December, especially compared to other organizations and countries.
According to the results of the June, 1998 poll, the orientation toward Ukraine's accession to NATO is becoming stronger. In March, 1998, in regard to a number of indices, the experts testified to a certain worsening of relations between Ukraine and NATO. In June, this orientation again began to overwhelm.
As most experts stressed, despite certain fluctuations, the process of Ukraine's westward integration - NATO, the EU, etc., - is continuing, albeit rather slowly. The situation has failed to improve decisively since March, when the estimation of the condition of this process essentially decreased, being close to " slow".
On the other hand, the situation did not become aggravated. In regard to the estimation of NATO as an ally, it even improved, or rather returned to the overall level. In March, a pessimistic attitude of the experts to Ukraine's relations with this organization was noticeable: the estimations decreased from 34. 1% to 13. 2%. In June, 34. 2% of experts mentioned NATO as our ally again. (Similarly, the estimations decreased in March and increased in June, 1997). As an ally, NATO usually occupied the 3-4th. position, after Poland, the USA, sometimes the Baltic states, and only in March, 1998 was it in 7th. place (together with the CIS), having ceded to the Council of Europe, OSCE and Russia.
As current estimations testify, Ukraine has to count on allies to a " low" extent, but still has to do so (to " medium" and " low" extents). Accordingly, the experts' estimations of the efforts of Ukrainian diplomacy in the Atlantic direction is higher than in March - 3. 54 points in June (the experts' opinions were the same in the summer of 1997, when the NATO-Ukraine Charter was signed). This estimation is almost the highest one - after Poland and the UNO.
In general, the experts point out the necessity of cooperation between Ukraine and NATO. A certain group exists which does not perceive opportunities in this direction and deems such cooperation unnecessary. However this opinion does nor gather more than 5-7% of adherents in 1998 (previously - not more than 10-12%). Up to the last moment, the first place direction in cooperation between Ukraine and NATO was perceived as " granting additional security guaranties to Ukraine". From March, 1997 (57. 1%) this opinion gradually lost adherents, falling to 47. 4% in March, 1998, and 36. 6% in June, 1998. The obtaining of such guarantees became ever more elusive, thus in the summer of 1998 it occupies the 3rd. position among desirable aspects of cooperation with NATO. Instead, first place (51. 2%) is occupied by a direction such as " creation of preconditions for Ukraine's accession to NATO in the future", which had always been in 2nd. place (44. 7% in March, 1998; 54-39% in 1997). In turn, 2nd. place (48. 8%) is now occupied by " direct assistance in the fulfillment of military reform" (previously, it was 3rd. and 4th. and acquired importance only at the beginning of 1998: 42. 1% in March, 1998; 30-35% previously). The 4th. position (34. 1%) in June, 1998 is occupied by the necessity for " coordination of policies in connection with NATO's eastward enlargement". The estimation of the importance of this direction is not stable and constantly fluctuates - in March this direction was at the 5-6th. positions (23. 7%), while previously it occupied from the 3rd. -9th. (last) positions (19-37%). A direction such as " arms, special techniques and military-technical services trade" persistently acquires importance from the beginning of 1998, when it occupied the 10th. position (11. 9%). In June, 1998 it reached the 5th. position (29. 3%), while in March it was 4th. (26. 3%). The 6th. position (22%) is occupied by " joint development of military policy concepts", which was 7th. in March (21. 1%) and 5-6th. previously (25-29%). The 7th. position (19. 5%) is occupied by " joint training of staff", which represents its highest achievement, as in March it was 9th. (18. 1%), and in general - occupied the 7-10th. positions (12-19%). During 1997, a direction such as " participation in peace-making operations" gradually acquired importance, rising from the 8th. (16. 7%) to the 5th. (29. 3%) position, while in 1998 it began to lose position and is today again at the 8th. position (17. 1%). Almost the same is the condition of " joint exercises", which acquired importance from June, 1997, rising from the 11th. position (7. 5%) to the 7th. position (22%), and from the beginning of 1998 fell to the 11th. position in June (4. 9%). 9th. place (12. 2%) is occupied by " coordination of military-technical policies, MIC maintenance", the importance of which also began to decrease since March, 1998, when it occupied 7-8th. places (21. 1%).
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Public Opinion on NATO: Trends of Changes
In April, 1998, on request of the " Democratic Initiatives" Foundation, the SOCIS-Gallup firm conducted a poll according to a program which was analogous to that of the poll carried out in January, 1997. The program had been prepared by O. Potekhin, UCPCCRS. The poll was conducted in all regions of Ukraine. The excerpt comprised 1200 respondents who according to their social-demographic characteristics (age, sex, education, type of settlement) represented the adult population of the country. The method of collecting the empirical sociological data was a standard interview at the place of permanent residence of the respondents.
During the 15 months separating these two polls, extremely important events in relations between Ukraine and NATO and changes in international relations and in the domestic-policy development of Ukraine took place, altering the general context of this issue. All this had an influence on the population's attitude to NATO. Some of changes are rather unexpected, i. e. the results of particular events were forecast by political analysts as distinct from what really happened. Outlining the above as a kind of scheme, i. e. on the whole taking into account the events that have really affected the public consciousness (or at least are present in it to a certain extent), we should point out the following events:
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· the adoption of the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine;
· Ukraine's active participation in the PfP Program, in particular " Sea Breeze" exercises which had an evident political response in Ukraine;
· the Ukraine-NATO dialog, numerous exchanges of visits, the establishment of a Ukrainian mission to NATO;
· a certain normalization of Ukrainian-Russian relations, the signing of the Ukraine-RF Treaty and the State Duma's delay of its ratification;
· the concluding of the Founding Act the RF-NATO;
· the pre-election campaign to the Verkhovna Rada in Ukraine;
· the crisis in the CIS and Ukraine's " distinctive standpoint";
· the opening of the NATO information center in Ukraine and death of its first director, R. Lishchinsky.
The mentioned events affected the level of the population's being informed about NATO. First of all, we should notify that though the number of those considering themselves rather well acquainted with NATO's activities grew by only 1. 5 times (from 9% to 13. 5%), the number of those indifferent to the Alliance became twice smaller - in 1998 only 8% stated " I do not care" (16% in the poll of 1997). Most polled (62%) would like to know more about NATO, while during the previous poll such volunteers made up only one half of the polled. We can ascertain that the presence of the NATO phenomenon in the public consciousness became more essential.
This took place simultaneously with a certain deepening of the divergence in public attitudes towards the Alliance. On the one hand, a growth of a positive approach to NATO was registered. The number of those estimating it as a defensive alliance had grown (from 27% to 32%). On the other hand, the share of those appraising the Alliance as a peace-making organization decreased (from 17% to 11%), and the share of those perceiving in it an aggressive military bloc increased (from 16% to 22%). Fewer respondents than before failed to give their own estimation of NATO's character (1997 - 39%; 1998 - 34%). However the reserves of affecting the opinion of a part of the population are still essential - one third of the polled have no clear standpoint. Such aggravations in divergence regarding the attitude to NATO were caused by the growth of the level of politicization of public thought during the pre-election campaign in the spring of 1998, although, as the research carried out by the SOCIS-Gallup firm on request of the UCPCCRS testifies, the issues of foreign-policy orientations in no way belonged to the main problems of the elections and did not have a decisive influence on the electorate's behavior. Still, the most important conclusion flowing from a comparative analysis of electoral preferences and the results of this research must be as follows: a share of the left-wing deputies' electorate, though not being of a pro-NATO orientation, is rather tolerant toward NATO and does not perceive any threat in its activities, or, at least - is indifferent to the Alliance.
The results of the appraisal of the Alliance's character coincide with the population's attitude to relations between Ukraine and NATO. Thus, the number of " realists" considering that in the future Ukraine will accede to NATO increased (from 19% to 25%), while those who wanted Ukraine to do so as soon as possible decreased from 19% to 14%. Overall, pro-NATO potential, according to answers given to direct question, constitutes almost 40% of the polled. The number of convinced NATO opponents increased somewhat — from 21 to 26%. Alongside this, the number of those having no clear standpoint on this issue decreased to some extent (from 42% in 1997 to 35% in 1998). Providing the respondents with an opportunity to choose among several variants of geopolitical orientation led to a certain decline of pro-NATO sentiments (adherents of Ukraine's non-aligned status are in the majority). However, those choosing the country's accession to NATO in the future still constitute more than 30% (in various forms). Let us note that the pro-NATO potential of Ukraine's political elite is almost two times greater than that of the population as a whole.
The picture of the respondents' estimations of the possible results of Ukraine's assumed accession to NATO appears rather mixed (an estimation is difficult even for a professional). From 36 to 50% of the polled refused to estimate in this or that way the suggested variants of consequences, either positive or negative (in 1997 the percentage of those not considering themselves to be competent ranged between 49 and 62%). The percentage of those having estimated such results negatively — " we shouldn't accede to NATO", and that of their opponents, is absolutely equal - 32% each. This fact contradicts the preeminence of those considering that as a result of such a step " Ukraine would become a completely European country having acquired effective international security guarantees" — 34% adherents versus 24% opponents. The preeminence of those stating that security and stability in Europe would benefit from such a step was approximately the same - 34% versus 21%. According to the respondents, especially noticeable would be positive results in the development of the scientific and technical, and intellectual potential of Ukraine (35% " yes" versus 18% " no" ) and its MIC (39% versus 16%). 26% of the respondents thought that such a decision would also promote the democratization of Ukrainian society (24% against). Fear of expenditures connected with accession to NATO is also noticeable — 34% " yes" versus 19% " no".
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The strengthening of Ukraine's international status during the period between the two polls, which was inter alia promoted by some of the above-mentioned events in Ukraine-NATO relations, was felt by the population. Thus, in 1997 only 36% of the respondents were sure that in the following five years Ukraine would not encounter any threat of attack from a foreign state. In 1998 the number of such optimists has increased to 53%. Against the background of such a level of being certain in the current security level, extension of pro-alignment, including pro-NATO, accession sentiments are, certainly, impeded.
In this context, estimations of confidence in NATO as Ukraine's potential protector from aggression are interesting. Thus, 34% of the population consider that NATO would defend Ukraine if it were a member of the Alliance (30% in 1997), while 13% (12% in 1997) count on such protection in any case (even if Ukraine preserves its current status). About 34% of the polled failed to estimate NATO's behavior in a crisis situation surrounding Ukraine (39% in 1997). Therefore, here the presence of a reserve for the interpretation of the Alliance's role as a peace-making organization is evident.
An essential decrease of the general rating of the President of Ukraine, who embodies in the respondents' consciousness the main pro-NATO political force (in April, 1998 38% termed him one of the most consistent adherents of Ukraine's accession to NATO, followed by the Narodny Rukh - with 22%), has not led to an increase of negative trends in attitude to the Alliance. A more certain estimation of the ultimate goal of L. Kuchma's policy - to join NATO in the end, was stated ( 1998 - 51%, 1997 - 40%). The number of those unconditionally positively estimating the orientation toward the extension of cooperation with NATO as corresponding to Ukraine's national interest and the strengthening of its security did not alter and remained at the level of 36% of the population. There is a certain growth in the fear that such a policy would result in Ukraine's " cordon sanitaire" status between NATO and the military-political alliance of CIS countries (from 26 to 36% of the respondents). However this growth cannot be deemed essential against the background of other indices, although it reflects an actual threat of Ukraine's joining the " gray zone" or " zone of indifference" in international relations.
At the same time, 51% of the participants of the 1998 poll think that the Kuchma Administration's orientation toward developing cooperation with NATO undermines the stability of relations with Russia (40% in 1997). The fact that only one half of the population regards Ukraine-NATO and Ukraine-Russia relations as a " nil outcome game" (i. e. every gain in relations with NATO means a loss in relations with the RF), must be recognized as a very high index. Certainly, it cannot be the ground for the conclusion that those having no clear standpoint in this regard - 34% (50% in 1997) — are adherents of " cooperative security" or regard Ukraine-NATO and the RF-NATO relations as parallel processes. However, the 15% of the respondents who considered that coming closer to NATO does not threaten relations with Russia (10% in 1997) can be regarded as the potential of a spread of this very approach.
The divergences between the standpoint of the elite in power and that of the population have been registered first of all in the attitude to the issue of Ukraine's having military-political allies. During January, 1997 - June, 1998 the experts regarded Poland, the USA, NATO and the Baltic states as potential candidates for this role, with Russia occupying 7th. place. In the public consciousness Russia, joined in 1998 by Belarus', is the sole and undisputed leader among the countries mentioned by the experts and only the USA, from the point of view of the public, was worthy of attention (third place after Belarus' and with a rating four times lower than that of Russia). However the problem loses its indisputable character when one takes into account the population's estimation of the assistance to Ukraine from other states. Among those having most contributed to the development of Ukraine during the years of independence, the leaders were mentioned by those polled in the following order (April, 1998): 1) Germany - 29. 8%; 2) the USA - 29. 1%; 3) Canada - 16. 8%; 4) Russia - 14. 9%; 5) the European Union - 13. 8%. An overtly negative attitude to this assistance is peculiar to 21% of the population (they consider that Ukraine did not benefit from the assistance).
The attitude to Ukraine's participation in the PfP Program has not changed. About one half of the population failed to estimate this process, which was loudly criticized by left-wing politicians in connection with the joint exercises. As before, 33% of the respondents considered that participation in the PfP Program strengthens Ukraine's security and the readiness of the Armed Forces, while only 4-5% declared that it weakens Ukraine' security.
A particular group of issues consists of the problems connected with NATO's eastward enlargement. As is evident, in the very period between the two polls the character of these problems essentially altered: they proceeded from the level of discussions, and later — of political decisions, to the level of practice. This affected the level of concern about these issues: in 1997 the number of those indifferent constituted 14-15%, while in 1998 it fell to 7-8%. We can speak of a growth of the population concerned about this development. In 1997 the number of those considering that NATO's eastward enlargement promoted European security and the number of those considering that it conflicted with the interests of Europe were equal (18% each). The situation of Ukraine in this regard was generally estimated as positive (20% positive versus 17% negative). In the spring of 1998 the accents altered. Today 25% of the respondents estimate the results of enlargement for European security to be negative, while 20% consider them positive. Appropriate changes also took place in regard to the estimation of the enlargement affecting Ukraine's condition: 25% consider that Ukraine's security will suffer, while 17% think vice versa. The support of Russia's resistance to enlargement has also grown. In 1998 it constitutes 36%, while at the beginning of 1997 it did not exceed 24%. At the same time, the population's standpoint as for accession to NATO by Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary became more expressive. At the beginning of 1997 14% of the polled spoke in favor of this step, 10% against, while in the spring of 1998 the figures were 22% versus 20% respectively. However we should note that the estimation of the outcome of such processes as NATO's enlargement is a very difficult task for ordinary citizens, therefore 30-40% of the respondents failed to express their own attitude to enlargement.
The conclusion from the above information may be formulated as follows: in Ukraine, there is a group of people of anti-NATO, or in a wider context - of anti-Western views, but this group in no way constitutes the majority of the population, and there are no trends towards its growth. Politicians who would strive to play the anti-NATO card are deprived of any prospects. Although NATO remains an organization which is rather mysterious for a considerable share of population, this does not result in hostile views, which would remain as a legacy of Soviet times.
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